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SUMMARY 
The Japanese banking system provides a distinctive platform for the examination of 
the long-lasting effect of problem loans on bank performance. Japan is also known for an 
extended quantitative easing programme of unprecedented scale. Yet the links between 
risk-taking activities, quantitative easing, and bank competition are largely unexplored. 
This thesis employs a unique database, which allows us to distinguish between bankrupt 
and restructured loans. The aim of the thesis is to investigate the impact of these loans on 
Japanese bank efficiency and productivity growth, as well as their relationship with bank 
competition and quantitative easing policy.  
We measure technical efficiency by modifying a translog enhanced hyperbolic 
distance function with two undesirable outputs, identified as problem loans and problem 
other earning assets. Further analyses reveal that bankrupt loans affect efficiency in a 
manner related to the “moral hazard, skimping” hypothesis, with the causality originating 
from bankrupt loans. In contrast, the relationship between restructured loans and 
efficiency supports the “bad luck” hypothesis. We also follow the parametric approach to 
quantify the impact of bankrupt and restructured loans on productivity growth of the 
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Japanese banking system. We further perform convergence cluster analysis to examine 
convergence in productivity growth between regions, where limited convergence is 
reported. Additionally, this thesis employs, for the first time, the bank-level Boone 
indicator to measure bank competition in Japan to examine the underlying linkages 
between quantitative easing, competition, and risk. Given the scale of problem loans, we 
measure bank risk-taking based on bankrupt and restructured loans. Our analyses show 
that enhancing quantitative easing and competition would reduce bankrupt and 
restructured loans, but it would negatively affect financial stability. In light of the ongoing 
negative interest rates and quantitative and qualitative easing policy to enhance economic 
growth in Japan, this thesis would provide insightful implications for policymakers and 
regulators.	
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Japan is one of the most important economies in Asia, serving as a unique research 
setting due to its regional significance, the economic shocks it has faced, and the policies 
set out to deal with those challenges. Among the outstanding economic features of Japan 
is its banking system, which had been struck by the asset bubble burst in the early 1990s 
before being restructured through a variety of central banking policies and government 
interventions. There are a number of distinctive reasons why the Japanese banking sector 
is an interesting research platform for academics and policymakers. Briefly, they are the 
protracted nonperforming loan problem, the controversial government responses, and the 
aggressive quantitative easing policy. 
It is worth mentioning an overview of Japan’s macroeconomic conditions and 
performance pre-crisis so that the overall economic developments of the country can be 
linked with the issues in subsequent discussions. In the late 1980s, Japan was 
characterised as a country with high economic growth, low risk premium, and nearly zero 
inflation (Yamaguchi, 1999). The real GNP per adult growth was at a rate much higher 
than the 2% benchmark which was the long run growth rate of the United States (Hayashi 
and Prescott, 2002). During the whole decade of the 1980s, strong GDP growth was 
witnessed, starting from 2.82% in 1980 and ending at 5.37% in 1989. GDP growth at its 
peak was recorded at 7.15% in 1988. As a result of the then booming economy, asset 
prices increased and credit expansion was rapidly under way. Besides, the accelerated 
financial deregulation and liberalisation catalysed the expansion of bank lending. In some 
detail, relaxation of interest rate controls, capital market deregulation, lifting of 
restrictions on banking activities were the typical examples (Kanaya and Woo, 2000). 
Banks increased their consumer and real estate lending, which was the riskier loan 
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segment in their portfolios. As real estate prices were soaring at the time, the fact that 
banks’ lending decisions were mainly made on the basis of collateral led to lax credit 
standards. In 1989, the Japanese stock market witnessed a record high, contributing to 
significantly overvalued stocks. Typically, the eighties in Japan was characterised as a 
decade of inflating an asset bubble. When, eventually, the asset bubble burst in the early 
nineties, Japan’s GDP growth dropped significantly from 3.32% in 1991 to 0.82% in 
1992, followed by deflation in 1998 (-1.13%) and 1999 (-0.25%). The slowdown of 
economic growth subsequent to 1991 and the plummet of stock and asset prices marked 
the start of the so-called Japanese lost decade and the banking crisis. 
Nonperforming loans were a central issue shattering financial stability post the 
Japanese banking crisis. The unprecedented amount of nonperforming loans endangered 
the banking system, forcing banks and financial firms to declare bankruptcy. In the 
aftermath of the land and asset price bubble, problem loans rose dramatically since a vast 
number of firms went bankrupt or experienced business difficulties. A number of high 
profile banks had to file for bankruptcy because the majority of collaterals were real 
estate, or they held stocks and land directly (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013). The first 
financial institutions that got into troubles and triggered the banking crisis were the jusen1, 
which were eventually liquidated in 1996 (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). The first listed 
failed bank in 1995 was Hyogo Bank. The Deposit Insurance Corporation at times was 
allowed to insure up to 10 million JPY per depositor, which meant that by 1996 all 
deposits in Japan were under guarantee. Following jusen, Sanyo Securities declared 
bankruptcy in early November 1997, which led to the first interbank loan default and the 
soar of the relative borrowing rate for Japanese banks. The first major bank failure post-
																																																						
1	The jusen financial institutions were housing loans companies in 1970s and involved in high risk real 
estate lending in 1980s (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). 
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war in Japan, Hokkaido Tokushoku, took place two weeks after that. Afterwards, regional 
bank Tokuyo City Bank collapsed in 1997, and two major banks (the Long-Term Credit 
Bank of Japan, and the Nippon Credit Bank) were nationalised in 1998. It is worth noting 
that the cost of bankrupt and restructured loans in 1997 was 30 trillion JPY (Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2000). However, the actual value could be in excess of 100 trillion JPY 
(Hoshino, 2002). The level of bad loans fell after March 2002, reflecting the effort of 
banks to reduce problem loans under the reform program by Heizo Takenaka (the 
Minister in charge of the Financial Services Agency). Along the line, nonperforming 
loans gradually declined. However, from the governance perspective, the weak corporate 
governance stemming from the system of “relationship banking” was also among the 
causes for the prolonged distress of the banking sector (Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2003; 
Kanaya and Woo, 2000). Japan’s financial system is bank-centered (i.e. horizontal 
keiretsu or main bank system), characterised by cross-shareholdings and the 
monopolisation of information from the banks. Banks are able to exploit information from 
borrower firms and conceal firms’ management information from their rivals. As a 
consequence, third parties may find it difficult to evaluate firms’ creditworthiness. Main 
banks were supposed to identify troubled borrowers and rectify the problems that their 
borrowers had been facing, thus reducing the likelihood of insolvency. However, when 
the main banks themselves were in distress, allowing borrowers to default would have an 
adverse effect on their reputation. The fact that main banks are required to cover some of 
the losses that the firms in question would cause to other creditors would add extra costs 
to their operations. Therefore, instead of disposing nonperforming loans, they were prone 
to forbearance (	Kanaya and Woo, 2000). 
In addition, government intervention as a whole was not without controversies. 
Indecisive government responses worsened the then chaotic situation. Instead of acting 
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promptly to stabilise the financial turmoil, initially, the government denied to admit the 
nonperforming loan problem, unnecessarily prolonging the disruption period. Before 
2002, although the government had enacted the rescue schemes by injecting capital and 
bailing out troubled banks, it was blamed to delay the much needed restructuring period 
(Caballero et al., 2008). In detail, before 1997, the then Ministry of Finance refused to 
use public fund to assist banks as they considered it unnecessary. In February 1999, the 
Vice Minister of International Finance said the banking crisis “would be over within a 
matter of weeks”. In addition, their attempts to rescue insolvent banks also faced criticism 
for legislation changes regarding zombie lending (i.e. loan financing to unprofitable 
borrowers) and restructuring bad loans of Small and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Under the basis of this policy, the then government required banks to carry on funding to 
SMEs to assist them in regaining their financial health. As indicated in Kanaya and	Woo 
(2000), the Japanese unnecessarily lengthy financial distress was characterised by 
regulatory weakness and forbearance. After 1998, the government encouraged banks, 
especially those received financial aid through public capital, to increase their lending to 
SMEs in order to ease the “credit crunch” (Hoshi, 2011; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). 
However, the fact that the government subsidised these unprofitable borrowers inhibited 
the entry and investment of productive firms, leading to fewer good lending opportunities 
for solvent banks (Caballero et al., 2008). Thus, during the 1999-2003 period, the core of 
problem loans shifted from real estate lending to SME financing. Hoshi (2011) 
emphasises the hidden risks in the SME sector because the Japan’s Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) acted in favour of these enterprises. Among the changes of the regulatory 
framework, the adjustment of nonperforming loans’ definition redeemed some credits for 
bad loans of SMEs. More than 40% the amount of nonperforming loans held by Regional 
Banks between September 2008 and March 2009 were reclassified as normal. Although 
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in 2007, Japanese banks’ capital was claimed to be restored (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010), 
in the basis of the Act of Temporary Measures to Facilitate Financing for SMEs, Hoshi 
(2011) argues that a large amount of nonperforming loans are in disguise until the end of 
March 2012.  
Third, Japan’s poor macroeconomic performance in the sense of sluggish growth and 
long-term deflation has influenced the latent risk within financial institutions. As 
indicated in International Monetary Fund (2003), protracted economic slowdown 
hindered bank profitability and magnified the nonperforming loan problem. Meanwhile, 
the continued deflationary environment exacerbated the bad loan issue by increasing the 
likelihood of corporate bankruptcy, raising the real value of debts, and deteriorating 
collateral values. An additional effect of deflation, the “debt deflation” process, whereby 
the real value of nominal debt obligations increases because of the fall in prices, can 
reduce borrowers’ net worth (Bernanke and James, 1991). This in turn could aggravate 
potential principal-agent problems in the borrower-lender relationship and could lead to 
a full-scale banking crisis. This proved to be the case in Japan. As a result, the then 
distressed Japanese banking system was systematically weakened by risks related to 
problem loans. Monetary expansion, quantitative easing in particular, was the underlying 
policy exercised as the solution for the Japanese sluggish growth performance and 
deflationary puzzle. 
Being the pioneer in enacting quantitative easing policy, Japan provides the unique 
case to assess its impact on the banking system, especially in terms of its relationship with 
risk. Japan had a long history of virtually zero interest rates in the 1990s. In March 2001, 
the Bank of Japan initiated quantitative easing policy to stimulate aggregate demand and 
boost the country’s productivity. Ending in March 2006, although deflation was not fully 
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pushed away, there was evidence for the effectiveness of quantitative easing in 
stimulating demand (Bowman et al., 2015). The policy was reactivated in October 2010 
due to concerns regarding the spill over effect of economic downturn in other countries. 
This time the Bank of Japan has been strongly committed to fighting against deflation. 
Tremendous amounts of asset purchases were set out in addition to extending the types 
of financial assets eligible for purchase. Given the extensive quantitative easing program, 
we could not rule out its potential impact on bank performance, competition, and risk. 
This thesis aims to highlight the aforementioned reasons in relation to the prevailing 
research topics in the banking literature, namely bank competition, efficiency, 
productivity, and quantitative easing policy. Bank performance is a well-established 
research field which seeks to compute efficiency scores and productivity growth, as well 
as identify the impact of determinants. It is of importance as information on efficiency 
scores and productivity growth can be used for comparison purposes, e.g. between banks 
or between different measures of performance such as accounting ratios (Return on Assets 
ROA and Return on Equity ROE). Furthermore, performance rankings can be revealed, 
thus allowing bank managers and policymakers to pinpoint the best and worst performers. 
Based on efficiency studies, areas of input overuse or output underproduction can be 
detected so that managers can adjust banking operations accordingly (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). For regulators and supervisors, they are provided with useful 
information to assess the impact of government policies. Productivity growth is also of 
interest to managers to determine the driving forces of growth. The methods employed in 
bank performance studies also vary. Among the nonparametric techniques, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most popular method. Numerous bank efficiency and 
productivity studies are DEA applications, for example Berg et al. (1992), Miller and 
Noulas (1996), Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1997), Alam (2001), Drake and Hall (2003), 
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Sturm and Williams (2004), Pasiouras (2008),  Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), Kao and 
Liu (2014). Stochastic Frontier Approach is the widely-used parametric method. While 
nonparametric techniques are assumption-free about the distribution of inefficiency and 
random error, and relax the specification form of the underlying production relationship, 
parametric techniques require explicit assumptions (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The 
distribution of inefficiency can follow a normal, half-normal, or truncated distributions. 
As no random error exists in DEA, Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that efficiency 
measurement could be problematic if there are measurement errors in constructing the 
frontier, or luck that may bring better performance, or inaccuracy created by accounting 
rules. Berger and Mester (1997), Berger and DeYoung (1997), Bonin et al. (2005), Fries 
and Taci (2005), Lensink et al. (2008), Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009), 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011), and Glass et al. (2014) are among studies that apply parametric 
methods to estimate bank efficiency. For bank productivity growth, typical studies 
include Kumbhakar et al. (2001), Orea (2002), Berger and Mester (2003), Boucinha et al. 
(2013), Casu et al. (2013), and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2014) among others. It is 
worth emphasising that in the Japanese bank performance literature, parametric studies 
are rather limited (Altunbas et al., 2000; Assaf et al., 2011; Barros et al., 2009; Fukuyama 
et al., 1999; Glass et al., 2014; Uchida and Satake, 2009).  
Alongside performance, bank competition is another interesting research topic. 
Banks are the central nodes in the economy, channelling funds from surplus areas to 
deficit sectors. Anticompetitive behaviour may result in additional costs for households 
and firms in their banking business, in turn affecting productive efficiency, economic 
welfare, and economic growth (Shaffer, 2004). Banking studies have examined in depth 
market structure (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Demsetz, 1973; Lloyd-Williams et al., 
1994; Molyneux et al., 1994), as well as the impact of competition on bank performance 
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(Fu et al., 2014; Homma et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2012). With regard to the banking system 
per se, whether competition is good or bad remains a debatable issue (Berger et al., 2009; 
Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Liu and Wilson, 2013; Schaeck and Cihák, 
2008; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). In this thesis, the role of bank competition is assessed in 
its impact on bank risk and efficiency. As competition can stimulate banks to minimise 
costs and maximise outputs (Andrieş and Căpraru, 2014; Schaeck and Cihák, 2008), it is 
among the determinants of efficiency. In a similar vein, competition may reduce bank 
risk through the efficiency channel. Yet, it could put bank stability at risk, e.g. through 
improper credit screening in the loan issuance process (Allen and Gale, 2004). The degree 
of bank competition in its relationship with bank risk would assist bank managers in 
assessing their risk management practices given the current competitive stance. 
Policymakers could also derive information to evaluate government interference as well 
as anti-competitive behaviours.  
Quantitative easing, as aforementioned, is an important monetary policy in Japan. Its 
implications are also of interest to other countries, especially the US, UK, and European 
economies. Following Japan, the central banks of these countries have implemented 
quantitative easing, which is also known as an unconventional monetary policy tool. Its 
impacts on aggregate demand, supply of credit, and economic growth through interest 
rates, government bond yields, and credit default swap have enlightened the substantial 
role of quantitative easing among macroeconomic policies (Bowman et al., 2015; Glick 
and Leduc, 2012; Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2013). The international transmission effect 
of unconventional monetary policy triggered by advanced economies such as the US, UK, 
Germany, and Japan could channel some contagion influences to other economies, for 
example, in terms of variations in bond yields, exchange rates, or stock price indices 
(Bauer and Neely, 2014; Bredin et al., 2010; León and Sebestyén, 2012). At the 
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microeconomic level, what effects that quantitative easing has imposed on the Japanese 
banking system would also have significant policy implications to other countries. Hence, 
this thesis aims to investigate these impacts at the bank-level. 
More importantly, in this thesis, the abovementioned research topics are studied with 
a particular focus on their relationship with risk which is characterised by problem loans. 
Lengthy disruptions for over a decade caused by problem loans warrant the need to 
examine their detrimental effect on the stability of the banking industry. The body of the 
thesis consists of three main chapters, beside chapter two which overviews the Japanese 
banking structure. We focus on commercial banks rather than the whole banking sector 
due to data unavailability and differences in business features. Chapter three addresses 
the question of how bankrupt loans and restructured loans affect bank efficiency. As 
research activities for this chapter were carried out first, the time span of our data ranges 
from financial years 2000 to 2012. For the remaining chapters, the data are updated until 
March 2015, which represents the ending financial year of 2014. Chapter four measures 
bank productivity, taking into account the impact of problem loans and further 
investigating the integration process in terms of productivity growth. Chapter five 
examines the interplay between quantitative easing, risk, and competition. Although each 
chapter has its own contributions to the literature, in general we can summarise the overall 
contributions of the thesis in the following ways. First, we apply the parametric approach 
to estimate bank efficiency and productivity, enriching this literature in Japanese banking, 
which has been dominated by studies using non-parametric approaches. Second, we 
employ data on bankrupt loans and restructured loans as proxies for risk. Data on these 
loans are reported under the Banking Law and have not been used in the literature. Third, 
we estimate bank-level Boone indicator of competition. This indicator is superior 
compared to other competition measures and mostly calculated at the industry level in 
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banking studies. Fourth, we take into account the impact of quantitative easing in our 
analyses, especially in its relationship with bank risk. Finally, our data are at semi-annual 
frequency from financial years 2000 to 2014. This provides us with a rich set of 
information, as well as covering the milestones in Japan economic history. In particular, 
they are the restructuring period, the global financial crisis, the two time frames of 
quantitative easing, and the Tohoku earthquake. The overview and contributions of each 
main chapter are detailed in the following paragraphs. 
Chapter three measures technical efficiency by modifying a translog enhanced 
hyperbolic distance function with two undesirable outputs, identified as problem loans 
and problem other earning assets. Unlike most studies on Japanese banking which 
consider problem loans as a control variable or a proxy for risk (Altunbas et al., 2000; 
Drake and Hall, 2003; Liu and Tone, 2008), we follow a new strand of the literature by 
treating problem loans as an undesirable output in bank efficiency measurement (Barros 
et al., 2012; Fukuyama and Weber, 2008; Glass et al., 2014). We apply the parametric 
approach introduced by Cuesta et al. (2009). This methodology allows for a simultaneous 
expansion of desirable outputs and contraction of inputs and undesirable outputs. The 
model is adjusted for a vector of two undesirable outputs, namely problem loans and 
problem other earning assets. We use the term “problem loans” instead of nonperforming 
loans to be consistent with the classification of problem assets under the Financial 
Reconstruction Law. It is necessary to include problem other earning assets as a second 
undesirable output. Similar to problem loans being by-products of loans, problem other 
earning assets are by-products of other earning assets. Beside conventional activities, 
Japanese commercial banks also invest in government bonds, corporate bonds and 
securities, as well as offer non-traditional banking services such as guarantees and 
acceptances. They are an output component of banking operations. Thus, accounting for 
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problem other earning assets would control for the effect of these problem assets on bank 
efficiency. Such an analysis has not yet been conducted because of the limitation of 
previous models and data unavailability. The next stage of our analysis investigates the 
impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on bank efficiency. Our unique database 
allows us to distinguish between bankrupt and restructured loans to investigate the 
underlying associations between these loans and efficiency. These types of loans are 
disaggregated from our data of risk-monitored loans of Japanese commercial banks and 
have not been used in the literature regarding Japanese bank performance. These loans 
measure the level of risk held within Japanese banks. The variation of these loans can be 
due to management issues and exogenous shocks. Given endogeneity concerns, we 
further examine the underlying dynamic relationship between bankrupt loans/restructured 
loans, bank specific and macroeconomic variables, and technical efficiency within a panel 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. This method enables causality hypothesis testing 
between bankrupt/restructured loans and efficiency. Following Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009), we address four renowned 
hypotheses: “bad luck”, “bad management”, “skimping/moral hazard”, and “risk-averse 
management”.  
Chapter four examines for the first time the impact of problem loans, categorised as 
bankrupt and restructured loans, on productivity growth. Our parametric methodology 
quantifies the impact of these loans on productivity growth of the Japanese banking 
system. We decompose bank productivity growth into different components, namely the 
effects of problem loans, quasi-fixed input, returns to scale, and technological change. 
Given the extensive volume of bankrupt and restructured loans in Japan, we expect that 
they have an impact on bank productivity. In this chapter, we also consider bankrupt and 
restructured loans as undesirable outputs. These overdue loans in turn would raise bank’s 
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operating costs in the short-run. Hence, one would expect these loans to deteriorate bank 
productivity. Beside bankrupt and restructured loans, we also employ equity as a quasi-
fixed input (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Hughes et al., 2001; Ray and Das, 2010). 
Unequivocally, equity plays a significant role in banking production as a buffer against 
risks (Boucinha et al., 2013). Equity is the shock absorber for unexpected operating 
losses, preventing banks from temporary illiquidity and insolvency (Diamond and Rajan, 
2000). Beside embracing the risks incurred, the level of equity should also facilitate future 
growth of the bank’s assets (Boucinha et al., 2013). In the banking literature, treating 
equity as a quasi-fixed input has been a typical practice (Berger and Mester, 1997; Hughes 
and Mester, 1993; Hughes et al., 2001; Ray and Das, 2010; Weber and Devaney, 2002). 
In the short-term, altering a significant level of equity would be impossible (Lozano-
Vivas and Pasiouras, 2014). In other words, banks benefit from equity but do not need to 
pay for it in the short-run. Equity would also serve as a cost-reducing factor due to less 
interest paid for debt financing (Hughes and Mester, 2013). Beside these benefits of 
equity, neglecting the impact of equity in the Japanese banking system would result in 
biased estimators. The reason is that during the banking crisis in the late 1990s – early 
2000s, the shortage of equity jeopardised Japanese banks’ stability, leading to the need of 
recapitalisation from the government (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Montgomery and 
Shimizutani, 2009). Further, we perform convergence cluster analysis to examine the 
presence of convergence between and within regions and over time. We employ the club 
convergence test developed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to test for convergence in total 
factor productivity growth and its components. This method is flexible as it can detect 
convergence in sub-groups, even though convergence is rejected at the whole sample. 
Chapter five studies the interplay between quantitative easing, risk, and competition. 
Along with the initiation of quantitative easing policy in March 2001, Japan is also known 
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for an extended quantitative easing program of unprecedented scale since October 2010. 
Yet the links between risk-taking activities, quantitative easing and bank competition are 
largely unexplored. This chapter employs, for the first time, the Boone indicator to 
measure bank competition in Japan to examine these underlying linkages. This 
competition proxy is valid under different situations that could lead to more intense 
competition in the market. For instance, an increase in the number of market participants, 
a lift in entry barriers, a decrease in costs for other incumbents, or more aggressive 
interactions between firms can result in heightened competition. Other competition 
proxies, both structural and non-structural ones, have limitations (Beck, 2008). Taking 
concentration ratio as an example, it rises following a decrease in the number of firms. 
Higher concentration ratio is interpreted as less competition. However, this interpretation 
could be misleading if firms are forced to exit the market because of higher competition. 
We further add to the literature by providing bank-level Boone indicators, as existing 
studies usually compute either industry/country-level scores, or time-varying ones at 
most. Given the scale of nonperforming loans, we explicitly measure bank risk-taking 
based on our new data set of bankrupt and restructured loans. We apply the dynamic panel 
threshold and panel Vector Autoregression analyses to identify the threshold values for 
our variables of interest and tackle endogeneity concerns. Following the literature, we test 
the competition-stability (Schaeck and Cihák, 2008; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003), 
competition-fragility (Fu et al., 2014; Liu and Wilson, 2013), and quantitative easing-risk 
(Buch et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014) hypotheses. Given the 
recent adoption of negative rates in January 2016 by the Bank of Japan, our study provides 
new insights, as clearly there is a trade-off between quantitative easing and financial 
stability beyond a certain threshold. Therefore, caution regarding further scaling up 
quantitative easing is warranted.  
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The remaining chapter of the thesis, chapter six, summarises the findings of the 
thesis. Policy implications, limitations, and directions for further research are also 
included in the conclusion.	
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Chapter 2. Overview of the Japanese Banking System. 
2.1. The horizontal keiretsu network 
The Japanese banking sector is special in the long-term relationship between 
manufacturing firms and financial institutions under the so-called horizontal keiretsu 
network. This strong tie arose on the dissolution of zaibatsu, which stands for a large, 
diversified, family-centered conglomerate prior to the war. These corporations held more 
than a quarter of the economy’s capital assets and much larger shares in heavy, modern 
industries (Hadley, 1970). Horizontal keiretsu indicates a business connection between 
various industries through a common main bank which holds a certain amount of equity 
of network firms. After the redistribution of shareholdings from individuals to 
corporations in the fifties, descendants of the big three former zaibatsu, namely 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo, constituted one type of the horizontal groups. The 
other type was bank-centered by Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo banks. Being the 
“big-six” horizontal groups post-war, these keiretsu groups benefited from stable funding 
thanks to the lending ties established between diversified member firms and the central 
financial institution (McGuire and Dow, 2009). The certainty in access to available funds 
is built on close relationships with banks and other debt providers, whereas equity 
financing is ready from reciprocal shareholdings. On the other hand, the fact that lending 
ties reinforced by interlocking board membership and equity holdings are coupled with 
personnel exchanges reduces market pressures for member firms in the sense of short-
term performance (McGuire and Dow, 2009; Yafeh, 2000). Being in a horizontal keiretsu 
network, member firms are protected from being controlled by external shareholders. 
Schaede (2006) argues that these groups act as an insurance against foreign hostile 
takeover and volatility in the stock market as the reciprocal equity would not be sold. 
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However, these benefits could also be regarded as costs which we will revisit at a later 
point.  
With regard to the aforementioned personnel exchange and reciprocal monitoring, 
horizontal keiretsu affiliations bring a risk-lowering advantage and mutual assistance 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). Additionally, information asymmetry among horizontal 
connected participants is lessened as mutual shareholdings create the incentives for the 
president’s councils to effectively manage member firms’ activities, as well as to assist 
each other in achieving profit goals or encountering operating challenges. One favourable 
consequence from this characteristic is the reduction in transaction and agency costs 
associated with trading, managing, and obtaining information (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 
2002; Lincoln et al., 1996). As a result, affiliation profitability could be improved or less 
exposed to exogenous shocks (Wang et al., 2005). Particularly, weak or distressed firms 
attain greater benefits from being within the network. Beside financial assistance from 
the main banks, they are protected from bankruptcy at the expense of the well-performing 
counterparts. This, however, could become a severe burden for the rescue team in the 
short-term (Lincoln et al., 1996).  
The costs of horizontal keiretsu could turn the appealing features of theses enterprise 
conglomerates into a dilemma for affiliated firms and a threat of uncertainty for the 
economy. The list and references of the disadvantages that financial keiretsu may embrace 
are comprehensively discussed in Lincoln et al. (1996), Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), 
McGuire and Dow (2009), and Brouthers et al. (2014). With regard to the central firm, 
overwhelming responsibility could make its monitoring of the network and its own 
operation inefficient. Main banks have come under heavy criticism for their financing to 
unprofitable firms, although, apparently as the crucial linkage of the network, they are 
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entitled to assist and rescue troubled firms. These firms, in fact, have paid for this 
protection when joining the affiliation as mentioned in the keiretsu main purpose of 
insurance above. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the cost of capital between 
member firms and independent firms, it appears that the protection from the network 
could be a burdensome expense for the former. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that if 
easy access to ready loans from the main banks serves as a great comparative advantage 
for client firms, their performance should be superior. Yet, research has come to show the 
opposite (Lincoln et al., 1996; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998). Explanations could rest on 
the borrowing encouragement of the main bank, which considers its creditor role more 
important than the ownership stake, consequently aiming for less risky tactics and asset 
protection (Suto and Toshino, 2005). Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) also regard this debate 
as one of the two main reasons for the lower profitability of firms relying on main bank 
financing compared against non-affiliated firms. The other cause lies on the bank’s ability 
to extract rents from client firms in exchange for its financial services. Thus, main banks’ 
clients could eventually incur relatively high interest expenses under the exertion of their 
main banks’ monopoly power. 
If information transparency appears as one of the great benefits internally, heightened 
information asymmetry between affiliated incumbents and outsiders could hinder keiretsu 
members from obtaining external investments (McGuire and Dow, 2009). This issue in 
turn also augments the monopoly power of main banks previously discussed. Another 
cost of affiliation is attributed to the joint monitoring and assistance that the group 
provides, resulting in intervention, bailout, and turnaround which affect the destiny of 
troubled affiliates (Lincoln et al., 1996). To reverse the adverse conditions pressuring 
problematic firms, the conglomerate may set favourable terms to support the purchase of 
their products. In addition, existing debts are rolled over, new loans are issued, and 
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directors of the spearheaded bank and principal trading partners are dispatched to the 
target firms. Nonetheless, how effective are these interventions? The costs to the group, 
in particular the main bank and highly performing firms, could seriously impede their 
growth in the short run. Besides, overall performance of the group can be worse if all the 
hard work does not pay back in the long term. In fact, what came into light after the 
financial crisis in the late 1990s reveals the harm of continuous financing for unprofitable 
firms. Caballero et al. (2008) call this phenomenon zombie lending which is found to 
distort competition, lower industry productivity and deprive healthy firms’ profits. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) also report that financially healthy firms suffer impaired 
profit in concentrated ownership structure, while weaker peers seem to absorb the benefits 
of inter-organisational framework.  
2.2. The Japanese banking structure 
Private Japanese financial institutions are classified into two main categories: 
depository institutions (commercial banks and cooperative banks) and other financial 
institutions (insurance companies and securities firms). City Banks, Regional Banks I, 
and Regional Banks II constitute half the number of commercial banks in the former 
classification. The other half consists of Trust Banks, Foreign Banks, Bank holding 
companies, and others. City Banks operate across the nation while Regional Banks are 
geographical restricted. However, Regional Banks compete among each other, although 
less aggressively compared to how City Banks do, especially before the banking crisis 
(Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005). Harimaya (2008) suggest that Regional Banks engage in non-
traditional banking activities because of increased competition, while findings from Kano 
and Tsutsui (2003) imply that Regional Banks compete within prefectures. There is no 
legal distinction between City Banks, Regional Banks I, and Regional Banks II. As stated 
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in the Japanese Banker Association’s website, these banks are classified into the three 
types for the purpose of administration and statistics. They do differ in terms of size and 
business functions, which are described in the following sub-sections. Figure 1 illustrates 
the overview of the Japanese banking structure.  
  
	 
	
20 
Central bank 
Bank of Japan 
Private financial 
institutions 
Public financial 
institutions 
Banks 
Cooperative-
type financial 
institutions 
- Development 
Bank of Japan 
- Japan Bank for 
International 
Cooperation 
- Japan Post Bank 
	
City Banks 
- large, nation-wide, 
- headquarters in major cities, 
- branches across the country. 
  
Regional Banks 
I 
- small,  
- in major cities of prefectures, 
- strong ties with local enterprises 
and government. 
  
Regional Banks 
II 
- similar to Regional Banks I but smaller, 
- serving smaller companies and 
individuals within their immediate 
geographic regions. 
Trust Banks 
- large, 
- offering trust services, long-term 
financing, fund management to large 
corporations. 
  
Foreign Banks 
Other Banks 
Bank Holding Companies 
Figure 1. The Japanese banking structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Japanese Bankers Association 
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2.2.1. City Banks 
As introduced in the previous section, members of City Banks were the main banks 
in the post-war horizontal keiretsu networks. The big-six horizontal keiretsu groups 
(Mitsui Nimoku-kai, Mitsubishi Kinyokai, Sumitomo Hakusui-kai, Fuyo Fuyo-kai, 
Sanwa group, and DKB Sankuin-kai) had City banks as the leaders that organised 
presidents’ council meetings and backed up member firms’ business through funding and 
board connections. Those main banks constituted the core of the corporate groups, 
functioning as an “internal capital market” and servicing the insurance mechanism 
between corporate businesses (Nakatani, 1983). In exceptional circumstances, 
management personnel assistance and financial aid from main banks to their customers 
going through business difficulties were significantly recognised, revealed by the 
increased proportion of lending to these specific companies (Horiuchi et al., 1988). Under 
their power, the large six banks used to bailout their affiliated firms by rescuing their 
members from the event of bankruptcy or intervening to mitigate circumstances that 
might destroy the member firms’ reputation. The cases of Sumitomo Bank and Mazda 
Motors, Mitsui Bank and Mitsukoshi department stores are representative evidence. 
Towards the late 1990s, bank consolidation tendency diminished the number of main 
banks. The remaining City Banks at present are still among the largest commercial banks 
in Japan, comprising of nationwide branching institutions. Their funding resources vary 
from the Bank of Japan to the deposit and short term financial market, as well as 
securities–type operations domestically and internationally (Drake and Hall, 2003).  
City Banks have been extensively studied in relation to the effectiveness of bank 
bailouts, the wave of mergers and acquisition, and the persistence of zombie lending 
(Caballero et al., 2008; Harada and Ito, 2011). For the two capital injection programs in 
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March 1998 and March 1999, nine City Banks were involved, namely Dai-ichi Kangyo, 
Fuji, Sakura, Sanwa, Sumitomo, Tokyo Mitsubishi, Asahi, Daiwa, and Tokai (Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2010) (see Appendix A). The famous deals regarding mergers are as follows: 
Mitsui Bank and Taiyo-Kobe Bank to form Sakura Bank; Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kanyo, and 
Industrial Bank of Japan to form Mizuho Bank; Sanwa and Tokai Banks to form UFJ 
Banks; UFJ Banks and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi; and Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank 
(Nakamura, 2006). It was expected that consolidation could strengthen bank financial 
health to withstand the critical situation at times. Nevertheless, mergers did not seem to 
improve bank performance, even in a decade later (Harada and Ito, 2011). Criticism also 
arose based on the misdirected lending of the government in encouraging banks to provide 
liquidity for troubled borrowers despite their insolvency (Caballero et al., 2008).  
2.2.2. Regional Banks 
Regional Banks (I and II) are smaller than City Banks. They are restrictedly operating 
in the principle cities of the prefectures where their head offices are situated. The loan 
markets of Regional Banks, however, are not segmented by prefecture. Kano and Tsutsui 
(2003) show that Regional Banks also operate in adjacent prefectures, revealed by similar 
loan interest rates across neighbouring prefectures. Over 50% of Regional Banks’ time 
deposits are from individuals, specialised from one year or more. They have strong 
commitment with the local development by financing SMEs’ activities. Local stock and 
money markets are also important sources for their investment portfolios. Regional Banks 
II are basically member banks of the Second Association of Regional Banks, which are 
categorised mainly for administration and statistical purposes, and smaller than the first 
category. Similar to Regional Banks I in business activities, Regional Banks II offer 
financial services for customers within their immediate geographical region.  
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Although their scope of business is rather limited compared to City Banks, the 
financial deregulation starting in 1993 has encouraged Regional Banks to expand their 
activities to nonconventional banking services. However, Harimaya (2008) argues that 
engaging in non-traditional activities, in particular Trust business, yields no cost benefit 
for Regional Banks. First, not all Trust activities were allowed. Only land trusts, 
charitable trusts, special donation trusts, and movable property trusts are authorised. 
Second, the ones approved are not very profitable to Regional Banks because of limited 
demand within the operating areas. 
Linked to Regional Banks is the problem of SME financing which is argued to be 
associated to political interests of local governments (Choe, 2007). As SMEs constitute a 
large part of employment creators, taxpayers and voters, their growth goes along with the 
development of the prefecture. Consequently, unavoidably, Regional Banks incur the 
political influences on financing SMEs. Discussed in Choe (2007), government supports 
vary from special loan programs, credit guarantee to credit insurance schemes. 
Subsequently, portfolio risk arises within Regional Banks, also as a result of insufficient 
regional diversification. Baba and Inada (2009) also highlight the incentives of Regional 
Banks in issuing subordinated debts, which in their view should be controlled for by 
appropriate disciplinary tools. Banks that encounter difficulties in maintaining capital 
requirement levels under Basel are more likely to issue subordinated debts. Nevertheless, 
during the disruption period 2000-2003, investors diverted their focus to nonperforming 
loan ratios to distinguish between good and bad banks. This screening behaviour, which 
acts as a market discipline, somehow hindered financially unhealthy banks from issuing 
subordinated debts. 
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2.2.3. Trust Banks and Cooperative Banks 
In contrast to conventional banks, Trust Banks are specialised long-term banking 
institutions, which combine financing services (offering deposits and savings account, 
and financing large Japanese corporations) with asset management services. Their 
funding sources are mainly from trusts (Drake and Hall, 2003), while their business 
operations spread over stock transfers, real-estate broking, securities underwriting, and 
securitisation. Differently, target clients of Cooperative Banks are households, local small 
and medium enterprises whose business operations are facilitated to improve the 
development of the local community. Each customer is allowed to borrow up to a specific 
amount of loan. Restrictions on membership are applied on the number of workers and 
the amount of capital. In addition, management practices must be approved in general 
representatives’ meetings (Barros et al., 2009). Cooperative banks are subject to the same 
regulatory rules imposed on commercial banks and the deposit protection scheme. 
However, as they operate in rural areas characterised by segmented loan markets, the lack 
of competition can result in unfavourably high loan interest rates (Kano and Tsutsui, 
2003). 
Based on data availability and for comparative purposes across commercial banks, 
we choose to include City Banks and Regional Banks in our study. Figure 2 illustrates the 
number of commercial banks over time, which indicates a downward trend in the numbers 
of City Banks and Regional Banks II as a result of the financial crisis and bank 
consolidation. The number of Regional Banks II varies mostly among the three 
categories, gradually decreasing from 56 at the end of financial year 2000 to 41 at the end 
of financial year 2014. Regional Banks I, overall, remain stable with 64 banks, except in 
2010. Although the number of City Banks over time does not seem to signify a significant 
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reduction, based on their systemic importance, the fall in their number from 9 in 2000 to 
5 in 2014 does indicate a remarkable change in the banking system.  
 
Figure 2. The number of Japanese commercial banks over time. 
 
Source: Japanese Bankers Association.  
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Appendix A. List of banks received capital injections. 
 
Bank name Type Amount injected 
in March 1998 
Amount injected 
in March 1999 
Dai-ichi Kangyo City Bank 99 900 
Fuji City Bank 100 1000 
Sakura City Bank 100 800 
Sanwa City Bank 100 700 
Sumitomo City Bank 100 501 
Tokyo Mitsubishi City Bank 100  
Asahi City Bank 100 500 
Daiwa City Bank 100 408 
Tokai City Bank 100 600 
    
Industrial Bank of Japan Long Term Credit Bank 100 600 
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan Long Term Credit Bank 177.6  
Nippon Credit Bank Long Term Credit Bank 60  
    
Mitsubishi Trust Trust Bank 50 300 
Sumitomo Trust Trust Bank 100 200 
Mitsui Trust Trust Bank 100 400 
Chuo Trust Trust Bank 60 150 
Toyo Trust Trust Bank 50 200 
    
Bank of Yokohama Regional Bank 20 200 
Hokuriku Bank Regional Bank 20  
Ashikaga Bank Regional Bank 30  
 
Source: Hoshi and Kashyap (2010). Unit: billion JPY. 
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Chapter 3. What is the Impact of Bankrupt and Restructured 
Loans on Japanese Bank Efficiency? 
3.1. Introduction 
An unprecedented escalation of nonperforming loans in the Japanese banking sector 
during the 1990s triggered a prolonged economic downturn. During the turmoil, the 
government undertook its stabilisation scheme by providing deposit insurance, injecting 
public capital, and bailing out troubled banks (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010; Montgomery 
and Shimizutani, 2009). The expensive bailouts and intervention policies helped banks to 
reduce the volume of nonperforming loans from 30 trillion JPY in 1997 to 11.6 trillion 
JPY in 2008. However, the Japanese government was criticised for its procrastination, in 
particular earlier in the banking crisis, as some considerable lags in response were 
recorded. Moreover, before 1997, banks had been struggling to deal with the surge of 
problem loans whilst indecisive government, back then, deteriorated a rather critical 
situation (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; Hoshi and Kashyap, 
2010). Overall, government intervention has been effective in pulling troubled banks out 
of the turmoil and relaxing the financial distress, yet it is factual that earlier indecisiveness 
prolonged the period of disruption, thereby hindering bank performance recovery. It 
becomes apparent that in effect the Japanese banking industry is unique worldwide and 
provides an interesting case to investigate the detrimental effect of problem loans on the 
stability of the industry.  
 Unlike most studies on Japanese banking which consider nonperforming loans as a 
control variable or a proxy for risk (Altunbas et al., 2000; Drake and Hall, 2003; Liu and 
Tone, 2008), this chapter follows a new strand of the literature by treating nonperforming 
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loans as an undesirable output in bank efficiency measurement (Barros et al., 2012; 
Fukuyama and Weber, 2008; Glass et al., 2014). We explore how nonperforming loans 
affect bank technical efficiency, as well as the causality of the relationship between risks 
(identified as bankrupt and restructured loans) and efficiency.  
This study is different from previous empirical research on bank efficiency in Japan 
in the following ways. First, we propose an innovative way of estimating bank efficiency 
by using a translog enhanced hyperbolic output distance function as introduced by Cuesta 
et al. (2009). The advantage of deploying this parametric approach is to allow for a 
simultaneous expansion of desirable outputs and contraction of inputs and undesirable 
outputs. Second, we modify the model with a vector of two undesirable outputs (problem 
loans and problem other earning assets2) using semi-annual data. In this chapter, we use 
the term “problem loans” instead of nonperforming loans to be consistent with the 
classification of problem assets under the Financial Reconstruction Law. We argue that 
while problem loans are by-products of loans, problem other earning assets are by-
products of other earning assets. Beside conventional banking operations, Japanese 
commercial banks also invest in government bonds, corporate bonds and securities, as 
well as offer non-traditional banking services such as guarantees and acceptances. Thus, 
the inclusion of problem other earning assets in the undesirable output vector would 
control for the effect of these problem assets on bank efficiency. Such an analysis has not 
yet been conducted because of the limitation of previous models and data unavailability. 
Third, our semi-annual data range covers a long time span from 2000 to 2012, embracing 
the restructuring period, the global financial crisis, as well as the aftermaths of the crisis. 
																																																						
2 The names and definitions are in accordance with the Financial Reconstruction Law. Problem loans are 
bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, doubtful, and substandard loans. Problem other earning assets are bankrupt, 
quasi-bankrupt and doubtful other earning assets (please see Data section and Appendix A for more details). 
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In addition, we investigate the impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on 
bank efficiency. No previous studies explored this particular issue. These types of loans 
are disaggregated from our data of risk-monitored loans of Japanese commercial banks3. 
Bankrupt loans are loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans by 6 months 
or more. Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans by 3 months but 
less than 6 months and restructured loans. We argue that bankrupt loans and restructured 
loans measure the level of risk held within Japanese banks. The increase of these loans 
could be attributed to both bank managers and exogenous shocks. Given endogeneity 
concerns, we further examine the underlying dynamic relationship between bankrupt 
loans/restructured loans, bank specific and macroeconomic variables, and technical 
efficiency within a panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. This method grants the 
opportunity to explore important causality hypotheses between bankrupt, restructured 
loans and efficiency. Following Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki 
and Mamatzakis (2009), we address four renowned hypotheses: “bad luck”, “bad 
management”, “skimping/moral hazard”, and “risk-averse management”. Our results 
show that the relationship between bankrupt loans and technical efficiency resembles the 
“moral hazard” and “skimping” hypothesis, with the causality running from bankrupt 
loans to efficiency. Restructured loans, on the other hand, affect technical efficiency in 
line with the “bad luck” hypothesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the restructuring process and problem loans in Japan. Section 3.3 summarises 
the literature on Japanese banking efficiency with an incorporation of problem loans. 
Methodology is presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes our data set and variable 
																																																						
3 See Data section and Appendix A for more details. 
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selection. Results are discussed in section 3.6. Finally, concluding remarks and policy 
implications are offered in section 3.7. 
3.2. The Japanese restructuring process and problem loans 
In this section, we briefly overview the main bottlenecks in the Japanese banking 
sector. In particular, we focus on the restructuring process and problem loans that in our 
view had a crucial impact on bank efficiency.  
 In response to the central issue of impaired loans which were a consequence of the 
outburst of asset price bubble, Japanese authorities instigated several restructuring 
packages to restore the financial health of the banking system. First, capital injection 
programs were implemented five times from March 1998 to March 2009. In 1998, under 
the Financial Revitalisation Plan, nearly two third of public fund injected was to fully 
protect depositors of insolvent banks and purchase their assets (Montgomery and 
Shimizutani, 2009). Second, in 2002, the Financial Services Agency forced banks to 
liquidate poorly performing companies’ shares. However, the Bank of Japan eventually 
had to buy those bank-held shares directly. Third, the government approved accounting 
changes which permitted banks to record either book or market values for their holdings 
of stocks in other firms and real estate holdings. This procedure raised the value of bank 
assets at that time when market values were reported, even though those market prices 
were far below their highest records. Nevertheless, in 2001, the government required 
those values to be switched back to their book ones (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). 
Apart from the abovementioned schemes, the wave of bank consolidation evolved 
among large banks to strengthen their resistance to financial severity. Mergers between 
City Banks (Mitsui Bank and Taiyo-Kobe Bank to form Sakura; Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kanyo, 
and Industrial Bank of Japan to form Mizuho Bank; Sanwa and Tokai Banks to form UFJ 
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Banks; UFJ Banks and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi; Sumitomo and Sakura (Nakamura, 
2006)) led a strong incentive for weaker banks to be consolidated. Yet, the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions in the Japanese banking industry appeared unsuccessful in 
stabilising the financial market and reducing the probability of failure (Harada and Ito, 
2011; Hosono et al., 2006).  
Nonetheless, the government has been criticised for their lending facilitation policies. 
The (misdirected) lending to unprofitable firms (“zombie lending”) was blamed to 
encumber the effort to diminish problem loans. The fact that Main banks (City Banks) 
rescued poorly performing firms at the expense of their well performing counterparts 
(Lincoln et al., 1996) led to an emergence of “zombie lending”. Banks could also have 
the perverse incentive not to write off bad debts to avoid the loss of capital, which could 
result in a failure to comply with Basel I capital adequacy standards (Watanabe, 2010). 
Thus, the financing to these “zombies” borrowers weakened the restructuring process in 
Japan and deterred healthy firms and banks from recovering. On the other hand, after 
1998, the Japanese government promoted lending to small and medium sized enterprises, 
hoping to mitigate the turbulent situation and resurrect the economy. This policy 
particularly called for banks rescued by public capital, even the weakest financial 
institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Hence, the core of problem loans shifted from 
real estate lending to small and medium enterprise financing. The fact that problem loans 
to assets ratios in Regional Banks I and II are somewhat higher than in City Banks over 
time (see Figure 1) provides further support for this argument as SMEs are Regional 
Banks’ target customers. Regional Banks, by channelling credit to SMEs, are supposed 
to support the local development of their prefectures where their head offices are situated. 
In addition, credit risk for those banks is a non-trivial concern despite the crisis-related 
interventions, which may underestimate the true magnitude of SMEs’ problem loans 
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(Hoshi, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 2012). These developments led to changes 
in the regulatory framework so as to adjust problem loans’ definition in an attempt to 
redeem some credits for bad loans of SMEs. Along these lines, more than 50% the amount 
of problem loans held by Regional Banks between September 2008 and March 2009 were 
reclassified as normal (Hoshi, 2011). It is argued that a large number of bad debts were 
in disguise until the end of March 2012. About 3% to 6% of total credit in Regional Banks 
was reclassified under the SME Financing Facilitation Act, compared to 1.7% for City 
Banks and Trust Banks (International Monetary Fund, 2012).   
Figure 1: Problem loans to assets ratios in Japanese commercial banks 2000-
2012 
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the ratio of problem loans to assets of Japanese commercial banks during 
2000-2012. PLA: Problem loans to assets; S: September; 00-12: 2000-2012. 
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It is worth mentioning the impact of macroeconomic performance on the banking 
system4. High public sector indebtedness and slow growth are amongst the most 
important factors accumulating the latent risk within financial institutions (International 
Monetary Fund, 2012). Fewer profitable investment projects, limited credit demand, 
economic stagnation characterised by long-term deflation and sluggish growth are all 
obstacles to a sound financial system, slowing down the recovery process of the economy. 
Hence, robust growth is a necessary condition of a successful bank recapitalisation. Yet, 
the causality could also be of the reverse nature as the dysfunction of the financial system 
retards macroeconomic rebound (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Besides, existing 
problematic firms would find themselves struggling to overcome the bottlenecks and face 
high accumulative operating costs. To deal with this long-lasting effect and the threat of 
deterioration, the Bank of Japan introduced quantitative easing as a monetary policy tool 
to stimulate aggregate demand and boost the country’s productivity (Bank of Japan 
statement, 19 March 20015). Virtually zero interest rate had been maintained until 2006. 
At times, although GDP growth was not adequate to defeat deflation, the stimulating 
effect of quantitative easing on aggregate demand could not be denied (Bowman et al., 
2015). The monetary easing policy was extended in 2010 due to major concerns about 
heightened price instability arising from negative spill over effects from slowdown 
overseas economies. Aggressive monetary easing has been launched ever since to support 
the Abenomics 6– the strategic economic policy proposed by the newly appointed Prime 
Minister in 2012. 
																																																						
4	We thank an anonymous referee for this helpful suggestion. 
5 Bank of Japan’s statements, 2001 
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2001/k010319a.htm/). 
	
6 The priority aims are: i) reconstruction and disaster prevention; ii) creation of wealth through growth; iii) 
securing safety of livelihood of regional revitalisation. The priority areas are documented on the Prime 
Minister website, January 11, 2013. 
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3.3. Literature review  
For a review of the literature, we revise bank efficiency studies where problem loans 
play an important part in the analysis. A number of studies use problem loans as 
covariates to identify their impact on bank efficiency among other independent variables. 
For instance, problem loans are treated as a proxy for asset quality (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997; Mester, 1993, 1996; Uchida and Satake, 2009) or a measure of risk (Lensink et al., 
2008). Hughes and Mester (1993) find that inefficiency is positively correlated to problem 
loans. Berger and DeYoung (1997), however, do not control for loan quality in the cost 
function. They assume that problem loans may be considered exogenous for a given bank 
if these loans are unexpected results of “bad luck”, or endogenous if they are due to “bad 
management” or “skimping” (actions taken by management). Under the “bad luck” 
hypothesis, an increase in nonperforming loans (which is considered exogenous for the 
bank) would lead to a decrease in efficiency. The rise in bad loans is caused by unforeseen 
shocks (for example natural disasters) that affect the repayment ability of debtors. In 
contrast, for all other hypotheses that Berger and DeYoung (1997) address, the heightened 
level of problem loans stems from the bank itself. “Bad management” refers to the 
incompetence of bank managers regarding credit screening, collateral evaluating, and 
loan monitoring, as they are also cost-inefficient managers. On the other hand, for 
ambitious managers, the fact that abnormal returns could help secure their position and 
bring on more bonuses could induce them to take on risky projects. It could also be a 
transfer of lower short-term costs to forthcoming risks to maximize long-term profit. To 
achieve their goals, bank managers could skip some management practices in the loan 
screening-monitoring process, causing the bank to appear more efficient due to fewer 
operating costs. That is how the “skimping” hypothesis explains the rise in problem loans 
from an increase in efficiency. Magnifying the outcomes of these three hypotheses, the 
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“moral hazard” hypothesis expresses that banks with relatively low capital may have the 
incentives to involve in risky loan portfolios as the risk is partly shifted to another party. 
Empirical results of Berger and DeYoung (1997) deliver support for the “bad luck” 
hypothesis, but for the whole industry, the results tend to favour the “bad management” 
one. 
Berger and Mester (1997) also include problem loan ratio as an environmental 
variable in the Fourier-flexible model. The findings support the “bad management” 
hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997) and reveal a statistically significant positive 
relationship between problem loans and total cost. Also testing these hypotheses, 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009) convey the “moral hazard” hypothesis 
in a similar aspect to the “skimping” one by emphasising the link between efficiency and 
risk. To pursue expansionary strategy, it could be tempting for an efficient bank to take 
on more risks which might not be paid off eventually. This study also introduces the “risk-
averse management” hypothesis, which refers to risk-intolerant bank managers whose 
prudential supervision could cause large operating costs in the short-term (subsequently, 
higher inefficiency) but prevent a high rate of default in the future.  
In our study, we will consider the relation between these aforementioned hypotheses 
and problem loans in Japan. On top of that, we argue that problem loans should be treated 
as an undesirable output vector in bank production process. Berg et al. (1992) introduce 
this concept for Norwegian banks. (Negative) loan loss is included in the output vector to 
measure the quality of loans in two benchmark years. Park and Weber (2006) argue that 
these loans should be treated as an undesirable output rather than an input in a bank’s 
production. A number of banking research then has accounted for problem loans directly 
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in their methodology (Assaf et al., 2013; Barros et al., 2012; Fujii et al., 2014; Fukuyama 
and Weber, 2008).  
Since the Japanese banking system has been chronically clogged by problem loans, 
it has become an exclusive laboratory for investigating the impact of these loans on bank 
efficiency. There is also a variety of methods in addressing problem loans in Japanese 
bank literature. Considering loan-loss provision as a control factor for output quality, 
Altunbas et al. (2000) examine the effects of risk factors in Japanese banks’ cost during 
1993-1996. Overall inefficiency scores appear to be between 0.05 and 0.069 for all 4 
years whether or not risk and quality factors are controlled for. Problem loans, in this 
study, are found to have little effect on scale economies and X-efficiency. Liu and Tone 
(2008) also include the ratio of problem loans as a bank characteristic variable in a cost 
frontier analysis.  
Unlike other studies, Drake and Hall (2003) choose to include problem loans as an 
uncontrollable input when estimating Japanese banking efficiency by DEA model. 
Following Berger and Humphrey (1997), they consider bad loans as a result of “bad luck” 
rather than “bad management”. Loan-loss provision is used as an indicator of the extent 
of problem loans. It is emphasised that although in the DEA model, uncontrollable inputs 
are held fixed, in effect; it is somewhat under the bank’s discretion as the management 
board is able to adjust the level of provision. After the basic DEA model is modified for 
the inclusion of non-discretionary input, the associated findings imply a reward for banks 
with good control of problem loans as mean pure technical efficiency increases from 
72.36 to 89.38 for financial year 1997.  
In contrast to Drake and Hall (2003), Fukuyama and Weber (2008) argue that 
problem loans should be treated as an undesirable output as they appear only after a loan 
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has been made. Data for Japanese banks are pooled over a three-year period (2002-2004), 
with an assumption that a common technology exists for all banks. The findings present 
that the null-jointness hypothesis between good output and bad output is satisfied, 
indicating that problem loans are a by-product of the loan generating process. Similarly, 
Barros et al. (2012) measure technical efficiency of Japanese banks (2000-2007) with the 
appearance of problem loans as an undesirable output. They apply a non-radial directional 
methodology, which involves the expansion of good outputs and the contraction of inputs 
and bad outputs directionally by the nonzero vector g=(-gx, gy, -gb). The finding suggests 
that the problem of nonperforming loans was not completely wiped out, although the 
process of revitalisation had been taken place. Glass et al. (2014) also consider 
nonperforming loans as an undesirable output when estimating technical efficiency of 
Japanese cooperative banks (Shinkin and Shinkumi) in 1998-2009. 
It is worth noting that the literature on Japanese banking efficiency shows that studies 
applying nonparametric approach, in particular DEA, outnumber those using parametric 
method (for example, Fukuyama (1993), Fukuyama (1996), Fukuyama et al. (1999), 
Fukuyama and Weber (2002), Drake and Hall (2003), Fukuyama and Weber (2008), 
Loukoianova (2008), Liu and Tone (2008), Drake et al. (2009), Barros et al. (2009), and 
Yang and Morita (2013)). Altunbas et al. (2000), Uchida and Satake (2009), Assaf et al. 
(2011), and Glass et al. (2014)	are among few parametric studies. 	
The first DEA study on Japanese bank efficiency is Fukuyama (1993), examining 
technical and scale efficiency of 143 Japanese commercial banks between 1990 and 1991. 
The average technical efficiency and scale efficiency for all banks in the sample are 
0.8645 and 0.9844 respectively. Fukuyama (1995) includes also Trust banks and Long-
Term Credit banks in the sample. These banks are found to be more technically efficient 
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than commercial banks between 1989 and 1991. Efficiency scores for 435 Japanese credit 
associations in 1992 reported in Fukuyama (1996) are similar to those of commercial 
banks reported in Fukuyama (1993). Ownership is also taken into consideration when 
measuring efficiency of credit cooperatives and commercial banks in Fukuyama et al. 
(1999). During 1992-1996, foreign-owned banks performed better than Japanese-owned 
counterparts. Studying the same period for all active Japanese commercial banks, 
Fukuyama and Weber (2002) utilise Russell and Farrell input technical efficiency 
measures. Efficiency scores obtained from Farrell methodology are 0.91, significantly 
greater than Russell measure (0.53). It is in line with Altunbas et al. (2000) as they report 
X-inefficiency scores ranging from 5% to 7% in 1993-1996. Fukuyama and Weber (2005) 
estimate the Luenberger and Farrell output efficiency measure for Japanese banks during 
1992-1999. The results entail a greater gain in outputs by reallocating inputs than 
reducing technical inefficiency.  
Focusing on credit cooperative banks, Barros et al. (2009) report that on average, 
Japanese credit banks had negative technical efficiency change in 2000-2006. Assaf et al. 
(2011) find that between 2000 and 2006, only about 28% and 43% of the number of 
Shinkin banks experienced productivity and efficiency, respectively. Average efficiency 
score of Shinkin banks was around 86%, consistent during the study period. Other studies 
employ a slack-based measure for technical inefficiency, e.g. Liu and Tone (2008), Drake 
et al. (2009), Fukuyama and Weber (2009), and Fukuyama and Weber (2010). 
In the strand of parametric efficiency studies, Tachibanaki et al. (1991) estimate 
output translog cost functions for 61 banks during 1985-1987. There is evidence for a 
presence of economies of scale (from 1.03 to 1.24) in City Banks and Regional Banks. 
McKillop et al. (1996) obtain similar values for economies of scale (from 1.08 to 1.28) 
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and confirm the presence of increasing returns to scale in five giant Japanese Banks 
during 1978-1991. Proposed explanations for lower costs in giant banks are: i) they are 
able to hold shares of corporate firms instead of various bonds, ii) the long-term 
interrelationship between banks and firms can result in cheaper information costs. 
Uchida and Satake (2009) was the first study incorporating market discipline in their 
efficiency estimation. They argue that depositors and market investors play a significant 
role in monitoring bank behaviours, thus motivating sound management and cost 
efficiency. Inefficiency measures are obtained from a translog cost function using 
stochastic frontier approach method and controlling for nonperforming loans. Tadesse 
(2006) also estimates the translog cost function for commercial banks and Trust Banks. 
Findings suggest that from 1974 to 1994, smaller banks appeared to benefit from 
increasing returns to scale. 
Glass et al. (2014) apply the enhanced hyperbolic output distance function proposed 
by Cuesta et al. (2009) on cooperative banks. The results reveal that Japanese credit 
cooperative banks are operating under increasing returns to scale, as they are too small 
on average. Banks with lower return on assets and capital adequacy ratio are found to be 
more efficient. This is explained by the fact that the business nature of those banks is for 
the sake of small businesses and individuals, and to increase financial welfare of their 
members. Therefore, the surplus generated may not be high in the first place. Regarding 
the capital adequacy ratio, because all banks reported their compliance during this period, 
the authors suggest that banks holding excess capital requirements are locking funds on 
non-earning or low-earning assets, which strongly affects their efficiency level. 
To this end, our study contributes to the existing efficiency literature about Japanese 
banks in terms of methodology employed and data used to measure bank efficiency. The 
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translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function proposed by Cuesta et al. (2009) allows 
us to directly estimate the impact of problem loans on efficiency. In addition, the 
introduction of problem other earning assets in the undesirable output vector is innovative 
and accounts for the non-traditional operations of Japanese banks. 
3.4. Methodology 
Our methodology is underpinned by Cuesta et al.’s (2009) model. They introduce a 
new specification and estimation procedure of the traditional distance function to take 
into account the undesirable output vector. The benefits of this methodology compared to 
other techniques are as follows. First, the traditional distance functions do not distinguish 
between desirable outputs and undesirable outputs. They measure performance radially 
to the extent of expanding all outputs (or contracting all inputs) in the same proportion 
(Cuesta et al., 2009). The enhanced hyperbolic distance function of Cuesta et al. (2009) 
can treat desirable outputs and undesirable outputs asymmetrically, replicating the 
theoretical and nonparametric techniques of Färe et al. (1989). In particular, Cuesta et al. 
(2009)’s model reveals the proportion by which desirable outputs can be increased, and 
undesirable outputs and inputs can be reduced in a multiplicative manner. Second, the 
model enables us to estimate efficiency scores in a parametric stochastic environment. 
Using nonparametric techniques, e.g. DEA, to estimate the directional or hyperbolic 
distance function encounters the shortcomings of non-constant returns to scale which lead 
to a nonlinear program and deterministic models where inferences can only be drawn by 
bootstrapping (Simar and Wilson, 2004). Employing stochastic frontier techniques to 
estimate a hyperbolic distance function can overcome these problems.  
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The enhanced hyperbolic distance function7 takes the form of: 
}),/,(:0inf{),,( TbyxbyxD Î>= ffff       (1) 
with input vector Kkiiii Rxxxx +Î= ),...,,( 21 , desirable output vector 
yi = (y1i, y2i,..., ymi )∈ R+M , and undesirable output vector Rriiii Rbbbb +Î= ),...,,( 21  . 
The technology T represents the production possibility set: 
,),(,:),,{( PK RbyRxbyxT ++ ÎÎ=  x can produce (y, b)} such that R+P expresses the set of all 
),( byu =  output vectors obtainable from x . 
Subscript ),...,2,1( Ni = denotes a set of observed producers. 
Equation (1) expresses a simultaneous expansion in good outputs y and shrinkage in 
inputs x and bad outputs b, generating a hyperbolic path. If 1),,( =byxD , the 
production of the observed unit lies on the production frontier and is efficient. Thus, if 
1),,( <byxD , the producer is inefficient and could improve their performance by 
increasing desirable outputs and cutting undesirable outputs and inputs. 
Applying a translog specification for ),,( byxD , it yields:  
             
  
 
(2) 
																																																						
7 The enhanced hyperbolic distance function has a range 1),,(0 £< byxD , assuming inputs and 
outputs are weakly disposable. It has the following properties:  
(i) it is almost homogeneous 0),,,(),,( 11 >=-- µµµµµ byxDbyxD , 
(ii) it is non-decreasing in desirable outputs  ]1,0[),,,(),,( Î£ ll byxDbyxD  
(iii) it is non-increasing in undesirable outputs 1),,,(),,( ³£ ll byxDbyxD  
(iv) it is non-increasing in inputs 1),,,(),,( ³£ ll byxDbyxD  
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Imposing the almost homogeneity condition and choosing the Mth desirable output 
for normalising purpose My/1=µ , we obtain: 
M
M
M
M y
byxDby
y
yxyD ),,(),,( =        (3) 
with MiririMimimiMikiki ybbYyyyxx *,/,*
*** === , the translog function takes the form: 
ln(D / yMi ) =α0 + αk ln
k=1
K
∑ xki* + βm
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(4) 
We can write equation (4) in a simplifying form of: 
( ) ititititMit vbyxTLyD += hgdcba ,,,,,;,,)/ln( ***   i = (1, 2, …, N)      (5)
 
As lnD corresponds to the one-sided distance component ui, by rearranging it we get: 
( ) itititititMit uvbyxTLy -+=- hgdcba ,,,,,;,,)ln( ***   i = (1, 2, …, N)      (6)
 
where –ln(yMit) is the log of the Mth desirable output, vit is the stochastic error which 
follows a normal distribution, uit is the inefficiency term8.  
The stochastic frontier approach enables researchers to decompose the usual error 
term, εit, into two components: the two-sided random error, and the one-sided inefficiency 
term to capture inefficiency. We assume that the inefficiency term follows a half normal 
distribution N(0 ,σ2u). It reflects the distribution of non-negative u values drawn from a 
																																																						
8	We can now estimate equation (6) with various methods, e.g. maximum likelihood estimation (Battese 
and Coelli, 1988) where the technical efficiency of each observed unit is expressed as TEit=exp(-uit) (Battese 
and Coelli, 1992; Greene, 2005).  
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population which is normally distributed with zero mean. It is worth mentioning that 
stochastic frontier techniques are extensively utilised to measure bank efficiency in 
Europe, US, and other countries where the banking systems are structured differently 
from Japan. The banking literature also reveals a considerable number of studies using 
this method for European banks compared to papers using similar stochastic techniques 
for Japanese banks (e.g. Altunbas et al., 2000; Liu and Tone, 2008; Uchida and Satake, 
2009). For the Japanese context, the application of the frontier techniques to estimate 
bank efficiency for the whole banking industry (which means Trust Banks, Cooperative 
Banks, Foreign Banks, and others are also included in the sample) should account for 
heterogeneous production technologies (Mester, 1997). One strategy is to estimate 
different frontiers for different sub-samples, especially when it comes to terms with the 
ownership structure (Altunbas, 2001). However, doing so may not yield comparable 
efficiency scores across sub-samples as they are relative values. One way to address this 
drawback is to simultaneously estimate different technology regimes by using one latent 
stochastic frontier (e.g. cost function) (Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004; Green, 2005; Koetter 
and Wedow, 2010). In our study, the presence of the Japanese keiretsu (although not as 
important as it used to be in the 1990s), relationship banking, and the business features of 
different bank types may raise concern over the existence of different technologies. 
However, we only focus on commercial banks (City, Regional I, and Regional II), not 
mutual banks and others. Additionally, although Regional Banks are smaller than City 
Banks and not acting as the central node of the horizontal keiretsu, their relationship with 
clients are somewhat similar to the role of City Banks in the keiretsu. Moreover, 
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government policies regarding banking operations usually concern all these three bank 
types. Besides, the application of efficiency techniques has been documented in the 
Japanese banking literature, both in DEA (Barros et al., 2012) and SFA (Altunbas et al., 
2000; Liu and Tone, 2008; Uchida and Satake, 2009). Hence, it is feasible to apply the 
parametric distance function of Cuesta et al. (2009) to our sample.  
Thus, the translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function takes the form9: 
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(7) 
It is very unlikely that technology is constant over time; therefore, we incorporate 
time variable t to capture neutral technical change. We estimate equation (7) using time-
varying decay technique, following Battese and Coelli (1992).  
3.5. Data 
Our dataset is drawn from semi-annually financial reports of Japanese commercial 
banks during 2000-2012, published on the Japanese Bankers Association website. We 
obtain an unbalanced panel data with 3036 observations, embracing City Banks, Regional 
Banks I, and Regional Banks II.   
																																																						
9 We specify model (7) for three inputs, two desirable outputs, and two undesirable outputs (please see Data 
section). y2 (net earning assets) normalises other output and input variables.	
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Being the largest commercial banks in Japan, City Banks comprise of nationwide 
branching institutions. Their primary funding sources vary from the Bank of Japan to the 
deposit and short-term financial markets. They also involve in securities–type operations 
domestically and internationally (Drake and Hall, 2003; Tadesse, 2006). In contrast, 
Regional Banks I are smaller than City Banks and operate only in the principal cities of 
the prefectures where their head offices are situated. They have a strong commitment with 
the local development through financing small and medium business activities. Regional 
Banks II 10 are similar to Regional Banks I in terms of business features, but smaller than 
Regional Banks I in size. They also offer financial services for customers within their 
immediate geographical regions. 
In the data set, six banks report negative shareholders’ equity in 2000-2007. Three of 
those banks (Ashikaga Bank, Kinki Osaka Bank, and Tokyo Sowa Bank) were bailed out 
to continue operating. On 12/6/1999, the Bank of Japan announced to provide necessary 
funds to assist the business continuation of Tokyo Sowa Bank11. Tokyo Sowa Bank only 
had negative equity and net income in September 2000. Ashikaga Bank also received 
liquidity support for undercapitalisation and income loss in September 200312. Unlike 
Tokyo Sowa Bank, Ashikaga Bank could not raise enough capital at the end of the first 
halves of fiscal years 2004-2007. After September 2007, Ashikaga Bank operation was 
restored. On the other hand, Kinki Osaka Bank suffered from capital loss only in 
September 2003. The Bank of Japan did not intervene in the case of Kinki Osaka Bank 
as it gained positive equity in the following period. Unlike these three banks which have 
																																																						
10 Regional Banks II are also called members of the Second Association of Regional Banks (source: 
Japanese Bankers Association website – Principle Financial Institutions). 
11 Bank of Japan’s statement (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/danwa/dan9906b.htm/) 
12 Bank of Japan’s statement (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/danwa/dan0311a.htm/) 
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successfully recovered from the banking turbulence and continued their normal operation, 
the other three banks (Kofuku Bank, Ishikawa Bank, and Chubu Bank) were unable to 
survive through the crisis and had to terminate their business after September 2002 and 
2003.  
With respect to input and output definitions of Japanese commercial banks used in 
equation (7)13, we follow the widely used intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 
1977). We characterise three proxies for inputs: x1 interest expenses (Glass et al., 2014; 
Liu and Tone, 2008), x2 fixed assets (Assaf et al., 2011; Fukuyama and Weber, 2008), 
and x3 general and administrative expenses14 (Drake and Hall, 2003; Liu and Tone, 2008). 
We define our outputs in line with Barros et al. (2009), Assaf et al. (2011), Barros et al. 
(2012) as y1 net loans and bills discounted, and y2 net earning assets which include net 
investments, securities, and other earning assets. Data are adjusted for inflation using 
semi-annual GDP deflator (2005=100). Table 1 describes the summary statistics of key 
variables in our panel data. 
  
																																																						
13 Our inputs and outputs specification is similar to Fukuyama and Weber (2008), Fukuyama and Weber 
(2009), Barros et al. (2009, 2012).  
14 as data for number of employees are not available semi-annually. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
y1 Net loans 3,182,876         7,867,099 109,898.9    69,541,992 
y2 Net earning assets 2,178,294        7,419,522 1,296.512 78,517,385 
b1 Problem loans 143,582.6     371,639.3    5,207.246     6,060,743 
b2 Problem non-loan assets 4,294.59     16,352.12   0      280,278 
x1 Interest expenses 17,093.14     80,852.25      45.966     1,379,955 
x2 Fixed assets 60,392.48 141,052.1    2,463.104     1,278,986 
x3 
General and administrative 
expenses 37,441.04     88,237.43        1,438.638 1,086,994 
 Total assets 5,833,343 16,390,968          172,320    151,697,392 
cap Capital ratio 0.04324     0.02552   -0.78823    0.12787 
NIM Net interest margin 0.01329     0.00553    0.00076    0.03794 
ROA Return on assets 0.00013     0.0084  -0.29452    0.05886 
Notes:  y1, y2, x1, x2, x3, b1, b2, total assets are in million JPY. Net loans = Loans and bills discounted-
Problem loans. Net earning assets=(call loans, receivables under resale agreement, receivables under 
securities borrowing transactions, bills bought, monetary claims bought, foreign exchanges, customers’ 
liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, investment securities, and other assets) – problem other earning 
assets. Problem loans are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, doubtful, and substandard loans. Problem other earning 
assets are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, and doubtful other earning assets. Capital 
ratio=shareholders’equity/total assets. Net interest margin=(interest income–interest expense)/(interest-
earning assets). Std.Dev: standard deviation. 
 
Turning to problem loans, a loan is defined as non-performing if payment of interests 
and principal are past due by 90 days or more, or if there are doubts that debt payments 
can be made in full. The availability of data allows us to distinguish the two classifications 
of problem assets in Japan. They are “risk-monitored loans” disclosed in accordance with 
the Banking Law, and “problem assets” disclosed under the Financial Reconstruction 
Law. According to the Financial Reconstruction Law, problem other earning assets 
(claims related to securities lending, foreign exchanges, accrued interests, suspense 
payments, customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, and bank-guaranteed 
bonds sold through private placements) are subject to the disclosure of problem assets. 
We follow the problem assets definition based on the Financial Reconstruction Law to 
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define undesirable outputs in our efficiency estimation (please see Appendix A). The first 
undesirable output is problem loans b1, the second one is problem other earning assets b2. 
Problem loans are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt loans, doubtful loans, and substandard loans. 
Problem other earning assets are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt and doubtful other earning 
assets15. The disclosed information from our data set is quite novel as it is for the first 
time that undesirable outputs are disaggregated into problem loans and problem other 
earning assets. The only study that we are aware of is Barros et al. (2012) but they did not 
disaggregate the data.  
To represent the level of risk, we employ data of risk-monitored loans disclosed 
subject to the Banking Law (see Appendix A). Another innovation of this study is that 
we further disaggregate risk-monitored loans into two components: the first one is the 
sum of bankrupt loans and non-accrual loans16, the second one is the sum of past due 
loans by 3 months or more but less than 6 months, and restructured loans17. To facilitate 
the analysis and the exposition of results, we name the first class of risk-monitored loans 
as bankrupt loans, whereas the second class is restructured loans. These two types of risk-
monitored loans contain information about the level of risk held in each bank, and partly 
reflect the exogenous impact of problem loans on bank operation. In the short-run, banks 
somewhat rely on their borrowers to reduce the level of these risk-monitored loans. This 
disaggregation permits us to further examine the relationship between bankrupt loans, 
restructured loans and bank efficiency.  
																																																						
15 The values of problem other earning assets = Problem assets – Risk-monitored loans (see Appendix A 
for more details). 
16	Reported in Japanese commercial banks’ balance sheets, these loans are loans to borrowers in the state 
of legal bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears of six months or more. 
17	The Japanese Bankers Association originally defined restructured loans as loans for which interest rates 
were lowered. In 1997, the definition was extended to loans with any amended contract conditions and 
loans to corporations under ongoing reorganisation (Montgomery and Shimizutani, 2009).	
	 
	
49 
To account for bank specific characteristics, we opt for performance variables which 
are represented by return on assets (ROA), and net interest margin (NIM) (Glass et al., 
2014). NIM is defined as the difference between interest incomes and interest expenses, 
divided by total interest-earning assets (Nguyen, 2012; Williams and Nguyen, 2005). To 
control for the leverage effect which is the higher the leverage ratio, the more volatile the 
return (Saunders et al., 1990), we use the capital to assets ratio, which also accounts for 
bank capitalisation.  
In terms of macroeconomic variables, we select the Nikkei 225 index as a proxy for 
the stock market performance, the industrial production index as a measure of business 
activity (Officer, 1973), and the total reserves held by the Bank of Japan at the end of 
each period as a proxy for quantitative easing policy (Lyonnet and Werner, 2012; 
Voutsinas and Werner, 2011).18 The inclusion of quantitative easing takes into account 
the effect of monetary policy in promoting bank lending and adjusting the performance 
of contemporary financial institutions. During the observed period, the Bank of Japan 
applied quantitative easing from March 2001 to March 2006 in order to maintain the 
target inflation rate and the level of current account balances held by depository 
institutions at the Bank (Berkmen, 2012). In addition, the purchase of long-term Japanese 
government bonds - the main instrument of quantitative easing - and other asset purchase 
programs reduced yields (Lam, 2011; Ueda, 2012a; Ugai, 2007) and assisted the Bank of 
																																																						
18 In terms of the macroeconomic variables, the Nikkei index can also represent aggregate demand, although 
not directly. The Nikkei index reflects stock prices whereby higher values could indicate high economic 
activity. In detail, I take into account an increase in consumption by households, an increase in real 
investment through higher Tobin’s q, and an increase in real investment through the credit channel (bank 
lending) as firms having higher net worth positions would benefit from lower external finance premium 
(Miyao, 2002). Hence, the Nikkei index can capture the effect of consumption and investment which are 
the components of aggregate demand. With regard to the Industrial Production index, it represents industrial 
output or real economic activity (Miyao, 2002) rather than aggregate demand. Please note that, however, 
output gap, or the gap between real Gross National Product and the potential output, and de-trended output 
(Gordon et al., 1975; Nelson, 2002) are the common indicators for aggregate demand in the 
economics/growth literature. 
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Japan to maintain the “zero interest rates” policy19. However, in terms of economic 
activity and inflation, whether or not quantitative easing policy in Japan was effective 
remains ambiguous. Baumeister and Benati (2010) and Girardin and Moussa (2011) find 
it effective, whereas Ugai (2007) finds little evidence. Bowman et al. (2015) suggest that 
the stimulus to economic growth from quantitative easing might be undermined by 
excessive spending on the weak banking system and firm balance sheet problems. 
To account for market concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
(Bikker, 2004). However, as concentration ratio is a rather crude indicator which 
measures the actual market shares disregarding inferences about bank competitiveness 
(Beck, 2008), we also use the Boone indicator as a proxy for competition20. Regarding 
risk variables, because most banks in our sample are not listed, we opt for accounting 
measures rather than market-based measures to compute risk. The most common risk 
proxy for banks is the Z-score, which is the number of standard deviations below the 
mean by which bank returns would have to fall so as to dry up capital (Boyd and Runkle, 
1993; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988). The higher Z-score indicates bank stability or lower 
insolvency risk. More importantly, we introduce risk-monitored loans as another proxy 
for risk in our model. As discussed above, the disaggregation of risk-monitored loans into 
bankrupt loans and restructured loans allows us to measure their exogenous effects on 
bank efficiency and ROA. In the short-run, bankrupt loans and restructured loans are not 
																																																						
19	Examples of other asset purchase programs: the purchase of asset-backed securities from July 2003 to 
March 2006; and the program under the Comprehensive Monetary Easing in October 2010, which expanded 
the types of assets purchased into private sector financial assets.	
20 We gratefully acknowledge the suggestion of an anonymous referee in choosing a better proxy for 
competition such as the Boone indicator, as HHI is a poor indicator of competition compared to non-
structural ones. The Panzar-Rosse indicator, although non-structural, requires restrictive assumptions such 
as the existence of a long-run equilibrium banking market (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). The Boone indicator 
is more appealing, given no such assumption needed and being robust in accounting for different forces 
that can lead to an increase in competition (e.g. lower entry costs, relaxation of entry barriers, more 
aggressive interactions between firms/banks). Please see Appendix C for the methodology used to derive 
the Boone indicator. 
	 
	
51 
subject to the control of bank management but the recovery of debtors and their 
compliance with the loan contracts. 
3.6. Results  
3.6.1. Technical efficiency  
Regarding input and desirable output elasticities, all the parameters are statistically 
significant and consistent with the monotonic condition. All three inputs exhibit expected 
negative signs, satisfying the property of non-increasing in inputs of D(x,y,b), and 
indicating a smaller distance to the frontier when input usage is reduced. The magnitude 
of these coefficients suggests that the contribution of fixed assets (α2 = -0.3793) to the 
production process outnumbers the other two. More specifically, the elasticities of interest 
expenses and general and administrative expenses are quite small and similar. The small 
magnitude of the coefficient of interest expenses (α1 = -0.0173) could be explained by the 
implementation of the virtually zero interest rate during 2000-2006. The reported 
coefficient of y1 (0.4650) is positive and significant, confirming the non-decreasing 
characteristic in good outputs. This is what we could expect as loans are the main products 
of banking operation. Our findings also suggest that Japanese commercial banks 
experience decreasing returns to scale (0.8427, with associated standard error of 0.0102 
significantly different from one at the 1% level). Previous studies have found that 
decreasing returns to scale is valid in the case of City Banks (Altunbas et al., 2000; Azad 
et al., 2014; Drake and Hall, 2003; Tadesse, 2006); while Regional Banks exhibit 
increasing returns to scale (Altunbas et al., 2000). Therefore, results are rather mixed (see 
also Fukuyama, 1993 and McKillop et al., 1996).  
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In terms of undesirable output elasticity, problem loans (χ1 = -0.0261) are found to 
have a significant negative impact on bank performance, in line with findings from Glass 
et al. (2014) for credit cooperatives. The finding suggests that problem loans are more 
important than interest expenses and general and administrative expenses in affecting 
bank efficiency. The coefficient of problem other earning assets – the second bad output 
in our undesirable output vector, however, is insignificant. The results might imply that 
problem other earning assets are not the main source of bank inefficiency.  
Table 2 exhibits technical efficiency (TE) scores for three groups of Japanese 
commercial banks over each observed period. The average technical efficiency of all 
banks over the entire period is 0.612, suggesting that Japanese commercial banks can 
improve their performance by increasing their desirable outputs by [(1/0.612)-1] = 63.4%, 
whereas simultaneously reducing inputs and bad outputs by [1-0.612] = 38.8%. Overall, 
the time varying technical efficiency scores of all banks expose a slight downward trend 
over time. This is consistent with our finding of no presence of technical progress over 
years. Within each group of banks, there is minor variation in the decreasing trend of 
mean technical efficiency. For example, scores of Regional Banks II dropped after rising 
in March 2002, while that of City Banks climbed from 32.93% in September 2007 to 
33.99% in March 2008. 
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Table 2. Technical efficiency scores by bank type over time 
Bank type City Banks Regional Banks I Regional Banks II 
Period Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Sep-00 8 0.3700 0.0412 0.3218 0.4325 64 0.5807 0.0922 0.4256 0.8231 55 0.7274 0.1212 0.5150 0.9890 
Mar-01 8 0.3691 0.0412 0.3209 0.4316 64 0.5811 0.0926 0.4247 0.8227 55 0.7221 0.1202 0.5142 0.9889 
Sep-01 8 0.3682 0.0412 0.3200 0.4307 64 0.5835 0.0923 0.4238 0.8223 55 0.7194 0.1205 0.5133 0.9889 
Mar-02 7 0.3697 0.0439 0.3191 0.4298 64 0.5805 0.0918 0.4229 0.8219 55 0.7210 0.1206 0.5125 0.9889 
Sep-02 7 0.3555 0.0625 0.2518 0.4289 64 0.5788 0.0930 0.4220 0.8215 55 0.7166 0.1186 0.5116 0.9889 
Mar-03 7 0.3474 0.0551 0.2509 0.4065 64 0.5769 0.0927 0.4211 0.8211 52 0.7113 0.1186 0.5108 0.9888 
Sep-03 7 0.3465 0.0551 0.2501 0.4056 64 0.5764 0.0936 0.4202 0.8207 50 0.7070 0.1194 0.5099 0.9888 
Mar-04 7 0.3456 0.0550 0.2492 0.4047 64 0.5756 0.0937 0.4193 0.8203 49 0.7089 0.1195 0.5091 0.9888 
Sep-04 7 0.3447 0.0550 0.2483 0.4038 64 0.5718 0.0914 0.4184 0.8199 48 0.7087 0.1209 0.5082 0.9888 
Mar-05 7 0.3438 0.0550 0.2475 0.4029 64 0.5710 0.0915 0.4175 0.8195 47 0.7085 0.1224 0.5073 0.9887 
Sep-05 7 0.3429 0.0550 0.2466 0.4020 64 0.5730 0.0933 0.4166 0.8191 47 0.7079 0.1227 0.5065 0.9887 
Mar-06 6 0.3435 0.0601 0.2458 0.4011 64 0.5723 0.0934 0.4157 0.8187 46 0.7028 0.1202 0.5056 0.9887 
Sep-06 6 0.3426 0.0600 0.2449 0.4002 64 0.5715 0.0935 0.4148 0.8183 46 0.7022 0.1204 0.5048 0.9886 
Mar-07 6 0.3417 0.0600 0.2441 0.3993 64 0.5707 0.0936 0.4139 0.8179 45 0.7000 0.1214 0.5039 0.9886 
Sep-07 6 0.3293 0.0592 0.2432 0.3972 64 0.5699 0.0937 0.4130 0.8175 44 0.6957 0.1205 0.5031 0.9886 
Mar-08 6 0.3399 0.0600 0.2423 0.3974 64 0.5692 0.0939 0.4121 0.8171 44 0.6951 0.1207 0.5022 0.9886 
Sep-08 6 0.3390 0.0600 0.2415 0.3965 64 0.5684 0.0940 0.4111 0.8166 44 0.6945 0.1209 0.5013 0.9885 
Mar-09 6 0.3381 0.0599 0.2406 0.3956 64 0.5676 0.0941 0.4102 0.8162 43 0.6959 0.1218 0.5005 0.9885 
Sep-09 6 0.3373 0.0599 0.2398 0.3947 64 0.5668 0.0942 0.4093 0.8158 43 0.6953 0.1220 0.4996 0.9885 
Mar-10 6 0.3364 0.0599 0.2389 0.3938 64 0.5661 0.0943 0.4084 0.8154 41 0.6961 0.1242 0.4988 0.9884 
Sep-10 6 0.3355 0.0599 0.2381 0.3929 63 0.5665 0.0946 0.4075 0.8150 41 0.6955 0.1244 0.4979 0.9884 
Mar-11 6 0.3346 0.0598 0.2373 0.3920 63 0.5657 0.0948 0.4066 0.8146 41 0.6949 0.1246 0.4970 0.9884 
Sep-11 6 0.3337 0.0598 0.2364 0.3911 63 0.5649 0.0949 0.4057 0.8142 41 0.6943 0.1248 0.4962 0.9884 
Mar-12 6 0.3328 0.0598 0.2356 0.3902 63 0.5642 0.0950 0.4048 0.8138 41 0.6937 0.1250 0.4953 0.9883 
Sep-12 6 0.3319 0.0598 0.2347 0.3892 63 0.5634 0.0951 0.4039 0.8133 40 0.6942 0.1266 0.4945 0.9883 
Mar-13 6 0.3310 0.0598 0.2339 0.3883 63 0.5626 0.0952 0.4030 0.8129 40 0.6936 0.1268 0.4936 0.9883 
All 169 0.3455 0.0530 0.2339 0.4325 1646 0.5715 0.0930 0.4030 0.8231 1203 0.7050 0.1209 0.4936 0.9890 
Notes: This Table reports average scores of technical efficiency in each period for each type of banks. The scores are obtained from estimating equation (7), using time-varying 
decay technique (Battese and Coelli, 1992). Obs: number of observations; Std.dev: standard deviation; Mar: March; Sep: September; 00-13: 2000-2013.
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Illustrated in Figure 2 is kernel density graph mapping the distribution of technical 
efficiency scores by bank type. We find that City Banks are the least efficient banks with 
average technical efficiency at 34.55% compared to their counterparts, whereas Barros et 
al. (2012) find a high level of efficiency for City Banks. Being the smallest in bank size, 
Regional Banks II seem to be the most efficient with mean TE at 70.49%. A potential 
explanation for the high TE of Regional Banks could be that under the Temporary 
Measures to Facilitate Financing for SMEs, banks are encouraged not only to supply loans 
in favour of SMEs, but also to relax the conditions of these loans. Under certain 
conditions, a loan to an SME debtor about to be classified as nonperforming could be 
considered as performing, as long as the borrower could provide a promising business 
reconstruction plan within one year from the date the loan was due to be nonperforming 
(Hoshi, 2011).   
 
Figure 2. Technical efficiency scores by bank type 
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates kernel density plots of technical efficiency scores by each type of banks. 
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3.6.2. The impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on bank performance 
In this section, we perform baseline regressions to investigate the relationship 
between risk-monitored loans and performance (technical efficiency and return on 
assets), taking into consideration the impact of bank specific and macroeconomic 
variables. We present results for both a fixed effect model to account for the unobserved 
heterogeneity across banks, and a two-stage least squares model to control for 
endogeneity. The dependent variables are: i) technical efficiency TE; and ii) return on 
assets ROA. As discussed in Section 3.5, we treat bankrupt loans and restructured loans 
as measures of risk. The analysis is also conducted for Z-score to test the robustness of 
the results. Risk proxies are respectively incorporated with alternative instruments. The 
results are reported in Tables 3 and 4, whereas robustness checks with the Boone indicator 
as a proxy for competition are provided in Tables 5 and 6. 
For fixed effect models, generally, bankrupt loans and restructured loans do not affect 
technical efficiency and ROA in a similar way. The relationship is found to be positive 
for these risk-monitored loans and TE, whereas an inverse one applies to ROA. The 
influences are statistically significant but small in magnitude. When we replace risk-
monitored loans by Z-score, the same conclusion can be drawn for the risk - 
efficiency/ROA nexus. Specifically, while Z-score shows a negative, insignificant effect 
on TE, its influence on ROA is positively significant. These initial evidences reveal that 
the less involvement in risky projects of the bank, the higher the level of its ROA. 
Regarding other control variables, higher capital to assets ratio would increase bank 
profitability. In a similar aspect, when the stock price and industrial indices rise, Japanese 
banks’ performance would be improved. The measure of market concentration, the HHI 
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index, is significant in most cases, but the effect varies. We obtain quite a similar pattern 
for the influence of total reserves.  
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Table 3. Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance - Fixed effect models 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent variable TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA 
Capital ratio -0.0027 0.0038 -0.0014 0.2450*** 0.2410*** 0.2510*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0047) 
Net interest margin 0.1350*** 0.1220*** 0.1080*** -0.1090*** -0.0859*** -0.0877*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0220) 
Nikkei index 0.0003 0.0007** 0.0003 0.0016** 0.0012* 0.0019*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Industrial production 0.0038*** 0.0036*** 0.0008 0.0032** 0.0037** 0.0055*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.3530*** -0.3310*** -0.2980*** 0.0772*** 0.0343*** 0.0323*** 
  (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0117) 
Quantitative easing -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Z-score 0.0000     0.0000     
  (0.0000)     (0.0000)     
Bankrupt loans   0.0017***     -0.0028***   
    (0.0001)     (0.0003)   
Restructured loans     0.0011***     -0.0008*** 
      (0.0000)     (0.0002) 
Constant 0.6320*** 0.6090*** 0.6320*** -0.0536*** -0.0180** -0.0565*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0075) (0.0084) (0.0074) 
R-sq 0.0149 0.0162 0.0089 0.4384 0.3872 0.4456 
p value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: This Table reports results of the fixed effect models examining the impact of control variables on technical efficiency and return on assets (ROA). The proxy 
for risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models. Quantitative easing is proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; 
Z-score=(ROA+capital ratio)/σROA. Bankrupt loans=Bankrupt loans+Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans=past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 
months+Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Given endogeneity concerns, we proceed with a two-stage least square regression. 
We examine the model with the same two dependent variables and alternative 
instrumental variables for risk proxies (see Table 4). The impacts of almost all variables 
are consistent with findings from the fixed effect models. In terms of bank characteristics, 
capitalisation appears to have a positive and significant effect on performance, suggesting 
that banks with lower leverage ratio operate more efficiently, in line with Pasiouras 
(2008). It is also well-known in the literature that well-capitalised banks will have higher 
ROA than their under-capitalised counterparts (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). Net 
interest margin also comes consistently positive and significant in relation with TE. On 
the other hand, the relationship between NIM and ROA is negative, in accordance with 
Goldberg and Rai (1996) who argue that more efficient banks are flexible to offer 
depositors and borrowers attractive interest rates. Even though the spread is smaller for 
those banks than that of less efficient banks, they could still be able to generate higher 
profit thanks to the larger quantity of loans. 
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Table 4: Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance - Two-stage least squares models. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent variable TE TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Capital ratio 0.0756*** 0.3660** -0.0026 -0.0026 0.1420*** 0.0094 0.2350*** 0.2420*** 
  (0.0120) (0.1560) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0187) (0.1190) (0.0090) (0.0091) 
Net interest margin 0.1410*** 0.1640** 0.1350*** 0.1330*** -0.1240*** -0.1450** -0.0741*** 0.0977 
  (0.0170) (0.0669) (0.0118) (0.0389) (0.0313) (0.0580) (0.0261) (0.1280) 
Nikkei index 0.0049*** 0.0219** 0.0003 0.00032 -0.0058*** -0.0150* 0.0009 0.0017* 
  (0.0009) (0.0094) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0084) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Industrial Production 0.0070*** 0.0188** 0.0038*** 0.0036 -0.0020 -0.0085 0.0038** 0.0263* 
  (0.0013) (0.0080) (0.0007) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0070) (0.0016) (0.0141) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.4270*** -0.6990*** -0.3530*** -0.3500*** 0.1990*** 0.3520** 0.0133 -0.3480 
  (0.0126) (0.1490) (0.0124) (0.0773) (0.0237) (0.1380) (0.0276) (0.2560) 
Quantitative easing -0.0002 0.0041* -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0034 0.0007*** 0.0015*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Z-score  -0.0011*** -0.0050**     0.0018*** 0.0039**     
  (0.0002) (0.0021)     (0.0003) (0.0019)     
Bankrupt loans      0.0000       -0.0044**   
      (0.0009)       (0.0020)   
Restructured loans        0.0000       -0.0087 
        (0.0016)       (0.0053) 
Constant 0.5900*** 0.4360*** 0.6320*** 0.6320*** 0.0120 0.0942 0.0033 -0.0585*** 
  (0.0083) (0.0859) (0.0123) (0.0033) (0.0151) (0.0758) (0.0275) (0.0101) 
R-sq  0.0175 0.0137 0.0136 0.0119 0.0428 0.0255 0.3113 0.0883 
p value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: This Table reports results of the two-stage least squares models examining the impact of control variables on technical efficiency and return on assets (ROA). The proxy 
for risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models with different instruments. Quantitative easing is proxied by the natural logarithm 
of total reserves. Z-score=(ROA+capital ratio)/σROA. Bankrupt loans=Bankrupt loans+Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans=past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 
months+Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Regarding the influence of macroeconomic variables, the Nikkei index and industrial 
production index yield equivalent impact on TE. A rise in the stock price index would 
positively affect the efficiency level of Japanese banks. Investment prospects signified by 
a rise in the stock price index could bring promising loan portfolios to commercial banks. 
Similar is the case of escalating manufacturing output which denotes an expansion period 
of the economy. In addition, the likelihood of nonperforming loans would be expected to 
be relatively small. Put differently, financial institutions could be able to expand their 
good outputs and lessen their bad outputs, which then help to improve their technical 
efficiency. In terms of ROA, the results are mixed. An increase in the stock price index 
is not necessarily associated with higher ROA. As not many banks in our sample are 
listed, the benefit they would acquire from the difference in stock prices might be 
negligible compared to the mounting fund required to purchase those securities. Regional 
Banks, in particular, invest mostly in government bonds and local government bonds, 
which are less volatile than other securities, and thus might be indifferent to market 
volatility. 
Another influential variable is the degree of concentration which is significant and 
negatively correlated with TE. This finding is related to Homma et al. (2014) who report 
that market concentration dampens cost efficiency of large Japanese banks. Coming to 
ROA, our evidence suggests a positive impact of HHI. Regardless the causality, this 
somehow supports the efficient-structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973; Smirlock, 1985) 
that banks with larger market share have greater profitability. Differently phrased, our 
findings could be expressed as heightened competition resulting in higher likelihood of 
default, which supports the results of Fu et al. (2014). Using the Lerner index as a proxy 
for market power of Asia Pacific banks (Japanese banks inclusive), they find a presence 
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of the “competition-fragility” hypothesis. Employing the three-bank concentration ratio, 
Liu et al. (2012) also report that South East Asian banks in more concentrated markets 
are less exposed to systemic risk. With respect to the coefficients of total reserves, we 
find mixed results for the effect of quantitative easing on bank performance. 
Corresponding to findings of the fixed effect estimation, two-stage least square 
models confirm the impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance. The 
results represent a positive relationship between risk-monitored loans and TE, though the 
impact is statistically insignificant. In contrast, these loans negatively affect ROA, with 
restructured loans being negligible compared to bankrupt loans. Our findings are 
reinforced when Z-score is used, and support the results from fixed effect models.  
When HHI is replaced by the Boone indicator as a robustness exercise, the impact 
stemming from most control variables on TE/ROA is confirmed. It is noteworthy that the 
effects of capitalisation, the stock price index, and Z-score vary compared to prior results. 
In model 1 reported in Table 5, capital ratio is found to be negatively associated with TE, 
whilst the relationship turns out positive in the other models. There is an ambiguous 
picture for the effect of stock price index on performance as the Nikkei index consistently 
becomes negative in affecting TE. Z-score, previously found insignificant in model 1-
Table 3, appears positive and significant. Yet, the magnitude of the effect is 
approximately zero, similar to the former result. We also find the same variation for these 
variables in our two-stage least square analysis, except the effect of capital ratio which is 
convincingly positive and significant.  
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Table 5. Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance - Fixed effect models – Robustness check 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent variable TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA 
Capital ratio -0.0128*** 0.0245* 0.0076 0.2482*** 0.2401*** 0.2508*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0133) (0.0081) (0.0691) (0.0702) (0.0693) 
Net interest margin 0.0478*** 0.0402*** 0.0273** -0.0756** -0.0613** -0.0642** 
  (0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0105) (0.0296) (0.0278) (0.0285) 
Nikkei index -0.0027*** -0.0003 -0.0009*** 0.0021*** 0.0012* 0.0019*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Industrial production 0.0116*** 0.0108*** 0.001 0.0015 0.0029** 0.0051*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
Boone indicator -0.1003*** -0.0824*** -0.0551*** 0.0272*** 0.0154** 0.0134* 
  (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0076) (0.0064) (0.008) 
Quantitative easing -0.0055*** -0.0046*** -0.0039*** 0.0017*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Z-score 0.0003***   0.0000   
  (0.0000)   (0.0001)   
Bankrupt loans  0.0046***   -0.0030***  
   (0.0005)   (0.0006)  
Restructured loans   0.0031***   -0.0009*** 
    (0.0003)   (0.0002) 
Constant 0.6378*** 0.5655*** 0.6298*** -0.0546*** -0.0149 -0.0558*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0079) (0.0039) (0.008) (0.0106) (0.0065) 
R-sq 0.0040 0.2767 0.1971 0.4805 0.3764 0.0920 
p value (F-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: This Table reports results of the fixed effect models examining the impact of control variables on technical efficiency and return on assets (ROA). We replace HHI with 
the Boone indicator as a proxy for competition. The proxy for risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models. Quantitative easing is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Z-score=(ROA+capital ratio)/σROA. Bankrupt loans=Bankrupt loans+Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans=past due loans 
over 3 months but less than 6 months+Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance - Two-stage least squares models – Robustness check 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent variable TE TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Capital ratio 0.1152** -0.0583 0.0685*** 0.0254*** 0.1453*** 0.1840*** 0.1859*** 0.2065*** 
  (0.0483) (0.0371) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0295) (0.0282) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Net interest margin 0.1098*** 0.0854*** 0.0667*** 0.0471*** -0.0931*** -0.0559*** -0.0622*** -0.0639*** 
  (0.0197) (0.0178) (0.0160) (0.0142) (0.0224) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0222) 
Nikkei index -0.0028*** -0.0048*** -0.0016*** -0.0020*** 0.0018** 0.0031*** 0.0014** 0.0020*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Industrial Production 0.0181*** 0.0139*** 0.0132*** 0.0015*** -0.0008 0.0025 0.0028* 0.0060*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Boone indicator -0.0962*** -0.0964*** -0.0757*** -0.0458*** 0.0227*** 0.0210*** 0.0124*** 0.0073* 
  (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0042) 
Quantitative easing -0.0042*** -0.0049*** -0.0038*** -0.0031*** 0.0011*** 0.0014*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Z-score  -0.0003 0.0005***   0.0003** -0.0001   
  (0.0002) (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.0001)   
Bankrupt loans    0.0054***    -0.0032***  
    (0.0003)    (0.0003)  
Restructured loans     0.0035***    -0.0012*** 
     (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
Constant 0.6031*** 0.6357*** 0.5464*** 0.6235*** -0.0397*** -0.0603*** -0.0105 -0.0539*** 
  (0.0106) (0.0086) (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0097) (0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0068) 
R-sq  0.0207 0.006 0.3267 0.2337 0.0792 0.1156 0.0920 0.1400 
p value (chi2-test) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: This Table reports results of the two-stage least squares models examining the impact of control variables on technical efficiency and return on assets (ROA). We replace HHI 
with the Boone indicator as a proxy for competition. The proxy for risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models with different instruments. 
Quantitative easing is proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves. Z-score=(ROA+capital ratio)/σROA. Bankrupt loans=Bankrupt loans+Non-accrual loans; Restructured 
loans=past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months+Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Our robustness exercise reveals firm evidence to portray a negative relationship 
between quantitative easing and TE, whereas it is positive in the case of ROA. A potential 
explanation could lie on fewer interest expenses due to the virtually zero interest rate 
policy that could results in higher return on assets. However, expansionary policy which 
stimulates investments and funding, especially when aiming to channelling credit to 
SMEs, could create a latent problem of adverse selection and decelerate the progress of 
contracting problem loans (International Monetary Fund, 2003). Low interest rates could 
also heighten banks’ risk-tolerance through higher asset prices and collateral values 
(Altunbas et al., 2010). Given the adverse effect of the banking crisis in Japan, a contrast 
experience of risk-aversion could also prevail, causing banks which had undergone the 
distressed period to hesitate to extend credit. In fact, although ample liquidity was 
provided by quantitative easing, bank lending did not rise proportionately during 1999-
2005 (Ito, 2006).  
The results are robust for the impact of competition on performance. Indicated in 
Boone et al. (2007), the larger the Boone indicator in absolute value signifies the higher 
the degree of competition. The reported coefficient of the Boone indicator in Tables 5 and 
6 confirm the competition – efficiency nexus hypothesising that heightened competition 
would stimulate banks to minimise costs and maximise outputs (Andrieş and Căpraru, 
2014; Schaeck and Cihák, 2008). In contrast, we find that intensified competition would 
refine return on assets of Japanese banks. This finding somewhat supports the 
“competition-fragility” hypothesis in the sense that tougher degree of competition puts 
more pressure on profit and eventually could lead to financial instability (Keeley, 1990). 
On the other hand, as the Boone indicator conveys bank market power, our result is more 
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robust in supporting findings of Fu et al. (2014) previously mentioned. Evidence of this 
hypothesis is also confirmed for Japanese banking in Liu and Wilson (2013). 
In terms of risk variables, both bankrupt and restructured loans significantly affect 
TE, which support the “moral hazard” and “skimping” hypotheses. It is worth noting that 
until this stage, we have not been able to assess the causality relationship between risk-
monitored loans and efficiency. These findings should be treated with some caution and 
it is the analysis of the panel VAR model that would shed light into their underlying 
relationships. 
3.6.3. Panel VAR analysis  
To capture the underlying dynamics, we apply panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
methodology. A VAR model allows us to relax any priori assumptions about the 
relationship between variables in the model. Instead, all variables entering the model are 
considered endogenous within a system of equations. We also account for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in our panel data by specifying individual specific terms (Love 
and Zicchino, 2006)21. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the impulse responses (IRFs) for 1 lag 
VAR technical efficiency, net interest margin, quantitative easing, bankrupt loans and 
restructured loans. The variance decompositions (VDCs) are reported in Tables 7 and 822. 
																																																						
21 To relax the restriction that all cross-sectional units in our panel data are the same, we incorporate the 
fixed effect µi, which is correlated with lags of the dependent variable. To remove the fixed effect in 
estimation without eliminating the orthogonality between the transformed variables and lagged regressors, 
we use forward mean-differencing, referred as the “Helmert procedure” (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The 
standard errors of the impulse response functions and their confidence intervals are estimated by Monte 
Carlo simulations. To illustrate the percent of the variation in one variable explained by the shock in another 
variable, we perform the variance decompositions (VDCs). We report the accumulated total effects through 
10 and 20 periods ahead. Please see Appendix B for the model specification. 
22 It is essential to select the optimal lag order j of the right-hand side variables in the equation system 
before estimation (Lütkepohl, 2007). It is constructed using the Arellano-Bover GMM estimator for the 
lags of j=1, 2 and 3 and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to decide the optimal lag order. The lag 
order 1 is proposed by the AIC, which is confirmed by the Arellano-Bond AR tests. More lags were added 
to detect evidence of autocorrelation. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for lag ordered one is not 
rejected in Sargan tests. According to the results from those tests, we estimate VAR of order one, also not 
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Figure 3. IRFs for TE, NIM, QE, Bankrupt loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with 
respect to one standard deviation shock in other variables. TE: technical efficiency; NIM: net interest 
margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Risk 1: Bankrupt loans= 
Bankrupt loans+ Non-accrual loans, s: number of periods. Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-
Carlo simulation. 
 
IRFs diagram describes the response of each variable in the VAR system to its own 
innovations and to innovations of other variables. The last diagram on the first row of 
Figure 3 shows that the response of TE to a shock in bankrupt loans is positive but small 
in magnitude. Put differently, a one standard deviation shock to bankrupt loans will raise 
technical efficiency visibly in the first three periods. After the first two periods, the 
confidence interval becomes wider. Hence, we could deduce that in the short-run, the 
relationship initiates from bankrupt loans to efficiency. This finding is related to the 
“moral hazard” and “skimping” hypothesis, in line with Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and 
																																																						
to lose information and reduce degrees of freedom. Additionally, we perform normality tests for the 
residuals, employing the Shapiro-Francia W-test. The results confirm that there is no violation of the 
normality. 
	
	 
	
67 
Mamatzakis (2009) who report similar causality. Altunbas et al. (2007) also find that more 
efficient European banks take on more risk. Under the “moral hazard, skimping” 
hypothesis, bank efficiency could be improved because of less inputs used corresponding 
to credit screening, loan monitoring and management. Banks might also be induced to 
involve in more credit screening relaxation to offset the loss of problem loans (Fiordelisi 
et al., 2011). This particular finding for Japan in terms of reverse causality could reflect 
the effect of quantitative easing through bank lending. Previously discussed in Section 2, 
apart from the central period of quantitative easing, the Bank of Japan has pursued 
aggressive unconventional monetary policy since December 2012 in accordance with the 
Abenomics. On the other hand, the potential “moral hazard” problem could also arise from 
government support and SME financing facilitation. The fact that bank lending expands 
could increase the likelihood of problem loans, followed by the rise of efficiency due to 
the attempt to “skip” management practices of bank managers.  
The first diagram in the last row of Figure 3 provides evidence of the reverse causal 
relationship between efficiency and bankrupt loans. In the short-run of the first two years, 
the response of bankrupt loans to a one standard deviation shock in technical efficiency 
is positive. The relationship might be explained under the “bad management” hypothesis. 
The magnitude of the response of bankrupt loans to a shock in TE (estimated at about 
0.025 in the first period) is larger than the magnitude of the response of efficiency to 
bankrupt loans’ innovations. The response of bankrupt loans turns out to be negative 
thereafter, reaching a value around -0.006 in the last observed period. We treat this finding 
with caution as the confidence interval expands after the first period. This case would 
imply that the “risk-averse management” hypothesis might come into play. 
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Interestingly, the causal relationship between restructured loans and efficiency lends 
support to the “bad luck” hypothesis. The last diagram on the first row of Figure 4 reveals 
that a one standard deviation shock in restructured loans would generate a negative 
response in efficiency. The magnitude of the effect is small but statistically significant in 
the short-run. The reverse causality is rejected as indicated in the first diagram on the last 
row of Figure 4, where we observe an insignificant response of restructured loans to a 
shock in efficiency. In line with the “bad luck” hypothesis, the relationship runs from 
restructured loans to efficiency, and carries a negative sign. When unexpected events lead 
to a rise in restructured loans, bank managers divert their focus to deal with delinquencies 
and loan supervision rather than daily operation. Additional operating costs associated 
with credit screening, loan monitoring, collateral liquidating, and writing-off bad debts 
would lessen bank efficiency.  
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Figure 4. IRFs for TE, NIM, QE, Restructured loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with 
respect to one standard deviation shock in other variables. TE: technical efficiency; NIM: net interest 
margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Risk 2: Restructured 
loans=past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months+Restructured loans; s: number of periods. Errors 
are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
 
In Figure 3, we observe a positive reaction of technical efficiency to a shock on net 
interest margin. A one standard deviation shock of net interest margin induces a positive 
response of technical efficiency, though the overall magnitude is small. In contrast, in 
Figure 4, the response of efficiency to a shock in net interest margin is negative after the 
first period. Regarding the response of technical efficiency to a one standard deviation 
shock in monetary policy as measured by quantitative easing, the results suggest a 
negative effect which is significant up to the second period in both Figures. These findings 
also further defend those reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
Both Figures 3 and 4 indicate a significant impact of a shock in net interest margin 
on the response of quantitative easing. This implies total reserves which act as a proxy 
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for quantitative easing would decline if there is a shock to net interest margin. In terms of 
the effect of a shock in technical efficiency on quantitative easing, we find a positive and 
significant response of quantitative easing (though only in the first two periods when 
bankrupt loans are included in the model). The positive response gradually declines over 
time, with greater magnitude when restructured loans are in the equation system.  
The effect of a shock in net interest margin on bankrupt loans and restructured loans 
is positive and significant. There is no specific pattern as the response of bankrupt loans 
to a shock in net interest margin varies over time, but overall exhibits a diminishing trend. 
The peak response takes place after period 1, with a large magnitude of about 0.05; while 
that magnitude is relatively stable around 0.1 for the response of restructured loans. 
Turning to the macroeconomic shock, the impact of a shock in quantitative easing on 
bankrupt loans is positively significant only in the first period; while it is insignificant on 
restructured loans. A weak implication here is, in the short-run, if the Bank of Japan 
reduces their asset purchase, interest rates might rise and borrowers would face extra costs 
associated with their future repayments. The probability that bankrupt loans increase 
would be more likely.  
The variance decompositions (VDCs) presented in Tables 7 and 8 enlighten our IRFs 
results. We report the total effect accumulated over 10 and 20 periods ahead. In Table 7, 
quantitative easing is found to explain 31.2% of the forecast error variance of efficiency, 
followed by bankrupt loans which account for approximately 14% of the variance after 
10 periods. The percent of variation in TE attributed to a shock in quantitative easing is 
higher for 20 periods ahead (increases to 41.6%). In contrast, TE’s variation described by 
a shock in bankrupt loans decreases to 11.1%. On the other hand, a small part of nearly 
1.7% forecast error variance 10 and 20 periods ahead in bankrupt loans is due to the shock 
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in technical efficiency. This implies the causality runs from bankrupt loans to efficiency, 
suggesting that the “bad luck” hypothesis could be valid. If we also take into account the 
findings from the IRFs, the “moral hazard” and “skimping” hypothesis is more 
appropriate to explain the relationship between risk and efficiency. Note that risk triggers 
the causal chain as indicated by the VDCs estimations. 
Table 7.  VDCs for TE, NIM, QE, and Bankrupt loans 
 s TE NIM QE Risk 1 
TE 10 0.4666 0.0814 0.3121 0.1399 
NIM 10 0.0058 0.8225 0.0709 0.1008 
QE 10 0.0386 0.0771 0.7339 0.1504 
Risk 1 10 0.0169 0.0609 0.1412 0.7809 
TE 20 0.3927 0.0801 0.4157 0.1114 
NIM 20 0.0060 0.8218 0.0714 0.1008 
QE 20 0.0388 0.0771 0.7309 0.1532 
Risk 1 20 0.0169 0.0602 0.1454 0.7775 
Notes: This Table reports the Variance Decompositions for the panel VAR with Bankrupt loans as a proxy 
for risk level. VDCs illustrate the percent of variation in one variable explained by the shock in another 
variable. We report the accumulated total effects through 10 and 20 periods ahead. TE: technical efficiency; 
NIM: net interest margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Risk 
1: Bankrupt loans=Bankrupt loans+Non-accrual loans; s: number of periods. 
 
In the case of restructured loans (Table 8), quantitative easing is also important in 
explaining 37.1% of the forecast error variance of efficiency over 10 periods. 
Disturbances in restructured loans account for 28% of efficiency’s variation, and become 
more prominent in explaining up to 44.5% after 20 periods. In contrast, efficiency’s 
innovations account for only about 1% variation of restructured loans. These results 
reinforce findings from the IRFs in the sense that the causality runs from restructured 
loans to efficiency, in line with the “bad luck” hypothesis. 
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Table 8.  VDCs for TE, NIM, QE, and Restructured loans 
 s TE NIM QE Risk 2 
TE 10 0.3346 0.0141 0.3713 0.2800 
NIM 10 0.0492 0.7348 0.0002 0.2159 
QE 10 0.2028 0.0346 0.5259 0.2367 
Risk 2 10 0.0103 0.0748 0.0001 0.9148 
TE 20 0.2280 0.0270 0.2999 0.4450 
NIM 20 0.0462 0.6776 0.0003 0.2759 
QE 20 0.1663 0.0422 0.4254 0.3660 
Risk 2 20 0.0113 0.0745 0.0004 0.9138 
Notes: This Table reports the Variance Decompositions for the panel VAR with Restructured loans as a 
proxy for risk level. VDCs illustrate the percent of variation in one variable explained by the shock in 
another variable. We report the accumulated total effects through 10 and 20 periods ahead. TE: technical 
efficiency; NIM: net interest margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total 
reserves; Risk 2: Restructured loans=past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months+Restructured 
loans; s: number of periods. 
 
Bankrupt loans and restructured loans are found to elucidate a large percent of the 
variation on net interest margin and quantitative easing. In contrast, the shock in net 
interest margin accounts for a small percent of variation in bankrupt loans (about 6%) and 
restructured loans (about 7.5%), confirming that the causality would run from bankrupt 
and restructured loans to net interest margin. In the case of restructured loans23, this 
finding supports the argument in Angbazo (1997), Wong (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999). Net interest margin would increase in response to a higher degree of 
risk as banks require a higher rate of return to offset the potential loss from risky 
portfolios. Interestingly, the causal relation between quantitative easing and bankrupt 
loans is not persuasively confirmed as being run from bankrupt loans. A shock in bankrupt 
loans explains slightly more variation in the forecast error of quantitative easing (15%) 
in comparison with a shock in quantitative easing interpreting bankrupt loans’ variation 
(14%). Either way, the relationship carries a positive sign. However, it is evident that the 
																																																						
23 Please refer to Figure 4, second row, last diagram.	
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relationship would run from restructured loans to quantitative easing. In general, our 
analysis indicates that bankrupt and restructured loans cause the changes of TE and other 
variables, rather than being affected.  
3.7. Conclusion 
This paper provides an additional angle of how to model bank production process so 
as to include undesirable outputs. We cover a large period that allows us to extensively 
analyse the changes in bank efficiency and its response to shocks. We report that Japanese 
banks’ efficiency remains rather low with a mean technical efficiency level of 0.612. The 
slight downward trend of efficiency also implies that banks do not seem to fully revive or 
perform more efficiently after overcoming the crisis. We further find that Regional Banks 
II operate more efficiently than their counterparts do. Unlike Barros et al. (2012), our 
findings show that City Banks are less efficient than Regional Banks. Regarding the 
impacts of undesirable outputs, problem loans are more influential in efficiency 
estimation than problem other earning assets. The model suggests that Japanese banks 
could increase their good outputs by 63.4%, whilst simultaneously reducing bad outputs 
and inputs by 38.8%. To enhance efficiency, Japanese banks could also diversify their 
loan and investment portfolios to achieve the optimal desirable output mix. Additionally, 
investing in technology innovation would assist a bank to be ahead of their peers in 
attracting customers. Although short-run costs would rise, the benefits for customers and 
long-term cost savings could generate higher efficiency in the long-run. 
In the latter stage analysis, we explore the impact of bankrupt loans and restructured 
loans on bank efficiency. We report that the response of technical efficiency is positive 
to a shock in bankrupt loans, but negative to a shock in restructured loans. There is 
evidence showing that bankrupt and restructured loans significantly explain the variation 
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in technical efficiency, net interest margin, and quantitative easing. The relationship 
between bankrupt loans and efficiency resembles the “moral hazard” and “skimping” 
hypotheses, with the causality originating from bankrupt loans to efficiency. Banks would 
appear to be more efficient in the short-run because of fewer inputs associated with the 
loan-issuing process, and the motivation to compensate the loss from bankrupt loans. 
However, restructured loans are revealed to affect efficiency under the “bad luck” 
hypothesis. When restructured loans arise due to unexpected events, banks might face 
excessive operating costs to defend their financial health. We also examine the impact of 
quantitative easing on bank efficiency. We argue that changes in monetary policy 
diminish technical efficiency in the short-run, but with a small magnitude. This finding 
implies that quantitative easing tool might not be useful in strengthening bank 
performance. Among the panel VAR variables, a shock in net interest margin - a bank 
specific factor - does not greatly explain the variation of efficiency.  
Our analysis sheds light for regulators and supervisors in terms of maintaining 
financial stability. There is evidence to convince that the favourable appearance of bank 
efficiency corresponds to more risky portfolios which are represented by the level of 
bankrupt loans. Regulators would need to prudently control the level of risk-taking in 
commercial banks as well as their loan issuance process. Lending standards, the screening 
process, and management practices are the potential areas to be examined so that the 
compliance with these procedures is ensured. On the other hand, based on findings from 
the impact of restructured loans on efficiency, effective regulatory procedures to preserve 
and enhance financial stability would help lessen bank default risk and improve 
performance. In detail, for instance, an early warning system for the potential 
macroeconomic disturbances could be helpful for bank risk management. Alongside the 
minimum capital requirement, encouraging higher level of capital to be kept by banks can 
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enhance their resilience to economic shocks. In addition, promoting diversification or a 
lower proportion of loans in the components of assets can reduce banks’ exposure to 
uncontrollable events. Besides, prompt responses of the government to natural disasters, 
such as the Tohoku earthquake/tsunami in 2011, should be acknowledged for assisting 
banks and firms in encountering unexpected events, hence mitigating the adverse effects 
which can lead to a rise in restructured loans. To sum up, both highly efficient banks and 
worst performing banks should be supervised thoroughly as their efficiency scores act as 
a warning for heightened uncertainty.  
In light of the ongoing Abenomics policy to drive Japan out of the deflation cycle, 
our finding for the impact of quantitative easing on technical efficiency and bankrupt 
loans could be supportive for future research in the Bank of Japan monetary easing policy. 
As there is no consensus evidence in the literature about the effectiveness of quantitative 
easing during March 2001-March 2006, the continuation of the zero interest rate policy 
and asset purchase programs from 2012 could provide an interesting platform for 
investigating their impact on bank productivity and financial stability. Not exclusively, 
one could directly control for the effect of bankrupt and restructured loans in measuring 
Japanese bank productivity growth. Departing from this study, we would conjecture a 
detrimental impact of these risk-monitored loans on bank productivity. 
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Bankrupt and  
quasi-bankrupt assets 
Total loans     Other assets 
Problem assets based on the 
Financial Reconstruction Law 
Risk-monitored loans 
Total loans 
  
Doubtful assets 
Substandard loans 
(A) 
Bankrupt loans 
Non-accrual loans 
Past due loans (3 
months or more) 
Restructured loans 
(B) 
Other assets 
(C) 
Appendices – Chapter 3 
A. Problem assets based on the Financial Reconstruction Law and Risk-
monitored loans 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: (A) – (B) = (C) 
Notes: This Appendix presents the two classifications of problem assets in Japan. The difference between 
the two is other assets which are problem other earning assets (claims related to securities lending, foreign 
exchanges, accrued interests, suspense payments, customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, and 
bank-guaranteed bonds sold through private placements). Risk-monitored loans are disclosed in accordance 
with the Banking Law, which we use to represent the potential risk. In this paper, Bankrupt loans are named 
after the sum of Bankrupt loans and Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans are named after the sum of past 
due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months and Restructured loans. Problem loans are the sum of 
bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, doubtful loans and substandard loans. Problem other earning assets are the sum 
of bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, and doubtful other earning assets. Source: Interim report 2010-Sumitomo 
Mitsui Financial group. 
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B. Panel VAR model 
The first order VAR model takes the form of: 
TtNieww tiitiit ,...,1;,...,1,1 ==+F+= -µ     Eq. (B.1) 
where wit is a vector of four random variables, technical efficiency Ef, net interest margin 
NIM, quantitative easing QE, and risk R (bankrupt and restructured loans), Φ is a 4x4 
matrix of coefficients, µi is a vector of m individual effects, µ0t is a time dummy, and ei,t 
is a multivariate white-noise vector of m residuals. The equation system to be estimated 
is as follows: 
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             Eq. (B.2) 
The residuals ei,t captures the exogenous shocks to the endogenous variables in the 
VAR system. The moving average (MA) representation equates Efit , NIMit , QEit and Rit 
on present and past residuals e1 , e2 , e3 and e4 from the VAR estimation: 
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The composite error term in the underlying structural model contains no economic 
implication, unless the equation is transformed. The orthogonalisation of impulse 
responses enables us to interpret the reaction of one variable to a shock in another variable 
in the system. Love and Zicchino (2006) opt for this technique in order to separate the 
influence of different variables in one variable of interest by holding other shocks 
constant. Because it is very unlikely that the covariance matrix of the error terms is 
diagonal, it is required that the residuals are decomposed following a procedure (such as 
Cholesky decomposition) to become orthogonal. A particular ordering is specified 
according to the degree of endogeneity of each variable. It is assumed that the variables 
appear first are more exogenous, and the ones appear later are more endogenous. The 
orthogonalised, or structural, MA representation is: 
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Eq. (B.5) 
where P is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the residuals: 
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C. The Boone indicator 
Derived from the log-linear relationship between marginal cost mc and profit π in 
equation C.1, the Boone indicator should be generally negative (Boone et al., 2007). The 
larger the Boone indicator in absolute value, the more intensified the competition.  
ii mclnln bap +=         Eq. (C.1) 
In order to obtain time-varying Boone indicator, we add a time dummy dt and run the 
following regression (Schaeck and Cihák, 2014; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011): 
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In line with Fiordelisi and Mare (2014), marginal cost is obtained from the translog 
cost function:  
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Eq. (C.3) 
where TCit is total costs which are the sum of interest and investment expenses, and 
general and administrative expenses; Q is total earning assets (loans, investments, and 
securities) (Delis, 2012). Price of funds P1 is defined as interest and investment 
expenses/deposits and borrowed funds. Due to data unavailability, we are unable to 
extract data from general and administrative expenses which include personnel expenses 
and non-personnel expenses associated to physical capital. Hence, in line with Hensel 
(2006) and Fu et al. (2014), we define the second input price as price of overhead P2 as 
general and administrative expenses divided by the number of employees. Time trend is 
t, and εit is a two-component error term capturing inefficiency and a two-sided error term. 
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The marginal costs can be derived from Eq.(C.3) as follows (Fu et al., 2014): 
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Chapter 4. What is the Impact of Problem Loans on Japanese 
Bank Productivity Growth? 
4.1. Introduction 
There has been extensive theoretical and empirical research into the field of firm 
efficiency and productivity (Heshmati et al., 2014; Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2016; Sun 
et al., 2015). In terms of bank efficiency and productivity, the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis has driven a surge of banking studies (Matousek et al., 2015; Tsionas et 
al., 2015), unfolding the paramount importance of financial intermediaries within the 
economic system. In terms of productivity growth, evidence is rather limited with studies 
that apply parametric methods to evaluate bank productivity (Boucinha et al., 2013; Feng 
and Serletis, 2010; Feng and Zhang, 2012, 2014). As indicated in a review of non-
parametric productivity applied in banking by Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), the majority of 
studies adopt a non-parametric approach (Fukuyama and Weber, 2005, 2010; Liu and 
Tone, 2008).  
Our study extends the literature on bank productivity by opting for a parametric 
estimation technique. We decompose bank productivity growth into different 
components, namely the effects of problem loans, which are essentially undesirable 
outputs, quasi-fixed input, returns to scale, and technological change. The Japanese 
banking system is of interest as its performance has been undermined by an 
unprecedented volume of bankrupt and restructured loans. These loans are referred as 
risk-monitored loans disclosed in accordance with the Japanese Banking Law. Moreover, 
in Japanese banking literature, bank efficiency studies have dominated the research field 
of bank performance, for example Drake and Hall (2003), Fukuyama and Weber (2005), 
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Fukuyama and Weber (2010), Barros et al. (2012), Yang and Morita (2013). Japanese 
bank productivity has been rather neglected (Assaf et al., 2011; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Fukuyama et al., 1999).  
We, thus, fill a gap in the literature and apply for the first time a productivity growth 
decomposition to Japanese banks, where problem loans’ impact would be revealed.24 
Previous literature has considered nonperforming loans as uncontrollable inputs (Drake 
and Hall, 2003; Hughes and Mester, 2010), a quality variable (Hughes and Mester, 1998), 
or undesirable outputs in the banking production process (Assaf et al., 2013; Barros et al., 
2012; Berg et al., 1992; Fukuyama and Weber, 2008; Glass et al., 2014; Mamatzakis et 
al., 2015; Park and Weber, 2006). We follow the last stream of literature to treat bankrupt 
and restructured loans as undesirable outputs in our productivity decomposition. Given 
the extensive volume of bankrupt and restructured loans in Japan, we expect that they 
have an impact on bank productivity. Arguably, banks may receive payments of the 
principal and interest on these loans subject to borrowers’ financial health. These overdue 
loans in turn would raise bank’s operating costs in the short-run. Hence, one would expect 
these loans to deteriorate bank productivity.  
Alongside bankrupt and restructured loans, we also employ equity as a quasi-fixed 
input (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Hughes et al., 2001; Ray and Das, 2010). Within a 
short period, it would be unfeasible to adjust the level of equity considerably and quickly 
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2014). In the event of unexpected losses, the level of equity 
is of utmost importance to ensure bank safety and soundness, preventing banks from 
temporary illiquidity and insolvency (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). Equity would also 
																																																						
24	The decomposition is similar to decomposing productivity growth with respect to public infrastructure 
in agriculture (Mamatzakis, 2003; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996) or branch growth in banking (Kim and 
Weiss, 1989). 
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serve as a cost-reducing factor due to less interest paid for debt financing (Hughes and 
Mester, 2013). Finally, the inclusion of equity in our productivity decomposition is of 
importance for Japan. The reason is that during the banking crisis in the late 1990s, there 
was a prolonged period of undercapitalisation until the early 2000s. The Japanese 
authorities responded by injecting public capital four times between March 1998 and June 
2003 (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010), hoping to stabilise the financial market and revive the 
banking industry. 
 The contribution of this study can be summarised in the following ways. First, we 
expand the parametric methodological literature of bank productivity growth (Boucinha 
et al., 2013; Casu et al., 2013; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2014) as opposed to the 
broadly applied nonparametric one (Alam, 2001; Berg et al., 1992; Delis et al., 2011; 
Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010; Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1997; Kao and Liu, 2014; 
Wheelock and Wilson, 1999). Our paper refers to Japan, which serves as an excellent 
case study given the trouble of its banking industry (Barros et al., 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Fukuyama and Weber, 2002). Second, we exploit a new data set of bankrupt and 
restructured loans, which are disaggregated from “risk-monitored loans” disclosed 
subject to the Japanese Banking Law. The adopted approach enables a comprehensive 
analysis by allowing for the impact of these loans on total factor productivity growth. 
Finally, we test for convergence – catching up effect – among Japanese banks and 
geographic regions by using club convergence analysis proposed by Phillips and Sul 
(2007). 
Our results show that productivity growth in Japanese commercial banks is impaired 
by the impact of bankrupt loans. The destructive effect of these loans varies over time, 
appearing to capture events such as government interventions, the global financial crisis, 
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and the Tohoku tsunami/earthquake. Interestingly, restructured loans are among the 
drivers of productivity growth, as they are found to lower costs. With regard to the club 
convergence analysis, we find divergence in productivity growth across regions over 
time. However, some integration, and thus convergence, is identified for Regional Banks 
I, whereas there exist some clubs of convergence within City Banks, and within the 
regions of Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Chugoku, and Shikoku.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the literature in bank productivity. Section 4.3 presents the methodology, 
followed by the data description in section 4.4. Empirical results are provided in section 
4.5, and convergence tests are discussed in section 4.6. Finally, section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2. Literature review 
This section highlights the literature in bank productivity with a particular focus on 
nonparametric and parametric techniques used to decompose total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth. According to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003), both approaches need 
calculation or estimation of a representation of production technology to answer: i) how 
productivity change can be measured and ii) what the sources of measured productivity 
change are (page 279). However, only the parametric approach is able to provide the 
answers to both questions in a stochastic environment. In what follows, we survey the 
studies that apply both methodologies to measure bank productivity. 
4.2.1. Non-parametric studies 
As indicated in a comprehensive review for bank efficiency and productivity (Fethi 
and Pasiouras, 2010), the majority of productivity studies conducted before 2010 apply 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to decompose the Malmquist productivity index 
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(Malmquist, 1953). This Malmquist TFP index measures the change in TFP between two 
data points by computing the ratio of the distances between each data point relative to a 
common technology (Casu et al., 2004). If an output distance function is utilised to derive 
the index, the Malmquist (output oriented) TFP change index taking a value greater than 
one (less than one) will indicate positive (negative) TFP growth between the base period 
and the following period. Banking applications which apply and adjust the Malmquist 
productivity index include Berg et al. (1992), Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1997), Wheelock 
and Wilson (1999), Alam (2001), Mukherjee et al. (2001), Casu et al. (2004), Lozano-
Vivas and Pastor (2006), Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008), Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), 
Delis et al. (2011), and Kao and Liu (2014). 
A number of studies examine bank productivity growth during the deregulation 
period in the 1980s. Berg et al. (1992) obtain the productivity index for Norwegian 
banking between 1980 and 1989. The largest banks are found to be strongly productive 
after deregulation. The worst performing banks also experienced productivity growth. 
Examining US banking, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Alam (2001) show that the 
driving factor for productivity growth was advances in technology during 1980s-1990s. 
Evidenced in Alam (2001), banks in states with limited branching obtained productivity 
growth through the incorporation of new technology into operation. Differently, banks in 
states allowing state-wide branching achieved productivity gain from catching up with 
the best performing banks. In unit-banking states, banks suffered from a decline in 
productivity growth due to the confined regulatory environment. Similarly, Tirtiroglu et 
al. (2005) show that intrastate branching deregulation had a pronounced and long-run 
effect on bank productivity growth. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) also report a presence 
of technological progress. However, there was a decline in average productivity growth 
during 1984-1993, when the majority of banks failed to keep up with the innovative 
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technology. Banks of all size also experienced an increase in inefficiency. Deregulation 
is also reported to enhance productivity growth of Portuguese banks which were created 
and transformed post-deregulation period 1990-1995 (Canhoto and Dermine, 2003). 
Significant growth as a result of financial deregulation is also found for Turkish banks 
between 1981 and 1990 (Isik and Hassan, 2003).  
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1997) replace the Malmquist productivity index by a 
generalised Malmquist productivity index, allowing for the measurement of the 
contribution of scale economies on productivity growth. In more details, for Spanish 
commercial banks and fast-growing saving banks over the 1986-1993 period, Grifell-
Tatjé and Lovell (1997) report greater productivity growth for the former (2.6% compared 
to 2.1% annually). Both categories benefited from the improvement of best-practice 
banks, while the scale effect had little contribution to productivity growth. Also 
examining Spanish banks, Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) use a bootstrapping technique to 
derive the Malmquist index in order to draw statistical inferences with regard to the 
significance of the index. By using this technique, one is able to obtain confidence 
intervals which are subsequently used to test whether the Malmquist productivity index 
is significantly greater or less than one at a given significance level. The results indicate 
that during 1992-1998, the majority of Spanish saving banks experienced productivity 
growth, statistically significant at 5% level. Kao and Liu (2014) is a recent study 
proposing that the Malmquist productivity index should be probabilistic as banking 
operations are subject to high externalities. A probabilistic analysis is carried out on data 
of Taiwanese banks after the second financial restructuring 2004. Kao and Liu (2014) 
argue that this type of analysis provides managers with probability information alongside 
average values, thus, strengthening information reliability. 
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Studies computing and comparing bank productivity growth in European banking 
also prevail in the literature, e.g. Casu et al. (2004), Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), and 
Delis et al. (2011). Based on the nonparametric approach, Casu et al. (2004) find different 
trends in productivity change of European banks (1994-2000). Modest productivity 
growth is reported for British, French, and German banks, while strong growth is found 
for Spanish and Italian banks. Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) obtain TFP growth of 
European banking by using similar techniques. Focusing on the impact of each 
component of the Malmquist productivity index, Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) further 
examine the role of productivity growth in explaining shareholders’ value. Technological 
change was the most productive component which contributed to shareholder’s value. 
Delis et al. (2011) examine bank productivity growth of 22 new EU members between 
1999 and 2009, in light of the regulation for transition countries in Europe. Covering also 
Japan and the US, Lozano-Vivas and Pastor (2006) also suggest that technological 
progress is a driving factor for the convergence of productivity growth.  
A development of the Malmquist index is the Luenberger productivity indicator 
(Chambers, 2002; Luenberger, 1992), which measures productivity in difference form. 
Unlike the Malmquist index, the Luenberger indicator can account for an expansion in 
outputs and a contraction in inputs simultaneously. Studies that compute the Luenberger 
indicator for banking industries are Park and Weber (2006) (Korean banks 1992-2002), 
Epure et al. (2011) (Spanish banks 1998-2006), Williams et al. (2011) (saving banks in 
10 European countries 1996-2003), Chang et al. (2012) (Chinese banks 2002-2009), and 
Fujii et al. (2014) (Indian banks 2004-2011). 
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4.2.2. Parametric studies 
Bank productivity in parametric studies is mainly derived from estimating cost, 
profit, or distance functions. There is extensive research on productivity growth of US 
and European banking industries, such as Stiroh (2000), Berger and Mester (2003), Feng 
and Serletis (2010), Feng and Zhang (2012), and Feng and Zhang (2014) among others. 
European banking systems also attract research interest, e.g. Chaffai et al. (2001) 
Kumbhakar et al. (2001), Orea (2002), Casu et al. (2004), Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. 
(2009), and Boucinha et al. (2013). Empirical research focusing on banks in other 
countries includes Kim and Weiss (1989), Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), and Casu et al. 
(2013). In what follows, we review the studies based on the underlying functional form 
employed.	
For the use of the cost function, Kim and Weiss (1989) estimate an equation system 
consisting of the translog cost function and cost shares of inputs to examine the effect of 
branches on TFP growth of Israeli banks during 1979-1982. The results show that during 
three years, TFP of Israeli banks increased at an average of 7.79% per year. The 
contribution of branch growth is found to be less than that of technical change, although 
they were both significant drivers of TFP growth, especially for small banks. For the 
Indian banking sector from 1985 to 1996, Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) estimate a 
translog shadow cost function together with one equation of the shadow cost share of one 
input, using seemingly unrelated regression. TFP growth is decomposed into three 
components: a scale factor, a technological change, and a miscellaneous part. All three 
factors depend on regulation via shadow prices of inputs which are a product of actual 
input prices and a function component defined as the distortion function of labour relative 
to capital. Results show a decreasing trend of productivity growth around the deregulation 
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period, followed by an upward trend after deregulation. Regardless of the ownership 
structure, the scale component was the main force of TFP growth in all banks. Estimating 
a cost function on its own by using stochastic frontier analysis, Boucinha et al. (2013) 
obtain the estimated parameters and compute total factor productivity change for 
Portuguese banks. Their results suggest that technological progress was the main driver 
of total factor productivity change from 1992 to 2006. 
Also utilising the cost function, Stiroh (2000) examines productivity in US bank 
holding companies during the 1990s using several econometric approaches: i) pooling 
annual data and estimate the shift from the cost function; ii) incorporating bank holding 
companies’ specific effects in panel data, and estimating the shift in a common cost 
function; and iii) decomposing total cost changes into changes in business conditions and 
in productivity. They find quite consistent results (0.4% yearly in average) across 
different techniques with different specifications of outputs. 
Berger and Mester (2003) estimate cost and profit functions for US banks during 
1991-1997 to obtain cost productivity change and profit productivity change. Productivity 
change in this study is defined as changes in best practice and changes in inefficiency. 
Focusing on off-balance sheet variables, Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2014) also obtain 
productivity change by applying this parametric decomposition on an international 
sample for the period 1999-2006. Using a translog profit function, Kumbhakar et al. 
(2001) measure productivity change as the sum of technical change which is defined as 
shifts in the profit frontier, and variation in the components of profit technical efficiency. 
For Spanish saving banks during 1986-1995, there was evidence for high technical 
inefficiency, but significant technical progress.  
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Chaffai et al. (2001) use a stochastic output distance function to decompose the 
Malmquist index into pure technological effect and environmental effect. During 1993-
1997, among the banking industries in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the 
environmental effect was more significant than the other factor in explaining the 
productivity gaps between countries. Orea (2002) also opts for the distance function to 
introduce a parametric decomposition of a generalised Malmquist productivity index. The 
TFP index in Orea (2002) is contributed by the Malmquist productivity index and a 
returns to scale term. Applying the parametric decomposition for Spanish saving banks 
(1985-1998), Orea (2002) finds that TFP growth was mainly attributed to technical 
progress, although the scale effect also revealed a positive impact on productivity change. 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) parameterise the directional distance function to 
examine Luenberger productivity indicator for banking industries in Central and Eastern 
European countries (1998-2003). Their finding suggests that the dominant factor driving 
productivity growth was technological change. Feng and Zhang (2012) and Feng and 
Zhang (2014) adopt a true random stochastic distance frontier model to allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity among US banks. The “output-distance-function-based-
Divisa” productivity index proposed in Feng and Serletis (2010) is used in these studies 
to measure TFP growth of large US banks. 
Following the parametric technique in Berger and Mester (2003), Casu et al. (2004) 
obtain productivity growth of European banking sectors to compare with findings from 
the Malmquist index. Their results confirm the strong productivity growth for Italian and 
Spanish banks, whereas mixed evidence is reported for the German and French banking 
sectors. Productivity growth is found to mostly stem from technical change rather than 
the catching up of non-best-practice financial institutions. Casu et al. (2013) also use both 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate 
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productivity change of Indian banks 1992-2009. They further conduct a metafrontier 
analysis to account for technology heterogeneity amongst banks with different ownership 
structures. 
It is noteworthy to emphasise that a semi-parametric approach has emerged in the 
efficiency and productivity literature (Sun and Kumbhakar, 2013; Sun et al., 2015). 
Flexibility is the main feature of this approach that attracts research interest. This 
methodology to measure productivity, however, has been mainly applied in nonbanking 
research (Heshmati et al., 2014). Sun et al. (2015) propose a semiparametric cost frontier 
of which the slope coefficients are a nonparametric function of the time trend. The 
semiparametric cost function is estimated first, followed by a decomposition of 
inefficiency into time-varying and time-invariant components. Finally, productivity is 
decomposed based on the estimated cost frontier. Although the authors use Norwegian 
farming data set as an example, this methodology could also be of interest for banking 
applications.  
4.2.3. Productivity growth in Japanese banking 
This section reviews the productivity literature with regard to the Japanese banking 
industry. As Barros et al. (2009) point out, there are limited studies examining 
productivity growth in Japanese banks in general. Productivity growth studies in Japanese 
banking are also dominated by those adopting nonparametric methodologies (Assaf et al., 
2011; Barros et al., 2009; Fukuyama, 1995; Fukuyama et al., 1999; Fukuyama and Weber, 
2002). Fukuyama et al. (1999), Barros et al. (2009), Assaf et al. (2011) are among a few 
studies publishing on cooperative banks. Fukuyama (1995) is a typical study investigating 
TFP growth of all commercial banks 1989-1991. 
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Estimating the Malmquist productivity index, Fukuyama (1995) finds evidence 
indicating that the collapse of the bubble economy resulted in lower productivity change 
index. Productivity loss is found to be attributed to reduction in efficiency. Similar 
technique of decomposition is applied in Fukuyama et al. (1999), following Färe and 
Grosskopf (1994). For both foreign and Japanese credit cooperatives, productivity had 
improved slowly during 1992-1994 before declining in 1995 due to the fall in efficiency. 
However, the number of credit cooperatives experiencing a greater fall in overall 
efficiency reduced over time, while the number of banks having technical progress 
increased. Foreign cooperative banks are found to have greater productivity growth 
(slower decline) than their Japanese counterparts. Fukuyama and Weber (2002) estimate 
a number of different specifications of the Malmquist productivity index, namely the 
indirect Malmquist–Russell productivity index, the indirect Malmquist–Farrell 
productivity index, and the indirect Malmquist output-based productivity index. All 
measures give evidence for a significant decline in productivity growth on average for 
Japanese banks operating between 1992 and 1996.  
Barros et al. (2009) employ the Malmquist productivity index and DEA to investigate 
the productivity growth and biased technological change in Japanese credit banks 
(Shinkin banks) in 2000-2006. The Malmquist index is disentangled into efficiency 
change and technological change composition. Technological change index then can be 
decomposed into three different component indices: output biased technological change, 
input biased technological change, and the magnitude of technological change. The 
results show that on average, Shinkin banks experienced negative productivity and 
technical efficiency change. The majority of them had a bias in using labour and fixed 
assets. Securities are also found to illustrate the bias in the production of relative outputs 
of most Shinkin banks. Similarly, Assaf et al. (2011) confirm that Shinkin banks do not 
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experience significant improvement in productivity growth during 2000-2006. They 
analyse productivity by using a bootstrapped Malmquist index, and further regress the 
scores on market share of deposits, number of branches, return on assets, net interest 
margin, and concentration ratio of deposits for the five largest banks. Except net interest 
margin, all other variables are significant in the contribution of productivity growth. 
To this end, the aim of our study in filling a gap in Japanese banking productivity 
growth literature is twofold. First, we enhance the literature in parametric productivity 
studies. Second, our parametric methodology allows for the impact of undesirable outputs 
and a quasi-fixed input on TFP growth, exploring further the principal effects of bankrupt 
and restructured loans on productivity growth of Japanese banks. 
4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Decomposing productivity growth  
The starting point is to minimise total cost given a production function F. This 
optimisation is: 
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where F denotes the production function with output quantity Y, input quantity X, input 
prices w (with k being the number of input prices), undesirable outputs b, equity E, and 
technology t. We treat equity E as quasi-fixed as it is difficult to adjust the quantity of 
equity quickly in the short-run (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2014). Hughes and Mester 
(2010) indicate that nonperforming loans can also be treated in the manner of accounting 
for a quasi-fixed “input” by including the level of nonperforming loans rather than the 
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price. In addition, reducing these loans, to some extent, is not under bank managers’ 
control, but the financial ability of borrowers and their willingness of repayment, as 
argued in	 Drake and Hall (2003). To derive the impact of undesirable outputs on 
productivity growth, we adopt the methodology proposed by Morrison and Schwartz 
(1996).  
The total differentiation of equation (1) with respect to time yields: 
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Dividing both sides of equation (3) by total cost C, multiplying and dividing the terms 
in the right hand side of equation (3) (except the last term) with input prices, outputs, 
undesirable outputs, and equity respectively, we obtain: 
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with a dot above variables denoting derivative with respect to time25; 
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technical change.      
																																																						
25 tww kk ¶¶=
×
; tYY mm ¶¶=
×
; tbb jj ¶¶=
×
; tEE ¶¶=
×
. Our data consist of K = 2 input prices, M = 2 
outputs, J = 2 undesirable outputs (bankrupt and restructured loans).	
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Thus, we can obtain equation (5):  
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Rearranging equation (5) with respect to Cte , we get: 
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From equation (6), we can obtain equation (11) by totally differentiating equation (2) 
with respect to time and with some arrangements detailed as below: 
 ▪ The total differentiation of equation (2) with respect to time is:  
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▪ Dividing both sides of equation (7) by total cost, we get:  
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▪ For the right-hand side of equation (8), multiplying and dividing the first term and 
second term with kw   and kX  respectively, we get: 
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▪ As CXwS kkk = , rearranging (9), we obtain: 
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▪ Thus, substituting the first two terms in the right-hand side of equation (6) by the left-
hand side of equation (10), we obtain equation (11): 
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The total factor productivity growth (if constant returns to scale, 1=CYe ), the Solow 
residual, showing the difference between the rate of change of outputs and the rate of 
change of inputs is: 
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In the case of nonconstant returns to scale, the traditional measure of productivity 
growth needs to be adjusted. Combining equations (11) and (12), we get: 
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Rearranging equation (13), we obtain equation (14): 
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The terms in the right-hand side of equation (14) are the impact of technological 
change ( )Cte- , the scale effect
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4.3.2. The translog function 
The specification of our translog cost function is as follows26: 
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(15) 
where wk, Ym, bj, E denote kth input price, mth output, jth undesirable output, and equity 
respectively. 
Applying Shephard’s lemma for equation (15), we obtain the shares of cost attributed 
to input price kth: 
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Total differentiating equation (15) with respect to output mth, undesirable output jth, 
and equity, we obtain: 
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26	Subscripts i for banks (i=1,..., N) and t for time (t=1,…, N) are omitted for simplification.	
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The cost function requires a monotonic condition of non-decreasing in w. We impose 
the usual symmetry restrictions sjjsnmmnlkkl ffbbaa === ,,  and linear homogeneity 
restriction on the cost function (15) with respect to input prices: 
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There are two input prices: price of fund, and price of physical capital and labour.27 
We estimate the model as specified from equations (15) to (20). The results obtained are 
then used to compute the impact of each component on productivity growth. 
4.4. Data 
This study employs a new data set of problem loans in Japan, providing new 
information of a critical bank undesirable output. Moreover, we disaggregate problem 
loans disclosed in accordance with the Japanese Banking Law into two categories. The 
first one consists of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears 
by six months or more. The second component comprises loans in arrears by 3 months or 
more but less than 6 months, and restructured loans. For simplicity, we name these two 
types of problem loans as bankrupt loans (BRL) and restructured loans (RSL) thereafter. 
Such disaggregation of problem loans has not been employed widely in the Japanese 
banking productivity literature (Mamatzakis et al., 2015). This disaggregation allows us 
to explore the extent to which each undesirable output, namely bankrupt loans and 
restructured loans, affects bank productivity.  
																																																						
27 Please refer to Data section.	The price of fund can be used to normalise. 
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In the aftermath of the asset price bubble that burst late 1990s in Japan, problem loans 
rose dramatically since a vast number of firms went bankrupt or experienced business 
difficulties. The cost of bankrupt and restructured loans in 1997 was 30 trillion JPY 
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2000). However, some estimate the actual value in excess of 100 
trillion JPY (Hoshino, 2002). After 1998, the government encouraged banks to increase 
their lending to small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) in order to ease the “credit 
crunch” (Hoshi, 2011; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). However, the fact that the government 
subsidised these unprofitable borrowers dampened the entry and investment of productive 
firms, leading to fewer good lending opportunities for solvent banks (Caballero et al., 
2008). Prior to 2002, the government had deployed rescue schemes by injecting capital 
and bailing out troubled banks, but it had been claimed that there was delay of much-
needed restructuring at the banking industry (Caballero et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
misdirected bank lending augmented the accumulated level of bankrupt and restructured 
loans. In 2002, the level of these loans fell, reflecting the effort of banks to reduce problem 
loans under the reform program introduced by Heizo Takenaka, who was in charge of the 
Financial Services Agency. After the recovering period, the global financial crisis 2007-
2008 somewhat increased further the level of bankrupt and restructured loans.   
We employ a unique semi-annual data set provided by the Japanese Bankers 
Association. Our panel data consist of 3484 observations for Japanese commercial banks 
- 10 City Banks, 65 Regional Banks I, and 56 Regional Banks II - from financial years 
2000 to 2014. City Banks are the largest banks amongst the three types. Apart from 
conventional banking activities, their operation spreads widely from security investment 
to ancillary services (Tadesse, 2006). Regional Banks, in contrast, strongly commit to the 
local development in their scope of business. They cater the financial need of SMEs 
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within their geographic regions. Regional Banks II are the smallest with a more 
prefectural focus.  
 To define outputs and input prices, we follow the widely accepted intermediation 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In our cost function, in line with Fukuyama and 
Weber (2009), Barros et al. (2012), Assaf et al. (2011), we specify two outputs: y1 net 
loans and bills discounted, and y2 earning assets which include investments, securities, 
and other earning assets. Because of data constraints, we are unable to extract data for 
personnel expenses or to obtain their share from noninterest expenses. Therefore, we 
define two input prices: price of fund, and price of physical capital and labour, in line 
with Fu et al. (2014). Price of fund w1 is the ratio of interest expenses divided by total 
deposits and borrowed funds. Price of physical capital and labour w2 is the ratio of 
noninterest expenses divided by fixed assets. Equity is included in the cost function as a 
quasi-fixed input (Hughes and Mester, 2013). Table 1 describes the summary statistics of 
key variables in our panel data. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
TC Total costs 57,055 172,876 153 2,267,130 
Y1 Net loans and bills discounted 3,342,342 8,387,483  124,016  76,700,336  
Y2 Earning assets 2,205,550  7,692,617  783  78,602,674  
w1 Price of fund 0.0012  0.0014  0.0001  0.0261  
w2 Price of physical capital and labour 0.7572  0.4241  0.0034  7.5558  
BRL Bankrupt loans 89,107  197,591  2,698  3,522,077  
RSL Restructured loans 43,424  154,252  48  2,701,164 
E Equity 242,010  678,690  2,845  7,425,766 
Notes: This Table reports summary statistics of main variables used in the translog cost function. Apart 
from w1 and w2, all other variables are in Million JPY. Total cost = interest expenses + noninterest expenses. 
Net loans and bills discounted = loans and bills discounted – bankrupt loans – restructured loans. Earning 
assets are call loans, receivables under resale agreement, receivables under securities borrowing 
transactions, bills bought, monetary claims bought, foreign exchanges, customers’ liabilities for 
acceptances and guarantees, investment securities, and other assets. Price of financial capital = interest 
expenses/(deposits + borrowed funds). Price of overhead = noninterest expense/fixed assets. Bankrupt loans 
= loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy + past due loans in arrears by 6 months or more. Restructured 
loans = past due loans in arrears by 3 months but less than 6 months + restructured loans. Std.Dev: Standard 
Deviation. 
 
4.5. Empirical results 
4.5.1. Cost elasticities with respect to undesirable outputs and equity 
Estimated parameters satisfy the monotonic condition and linear homogeneity 
constraints of the cost function.28 The coefficients are statistically significant with 
appropriate signs as expected. Bankrupt loans are found to have a slightly stronger impact 
on cost than restructured loans (the parameters are 0.0384 and 0.0203 respectively). The 
impact of equity on cost is positive and significant (0.0533). We report the elasticities of 
cost with respect to bankrupt loans, restructured loans, and equity in Table 2. Overall, for 
all banks in the sample, these variables expose a cost-augmenting effect. The average cost 
elasticities with respect to bankrupt loans, restructured loans, and equity are reported at 
																																																						
28 Please see Appendix A of this chapter. 
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0.0385, 0.0201, and 0.0537 respectively. In sub-periods, while the cost elasticity with 
respect to bankrupt loans appears to vary over time, the cost elasticity with respect to 
restructured loans decreases monotonically, turning out negative in the last two sub-
periods (-0.0002 and -0.0106). This negative cost elasticity is attributed to the negative 
values found for City Banks and Regional Banks I. In terms of equity, there is variability 
in cost elasticities. The largest magnitudes for cost elasticities with respect to equity are 
in the first two sub-periods, 0.0721 in September 2000-March 2003 and 0.0998 in 
September 2003-March 2006. This could reflect the high cost of equity prevailing during 
the acute phase of the banking crisis and the restructuring period. Afterwards, the cost 
elasticity with respect to equity declines to 0.0415 in September 2006-March 2009, and 
thereafter, further down to 0.0194 in September 2009-March 2012. This finding is in line 
with King (2009). King (2009) reports that the magnitude of the cost of equity incurred 
by Japanese banks is higher compared to that in other countries such as Canada, France, 
Germany, UK, and US. 
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Table 2. The elasticity of cost with respect to undesirable outputs and equity. 
Time 
All banks  City  Regional I  Regional II 
BRL RSL Equity  BRL RSL Equity  BRL RSL Equity  BRL RSL Equity 
Sep 2000-Mar 2003 0.0527 0.0510 0.0721  0.0286 -0.0166 -0.0959  0.0476 0.0456 0.0810  0.0619 0.0659 0.0834 
Sep 2003-Mar 2006 0.0313 0.0462 0.0998  0.0265 -0.0156 0.0265  0.0252 0.0395 0.1067  0.0399 0.0636 0.1012 
Sep 2006-Mar 2009 0.0470 0.0086 0.0415  0.0226 -0.0410 -0.0047  0.0405 0.0044 0.0453  0.0592 0.0212 0.0423 
Sep 2009-Mar 2012 0.0447 -0.0002 0.0194  0.0011 -0.0551 -0.0045  0.0386 -0.0022 0.0302  0.0601 0.0106 0.0067 
Sep 2012-Mar 2015 0.0148 -0.0106 0.0303  -0.0468 -0.0601 -0.0268  0.0103 -0.0133 0.0411  0.0296 0.0000 0.0210 
Sep 2000-Mar 2015 0.0385 0.0201 0.0537  0.0088 -0.0359 -0.0221  0.0325 0.0148 0.0608  0.0507 0.0349 0.0541 
Notes: This Table reports the elasticity of cost with respect to bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), and equity for all banks and per type of banks. The figures are 
averaged per 6 semi-annual periods. Figures may not sum due to averaging and rounding. Mar: March, Sep: September. 
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Breaking up the cost elasticities according to bank types, we observe a decreasing 
trend of the cost elasticities with respect to undesirable outputs for City Banks. Note that 
these values are negative in the case of restructured loans in all sub-periods and in the 
case of bankrupt loans during the September 2012-March 2015 period. For Regional 
Banks I and II, there is also a downward trend of the cost elasticities with respect to 
restructured loans. In the September 2009-March 2012 period and September 2012-
March 2015 period, there are negative cost elasticities with respect to restructured loans 
in Regional Banks I. These findings show that restructured loans do not always raise cost. 
This is an interesting finding, revealing that restructuring the industry through legislation 
changes referring to restructured loans benefits the industry. A component of our 
restructured loan data relates to loans of which interest rates have been lowered, contracts 
have been amended, and/or loans to corporations under ongoing reorganisation 
(Montgomery and Shimizutani, 2009). Without this process, these loans would be more 
likely to become nonperforming loans, raising further bank costs. Furthermore, to deal 
with restructured loans, banks have received government support through the Act on 
Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions (August 2004-March 2008). 
Under this Act, capital injections ensure that financial institutions overcome difficulties 
in funding so that “the financial sector can voluntarily commit to risk taking and function 
as financial intermediaries in the regional economy” (Endo, 2013). In the aftermath of 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, this Act was reactivated in December 2008. From 
March 1999 to March 2009, there were four capital injection programs, involving 37 
financial institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Banks rescued by public capital were 
then required to increase lending to SMEs. In the Policy Statement on 12/03/2009, Kaoru 
Yosano (Minister of Finance and Minister of State for Financial Services and Economic 
and Fiscal Policy) announced that various measures had been enforced to allow financial 
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institutions to supply funds with confidence, “including prompt enforcement of the 
amended Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions, partially 
relaxing the capital adequacy requirements of banks, and expanding the scope of cases 
in which restructured loans to SMEs are not classified as nonperforming loans”. 29 
Besides, in the basis of the SME Financing Facilitation Act (2008-2013), there were 
changes in the regulatory framework which allowed bad loans of SMEs to be reclassified. 
These legislation amendments appear to be effective, as shown in our findings of negative 
cost elasticities with respect to restructured loans.  
Apart from government support measures, the nature of business might also explain 
for the cost-saving impact of restructured loans. Regional Banks are committed to the 
development of the local regions where their headquarters are situated. SMEs are among 
their target clients. Therefore, Regional Banks are motivated to support SMEs through 
amending bad loans. As a result, 3-6% total credit was reclassified under the SME 
Financing Facilitation Act (International Monetary Fund, 2012).30  
Another noteworthy finding is the cost-saving impact of equity for City Banks, on 
average at -0.0221. While the cost elasticity with respect to equity remains positive in all 
																																																						
29 http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/announce/state/20090312.html 
30 City Banks were strongly engaged in a so-called main bank system (Hoshino, 2002), in which they had 
strong ties with their clients. After the second half of the 20th century, this business network has gradually 
shrunk (Lincoln and Shimotani, 2010). In this type of relationship, there exist interlocking shareholdings 
among banks and their client firms. Apart from funding, banks provide member firms with management 
assistance. If restructured loans were disposed, banks would terminate their financial relation with the firms 
in question, and force them to declare bankruptcy. Hence, City Banks might have incentives to carry on 
funding troubled firms to assist them in regaining their financial health. In addition, as City Banks are the 
largest commercial bank group, they may have available resources to withstand restructured loans and 
recover these loans within the time frame set out in the regulatory framework. Furthermore, since October 
2012, the Bank of Japan has pursued aggressive quantitative easing and committed to provide unlimited 
funding to match the net increase in loans to households and non-financial sectors (Bank of Japan’s 
announcement on 30/10/2012). Although this Stimulating Bank Lending Facility benefits financial 
institutions in terms of funding, this may discourage proper credit screening. These countervailing effects 
might be reflected in the negative cost elasticities with respect to bankrupt loans from September 2012 to 
March 2015. Note that the Japanese economy has been struggling to strive from deflation since 2009, 
notably indicated by the implementation of negative interest rate in January 2016. If the economic slump 
is not attributed to banks not willing to lend (due to the fear of bad loans), but the lack of borrowers, there 
could be less incentive for banks to accelerate the disposal of bankrupt loans. 
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sub-periods for Regional Banks I and II, it is positive only in September 2003 to March 
2006 for City Banks. Hence, equity financing might benefit City Banks in terms of 
mitigating the interest burden from debt financing, supporting the argument of Hughes 
and Mester (2013). These negative elasticities could also be interpreted as how much 
banks are willing to pay for equity as it would result in cost saving (Boucinha et al., 2013). 
Boucinha et al. (2013) also report a desirable impact of equity in lessening costs for 
Portuguese banks during 1992-2006. In contrast, this may not apply for Regional Banks. 
Their cost elasticities with respect to equity appear to have variability over time. On 
average, a more pronounced magnitude is found for Regional Banks I (0.0608 compared 
to 0.0541 for Regional Banks II). 
4.5.2. Total factor productivity growth over time 
In Table 3, we report the average values (semi-annually) of TFP growth over time. 
On average, the productivity growth of Japanese banks during the years 2000-2014 is at 
1.52%. In the first sub-period March 2001-March 2003, Japanese banks experienced 
negative productivity growth, which could be expected since they were undergoing major 
reforms to restore financial stability post-crisis. In the second sub-period September 
2003-March 2006, TFP exhibited strong growth at an average of 3.53%, thanks to the 
decline in bankrupt loans and restructured loans. This could also be attributed to the effect 
of quantitative easing in stimulating economic activity (Girardin and Moussa, 2011).31 In 
the third sub-period September 2006-March 2009, TFP growth dropped markedly to 
0.17%, possibly because of the onset of the global financial crisis 2007-2008. The 
destructive effect of the crisis seems short-lived, as TFP growth bounced back and peaked 
at 3.64% during the September 2009-March 2012 period, followed by a decrease to 2.29% 
																																																						
31 Japanese annual GDP growth rate in 2004 was 2.4%, highest since 2000 (source: OECD statistics). 
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in the last sub-period September 2012-March 2015. With reference to the Japanese 
banking literature, there are a few studies which estimate bank productivity growth, 
though not very recent. Using the indirect Malmquist–Russell productivity index, 
Fukuyama and Weber (2002) report a 2% decline per year on average for Japanese banks 
operating between 1992 and 1996. Studying Japanese credit cooperative banks and using 
the bootstrapped Malmquist index, Assaf et al. (2011) find that their productivity growth 
did not rise significantly during 2000-2006.  
Table 3. Average total factor productivity growth 
Time All banks City Regional I Regional II 
Mar 2001-Mar 2003 -2.3660 9.6486 -1.6734 -4.6385 
Sep 2003-Mar 2006 3.5314 4.7213 3.7549 3.0757 
Sep 2006-Mar 2009 0.1681 -0.6270 -0.2066 0.7982 
Sep 2009-Mar 2012 3.6375 4.0606 3.8651 3.2369 
Sep 2012-Mar 2015 2.2884 -1.6154 2.8062 1.9943 
Mar 2001-Mar 2015 1.5197 3.2803 1.8179 0.8747 
Notes: This Table reports average total factor productivity growth every three fiscal years for all banks and 
for each type of banks. The figures are averaged per 6 semi-annual periods, except the first time frame 
which includes 5 semi-annual periods. All values are in % and may not sum due to averaging and rounding. 
 
Among bank categories, City Banks were the most productive, on average at 3.28%, 
followed by Regional Banks I (1.82%). The smallest banks in size, Regional Banks II, 
performed the lowest growth of 0.87% on average. Fukuyama (1995) also reports that 
between 1989 and 1991, City Banks were more productive than Regional Banks. In a 
similar vein, Barros et al. (2012) find that City Banks were the most efficient among the 
three types during 2000-2007. During the restructuring and the first quantitative easing 
period (March 2001-March 2006), City Banks experienced substantial growth in their 
productivity, notably at 9.65% during March 2001-March 2003 and 4.72% during 
September 2003-March 2006. The other two types, in contrast, underwent negative 
productivity growth in the restructuring period, -1.67% for Regional Banks I and -4.64% 
for Regional Banks II. Like City Banks, their productivity growth increased significantly 
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during the initial quantitative easing period September 2003-March 2006 (3.75% and 
3.08%). In the third sub-period September 2006-March 2009, which covers the duration 
of the global financial crisis 2007-2008, City Banks and Regional Banks I bore a loss in 
productivity growth. The decline was more prominent in City Banks, -0.63%. On the 
contrary, Regional Banks II appeared to survive the crisis, though their growth dropped 
to 0.798%. Afterwards, productivity growth rose to 4.06% in City Banks, 3.87% in 
Regional Banks I, and 3.24% in Regional Banks II. The last sub-period September 2012-
March 2015, which embraces the aggressive quantitative easing time frame, witnessed a 
considerable decline in productivity growth of City Banks (down to -1.62%). Other bank 
types also saw a fall in their productivity growth. 
4.5.3. Total factor productivity growth decomposition 
To shed more light into the contribution of each component to TFP growth, we report 
the average values of the effect of each component in Table 4, according to equation (14) 
of our model. From March 2001 to March 2003, bankrupt loans dampened TFP growth 
by -0.45. Nevertheless, their negative effect was smaller compared to the impact of 
restructured loans, -0.49, and the impact of returns to scale, -2.17. Equity and 
technological change positively contributed to productivity growth by 0.11 and 0.65 
respectively. In the second sub-period September 2003-March 2006, large productivity 
growth was a result of the decline in bankrupt and restructured loans, the rise in the scale 
effect, and technological progress.  
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Table 4. Total factor productivity growth decomposition 
Time BRL RSL Equity Scale Technology 
Mar 2001-Mar 2003 -0.4509 -0.4947 0.1060 -2.1719 0.6453 
Sep 2003-Mar 2006 0.0408 0.3915 -0.2250 2.6708 0.6532 
Sep 2006-Mar 2009 -0.0562 0.2117 0.1371 -0.4791 0.3546 
Sep 2009-Mar 2012 0.0492 0.2341 0.0704 3.1515 0.1322 
Sep 2012-Mar 2015 0.0177 0.1181 -0.0570 1.9418 0.2679 
Mar 2001-Mar 2015 -0.0735 0.1044 0.0030 1.0751 0.4108 
Notes: This Table reports the effects of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, scale, and 
technological change on TFP growth for all banks. The figures are averaged per 6 semi-annual periods, 
except the first time frame which includes 5 semi-annual periods. All values are in % and may not sum due 
to averaging and rounding. The sum of each row equals total factor productivity growth reported in Table 
3 for all banks. 
 
In the third sub-period September 2006-March 2009, on average, bankrupt loans 
constrained productivity growth with a magnitude of -0.06. In contrast, from September 
2009 onwards, they in fact contributed to productivity gain because there was a drop in 
the level of bankrupt loans for the whole banking system (gradually down from 8458 
billion JPY in September 2009 to 5896 billion JPY in March 2015). Using nonperforming 
loan ratio as a control variable in the cost function, Altunbas et al. (2000) find a positive 
relationship between nonperforming loans and inefficiency. Mamatzakis et al. (2015) also 
report a negative impact of problem loans on Japanese bank performance. Like bankrupt 
loans, restructured loans had imposed a negative effect on TFP growth (-0.49) before the 
implementation of the Takenaka plan. From September 2003 to March 2006, the 
effectiveness of the rehabilitation program was revealed by the fall in restructured loans, 
consequently contributing to productivity growth by 0.39%. From September 2006 to 
March 2015, the positive impact of restructured loans on TFP growth remained. Note that 
there was an increase in restructured loans in the last two sub-periods. It could be the case 
that the US credit crunch imposed a destructive effect on Japanese bank productivity 
growth with a lag, which was reflected in the rise of restructured loans after the crisis. 
The Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake in March 2011, which has been the most powerful 
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earthquake ever in Japan, might also be among the reasons for the rising of restructured 
loans afterwards.  
Equity was among the growth drivers, although its average impact on productivity 
growth was small (0.003) for the whole sample period. In the initial sub-period March 
2001-March 2003, 0.11% was the contribution of equity to TFP growth. This could stem 
from the fact that banks were undercapitalised post-crisis, and during that time of 
uncertainty, the cost of equity financing was high. Nevertheless, banks that failed to raise 
enough equity were eventually rescued by public capital (Montgomery and Shimizutani, 
2009). Therefore, they benefited from government subsidisation and could make use of 
the bailout capital. In the second and the last sub-periods, equity put more weight on the 
cost burden, thus eroding productivity growth, -0.23 during September 2003-March 2006 
and -0.06 during September 2012-March 2015. Between September 2006 and March 
2012, equity positively contributed to productivity growth.  
Overall, technical progress was consistently the driving force of TFP growth. Over 
the whole period, technology accounted for the increase in TFP growth on average at 
0.41. Tadesse (2006) also reports evidence for technological progress in Japanese banks 
between 1974 and 1991. The scale effect, although fluctuating over time, on average was 
the major contributor to productivity growth (1.08). Boucinha et al. (2013) also find a 
significant contribution of returns to scale to increased productivity growth of Portuguese 
banks. Feng and Serletis (2010) find a moderate positive effect of returns to scale on 
productivity growth of large US banks, on average about 0.44%. Yet, the scale effect is 
the second largest component (after technical change) of US banks’ productivity growth. 
Computing technical and scale efficiency for Japanese commercial banks in 1990, 
Fukuyama (1993) reports that scale inefficiency is negligible compared to pure technical 
	111 
	
inefficiency. Regarding the quasi-fixed input, the magnitude of the contribution of equity 
over time is not considerable, 0.003. In terms of undesirable outputs, bankrupt loans, on 
average, showed a detrimental impact on TFP growth, -0.07. Restructured loans, in 
contrast, was among the main driving forces for productivity growth, 0.104. There is 
evidence to support that the increase in TFP growth during September 2003-March 2006 
was partly attributed to the fall in bankrupt loans and restructured loans. The reverse is 
true for the initial sub-period, when the loss in TFP growth was also mainly explained by 
the scale effect.  
4.5.4. Total factor productivity decomposition per type of banks 
Table 5 reports the decomposition of TFP growth for each bank type. In terms of the 
effects of undesirable outputs, on average bankrupt loans exhibit a destructive effect on 
productivity growth of all banks. The magnitude of the impact is greater for City Banks, 
-0.23, than for Regional Banks I, -0.04, and Regional Banks II, -0.09. In the first sub-
period March 2001-March 2003, except City Banks, Regional Banks suffered a negative 
effect of bankrupt loans on TFP growth. This finding could indicate that the restructuring 
scheme had helped City Banks to cut their bankrupt loan level. Afterwards, Regional 
Banks had to bear that impairment again during September 2006-March 2009. From 
September 2003-March 2015, City Banks endured a negative impact of bankrupt loans 
on productivity growth. It could be that the global financial crisis worsened the likelihood 
of recovery of bankrupt loans and downgraded restructured loans to bankrupt loans. The 
effect could be more pronounced in City Banks than in the others because of their size 
and business structure. Regional Banks are more geographical focus, thus, could be less 
exposed to the contagion effect of the US credit crunch. 
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Table 5. Total factor productivity growth decomposition per bank type. 
 City  Regional I  Regional II 
Time BRL RSL Equity Scale Time  BRL RSL Equity Scale Time  BRL RSL Equity Scale Time 
03/2001-03/2003 0.1041 1.6966 -0.5542 7.3895 1.0127  -0.3847 -0.5047 0.1465 -1.6439 0.7134  -0.5960 -0.7488 0.1386 -3.9530 0.5207 
09/2003-03/2006 -0.1983 -0.0655 0.9321 3.3261 0.7268  0.0457 0.3323 -0.3473 2.9708 0.7534  0.0680 0.5322 -0.2287 2.1910 0.5132 
09/2006-03/2009 -0.6755 -0.2386 0.1311 -0.1969 0.3529  -0.0136 0.1905 0.2561 -1.0710 0.4314  -0.0339 0.3010 -0.0288 0.3126 0.2473 
09/2009-03/2012 -0.1029 0.1696 0.1425 3.1549 0.6965  0.0524 0.1427 0.1531 3.3169 0.2001  0.0662 0.3799 -0.0635 2.9037 -0.0492 
09/2012-03/2015 -0.2313 0.2426 0.2162 -2.5095 0.6666  0.0227 0.0782 -0.0942 2.4542 0.3452  0.0423 0.1637 -0.0350 1.7271 0.0963 
03/2001-03/2015 -0.2254 0.3291 0.2062 2.2832 0.6872  -0.0448 0.0657 0.0191 1.2967 0.4811  -0.0929 0.1278 -0.0463 0.6089 0.2771 
Notes: This Table reports the effects of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, scale, and technological change on TFP growth for all banks. The figures are 
averaged per 6 semi-annual periods, except the first time frame which includes 5 semi-annual periods. All values are in % and may not sum due to averaging and rounding. The 
sum of five components for each bank type in each row equals total factor productivity growth reported in Table 3 per bank type. 
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Restructured loans appear beneficial to productivity growth of each bank type. On 
average, they contributed to TFP growth of all types, more considerably for City Banks, 
0.33. Yet, City Banks had to face a negative effect of restructured loans from September 
2003 to March 2009. In the initial sub-period, Regional Banks suffered from an adverse 
effect of restructured loans on their productivity growth, while the contrary is reported 
for City Banks. In the remaining sub-periods, restructured loans enhanced TFP growth of 
Regional Banks. In terms of equity, on average, equity undermined productivity growth 
of Regional Banks II by -0.05, while the effect is favourable for City Banks, 0.21, and 
Regional Banks I, 0.02. Over time, there was a volatile impact of equity on productivity 
growth of Regional Banks I. From September 2003 to March 2015, the impact of equity 
was persistently negative for Regional Banks II, but positive for City Banks. 
Regarding the scale effect, the influence of the global financial crisis on all banks 
could be reflected in our results. The reason is that the contribution of returns to scale 
declined considerably in the third sub-period, which covers the crisis. It was even negative 
in City Banks, -0.197 and Regional Banks I, -1.07. This might be due to quantitative 
easing policy that the scale effect was quite large in the second and the last two sub-
periods, especially for Regional Banks. Other studies also find that small Japanese banks, 
in particular Regional Banks, exhibit increasing returns to scale (Altunbas et al., 2000; 
Azad et al., 2014; Fukuyama, 1993). Interestingly, there exists decreasing returns to scale 
for City Banks in the last period, -2.51. Previous research on Japanese banks also reports 
decreasing returns to scale for City Banks (Altunbas et al., 2000; Azad et al., 2014; Drake 
and Hall, 2003; Tadesse, 2006).  
Turning to the effect of technology, we find strong evidence for technological 
progress in all bank types. Within City Banks, the impact of technological change on 
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productivity growth was greater than this of other banks, 0.69 compared to 0.48 for 
Regional Banks I and 0.28 for Regional Banks II. From March 2001 to March 2012, 
Regional Banks II experienced a downward trend of technological progress, with 
technological regress, -0.05, reported in the September 2009-March 2012 period. In the 
last sub-period, technological change contributed to productivity growth of all banks. 
Evaluating technical efficiency of Japanese credit cooperatives, Glass et al. (2014) also 
find a presence of technical progress between 1998 and 2009. Technical progress also 
existed for all banks in the early 1990s, although different productivity measures yield 
different timing for its presence (Fukuyama, 1996). 
4.6. Convergence cluster analysis 
The next stage of our analysis investigates whether there is a tendency of 
convergence in TFP growth across regions and time. During the course of bank 
restructuring and promoting economic growth, the Japanese government has enacted a 
variety of support measures, including quantitative easing policy, aiming to raise bank 
lending to nonfinancial sectors. Hence, if indeed the restructuring were working, we 
would expect a tendency of convergence in bank productivity growth among banks and 
across regions over time. We adopt the methodology developed by Phillips and Sul (2007) 
to identify the integration process in Japanese banks.32 In the context of our data, we 
																																																						
32 Appendix B provides an overview of this methodology. In banking research, two widely used methods 
to examine convergence are β-convergence and σ-convergence, proposed by Barro et al. (1991) for the 
growth literature. Banking applications include Andrieş and Căpraru (2014), Casu and Girardone (2010), 
Fung (2006), and Weill (2013). If β-convergence regresses the growth rate of any variable on its initial 
level, σ-convergence measures the cross-sectional dispersion of the level of the variable over time. β < 0 
implies that there exists a negative correlation between the initial level and the growth rate, which can be 
expressed as the entity that has a lower starting point has a faster growing speed than their counterparts 
which have higher initial levels. In the long-run, all observed units would converge to the same steady state. 
On the other hand, if the dispersion of a cross-section declines over time, there exists σ-convergence which 
exhibits the speed of each unit’s growth to converge with the average level of the sample. σ-convergence 
somehow outperforms β-convergence in terms of explanatory power. Quah (1996) indicates a few 
limitations of β-convergence by referring to a situation where the entity with lower departing point grows 
so quickly that passes the ones with higher starting points, resulting in no convergence in the long-run. 
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explore the process of banking integration in the convergence of TFP growth, and the 
effect of each component in 121 Japanese commercial banks.33 Matousek et al. (2015) 
also apply this methodology for testing banking integration in the ‘old’ European Union 
using bank-level efficiency data. Rughoo and Sarantis (2012) use this approach to test the 
convergence of deposit and lending rates in the European retail banking market. To our 
knowledge, our paper would be the first to test for convergence in TFP growth and its 
components using Phillips and Sul (2007) methodology. The task is to find the speed of 
convergence b-hat, and then apply a one-sided t-test. If t-statistics < -1.65, the null 
hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level. We report the speed of convergence 
and associated t-statistics in Tables 6 to 9. 
4.6.1. Results for bank types 
We start the analysis by testing for convergence in TFP growth and the effects of the 
five underlying TFP components over the whole sample. Results from the log t-test 
indicate that there is no convergence (see Table 6). Results from the club convergence 
test also show an absolute absence of convergence clubs. We further repeat the analysis 
for each bank type. We find no club convergence for Regional Banks II. For the other 
two types, there exists convergence, reported in Table 6. For Regional Banks I, there is 
evidence of convergence for this sample in terms of productivity growth (b-hat = -0.122) 
and its components. However, the speed of convergence is slow as values of b-hat are 
negative in all data series. They are -0.137 for the effect of bankrupt loans, -0.146 for the 
effect of restructured loans, -0.136 for the effect of equity, -0.059 for the scale effect, and 
-0.174 for the effect of technological change. 
																																																						
33 After computing TFP growth, we exclude some banks from the convergence test because they have too 
few observations. 
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Table 6. Log t-test and club convergence test – All banks and per bank type. 
Bank types Data series Clubs Bank IDs b-hat t-statistics 
All banks 
TFP growth All banks: Divergent  -1.781 -13.193* 
BRL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.669 -12.009* 
RSL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.686 -12.183* 
Equity effect All banks: Divergent  -1.636 -12.207* 
Scale effect All banks: Divergent  -1.647 -12.751* 
Technological change All banks: Divergent  -1.684 -13.017* 
City 
TFP growth All banks: Divergent  -3.458 -3.406* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.132 -0.693 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.978 -3.903* 
BRL effect All banks: Divergent  -3.424 -3.354* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -1.915 -0.883 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.924 -3.873* 
RSL effect All banks: Divergent  -3.437 -3.362* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.027 -1.016 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.928 -3.871* 
Equity effect All banks: Divergent  -3.442 -3.371* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.029 -1.053 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.941 -3.895* 
Scale effect All banks: Divergent  -3.468 -3.398* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 10 -2.026 -0.789 
 Club 2: Divergent  -3.999 -3.891* 
Technological change All banks: Divergent  -3.183 -3.361* 
 Club 1: Convergent 1, 16 1.832 2.307 
  Club 2: Convergent 8, 17 -0.928 -0.510 
  Club 3: Divergent  -5.967 -9.229* 
Regional I 
TFP growth All banks: Convergent  -0.122 -0.976 
BRL effect All banks: Convergent  -0.137 -1.021 
RSL effect All banks: Convergent  -0.146 -1.085 
Equity effect All banks: Convergent  -0.136 -1.001 
Scale effect All banks: Convergent  -0.059 -0.472 
Technological change All banks: Convergent  -0.174 -1.334 
Regional II 
TFP growth All banks: Divergent  -1.851 -11.953* 
BRL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.628 -12.520* 
RSL effect All banks: Divergent  -1.659 -12.486* 
Equity effect All banks: Divergent  -1.584 -12.819* 
Scale effect All banks: Divergent  -1.746 -12.025* 
Technological change All banks: Divergent  -1.606 -13.200* 
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for TFP growth and the effect of each 
component on TFP growth in all banks and each bank type. The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club 
convergence test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code by Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence 
coefficient or speed of convergence. If t-statistics<-1.65, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at 
the 5% significance level. The corresponding bank IDs are reported for each convergent club. * indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level.  
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For the sample of seven City Banks, the tests reveal some convergence clubs. Table 
6 also reports the convergence coefficients for City Banks and associated t-statistics 
obtained from the log t-test for six data series. The null hypothesis of convergence in TFP 
growth in City Banks is rejected at the 5% level (b-hat = -3.458). Similarly, the null 
hypothesis of convergence for the effect of each component on TFP growth is rejected, 
which reinforces the divergence of TFP growth.  
The next step is to examine if there exists any cluster of convergence in TFP growth 
as well as in each of its underlying components. We find negative values of b-hat 
associated with almost all convergence clubs. These findings exhibit weak convergence 
with slow speed as the estimated b-hat is insignificantly different from zero. Matousek et 
al. (2015) also report a few negative b-hats in their Phillips and Sul (2007)’s convergence 
test for technical efficiency of the top 10 EU banks. Regarding TFP growth, we detect 
one convergence club which is formed of two banks (IDs 1 and 10). The same two banks 
are reported to constitute the club of convergence in the effect of bankrupt loans, 
restructured loans, equity, and the scale effect. In terms of the impact of technology, there 
are two clubs of convergence. Banks 1 and 16 are identified in the first club with a faster 
convergence speed (1.832) than banks 8 and 17 in the second club (-0.928). 
4.6.2. Results by geographic regions 
Given that overall there is weak evidence regarding convergence, we further 
investigate whether there exists any convergence across geographic regions. We classify 
banks into eight regions based on their headquarters’ locations. These eight regions are 
the eight principal regions of Japan, namely Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kansai, 
Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Their relative geographic locations are illustrated in the 
map of Japan in Figure 1. The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
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Table 7. Log t-test and club convergence test in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, 
Kansai, and Kyushu. 
Region Data b-hat t-stat Region Data b-hat t-stat 
Hokkaido TFP  0.671 1.104 Kansai TFP  -1.176 -4.716* 
 BRL  0.888 1.476  BRL  -1.069 -4.441* 
 RSL  0.867 1.446  RSL  -1.104 -4.525* 
 Equity  0.897 1.494  Equity  -1.052 -4.406* 
 Scale  0.742 1.217  Scale  -1.121 -4.560* 
 Tech. 0.896 1.492  Tech. -1.064 -4.472* 
Tohoku TFP  -0.088 -0.247 Kyushu TFP  -1.578 -5.832* 
 BRL  -0.083 -0.235  BRL  -1.557 -5.643* 
 RSL  -0.113 -0.319  RSL  -1.562 -5.68* 
 Equity  -0.11 -0.312  Equity  -1.55 -5.632* 
 Scale  -0.053 -0.148  Scale  -1.562 -5.774* 
 Tech. -0.132 -0.376  Tech. -1.568 -5.737* 
Chubu TFP  2.096 2.704     
 BRL  2.121 1.281     
 RSL  2.184 1.341     
 Equity  1.858 1.285     
 Scale  2.002 1.381     
 Tech. 2.032 1.586     
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for TFP growth and the effect of each 
component on TFP growth per region. The numbers of banks are: 3 in Hokkaido, 16 in Tohoku, 21 in 
Chubu, 18 in Kansai, and 21 in Kyushu. The data are total factor productivity growth (TFP), the effect of 
bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, the scale effect and technological change (Tech.) 
on TFP growth. The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club convergence test were run in OxEdit using 
the Gauss code by Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence coefficient or speed of convergence. If t-statistics 
(t-stat)<-1.65, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% significance level. If the null is 
rejected, we conduct club convergence test. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at 
the 5% significance level. 
 
The log t-test and club convergence test denote that banks in Hokkaido, Tohoku, and 
Chubu converge in TFP growth. Among these regions, Chubu has the fastest convergence 
rate, while Tohoku is the slowest. Convergence in the five underlying components of TFP 
growth is also present in these three regions. There is no existence of convergence for 
banks in Kansai and Kyushu (see Table 7). We find some clubs of convergence for banks 
in Kanto, Chugoku, and Shikoku (see Table 8).  
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Table 8. Log t-test and club convergence test in Kanto, Chugoku, and Shikoku. 
Data Clubs/Bank IDs b-hat t-stat  Data Clubs/Bank IDs b-hat t-stat 
For Kanto  For Chugoku 
TFP   -2.196 -14.75*  TFP  -3.691 -4.522* 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.062 1.025   166, 167, 168, 169 0.266 0.339 
 133, 135, 138, 516 -0.63 -0.529   Divergent: the rest -8.302 -5.063* 
 Divergent: the rest -0.957 -3.477*  BRL  -3.739 -4.446* 
BRL   -2.115 -14.078*   166, 167, 168, 169 0.287 0.237 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.049 1.321   Divergent: the rest -8.983 -4.928* 
 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 0.230 3.660  RSL  -3.747 -4.468* 
 17, 130, 150, 517 2.378 1.944   166, 167, 168, 169 0.298 0.281 
 Divergent: the rest -4.310 -5.533*   170, 565 -5.270 -1.188 
RSL   -2.093 -13.956*   Divergent: the rest -12.177 -6.211* 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.068 1.696  Equity  -3.732 -4.437* 
 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 0.206 3.280   166, 167, 168, 169 0.307 0.258 
 130, 150 1.031 1.009   170, 565 -5.420 -1.630 
 517, 525 0.631 0.586   Divergent: the rest -12.41 -5.893* 
 131, 134 0.758 0.309  Scale  -3.669 -4.488* 
 Divergent: the rest -3.881 -3.323*   166, 167, 168, 169 0.284 0.358 
Equity   -2.116 -13.81*   Divergent: the rest -8.291 -5.029* 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.066 1.912  Tech.  -3.745 -4.457* 
 133, 135, 138, 526, 597 0.207 3.369   166, 167, 168, 169 0.290 0.246 
 9, 150, 517 0.574 0.445   Divergent: the rest -8.938 -4.935* 
 17, 130, 525 0.173 0.249   
 128, 134 -3.392 -1.505  For Shikoku 
 Divergent: the rest -5.187 -4.985*  TFP   2.256 11.433 
Scale   -2.187 -14.719*  BRL   -0.959 -0.692 
 5, 16, 129, 522 0.133 2.395  RSL   -1.383 -2.558* 
 133, 135, 138, 516 -0.780 -0.746   173, 174, 175, 578 2.297 2.126 
 Divergent: the rest -0.705 -3.191*   Divergent: the rest -4.239 -9.634* 
Tech.  -2.337 -14.754*  Equity   2.714 0.96 
 8, 17, 130 -0.923 -1.171  Scale   3.902 13.833 
 16, 128, 131, 134, 137, 150, 516, 517, 525, 530 -0.157 -1.292  Tech.  -0.966 -7.838* 
 133, 135 -3.849 -1.461   172, 173, 174, 175, 573, 576, 578 -0.175 -0.835 
 Divergent: the rest -3.627 -5.301*   Divergent: 572   
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for TFP growth and the effect of each 
component on TFP growth per region. The numbers of banks are: 24 in Kanto, 10 in Chugoku, and 8 in 
Shikoku. The data are total factor productivity growth (TFP), the effect of bankrupt loans (BRL), 
restructured loans (RSL), equity, the scale effect and technological change (Tech.) on TFP growth. The 
Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club convergence test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code by 
Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence coefficient or speed of convergence. If t-statistics (t-stat)<-1.65, the 
null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% significance level. If the null is rejected, we conduct 
club convergence test. The corresponding bank IDs are reported for each convergent club. * indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level. 
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In our sample, the number of banks in Kanto is the largest compared to the numbers 
of banks in other regions. There are 24 banks, among which are six City Banks having 
their headquarters registered in Tokyo, which belongs to Kanto region. Note that City 
Banks and Regional Banks differ from each other in size, business structure, and focus. 
Hence, we would expect to find club convergence rather than convergence at the whole 
sample. In fact, results indicate a few clubs of convergence in TFP growth and its 
components. It is noteworthy that the club of banks 5, 16, 129, 522, and the club of banks 
133, 135, 138, 526, 597 appear in most of the results for the data tested. 
In Chugoku, there is one convergence club, formed of four banks 166, 167, 168, and 
169, for productivity growth. The club convergence test for the underlying components 
of TFP growth also identifies this club. There is an additional convergence club (bank 
IDs: 170 and 565) with slow convergence rate for the effect of restructured loans (b-hat 
= -5.27) and equity (b-hat = -5.42). Eight banks in the remaining region, Shikoku, 
converge in TFP growth (b-hat = 2.256). There also exists convergence in the effect of 
bankrupt loans (b-hat = -0.959), equity (b-hat = 2.714) and the scale effect (b-hat = 
3.902). For the effect of restructured loans and technological change, there are 
convergence clubs instead. One club of convergence, constituted by banks 173, 174, 175, 
and 578, is reported for the effect of restructured loans (b-hat = 2.297). For the impact of 
technological change, only bank 572 is not classified in the club of convergence.  
Overall, in eight principal geographic regions of Japan, there are four regions where 
there exists convergence in terms of productivity growth. We proceed by investigating 
further whether that convergence behaviour is present between regions. The data are 
averaged for each region and are applied for between-region convergence. Interestingly, 
all regions converge in terms of the impacts of bankrupt loans (b-hat = 0.112) and equity 
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(b-hat = 2.931) on TFP growth (see Table 9). There exist clubs of convergence in other 
components of TFP growth. Regarding restructured loans, Tohoku, Chugoku, and 
Shikoku belong to one convergence club. With regard to the scale effect, there are two 
clubs. Club one (Tohoku, Chubu, Chugoku, and Shikoku) experiences a faster convergent 
process (at the rate of 1.553) compared to club two (Hokkaido and Kanto, at the rate of 
0.936). Regarding technological change, the tests reveal three clubs of convergence. 
Table 9. Log t-test and club convergence test across regions. 
Data series Clubs b-hat t-statistics 
TFP growth All regions: Divergent -2.328 -9.97* 
 Club 1: Tohoku, Shikoku 5.634 3.997 
 Club 2: Kanto, Chubu, Chugoku 0.789 1.666 
 Club 3: Divergent -8.016 -9.792* 
BRL effect All regions: Convergent 0.112 0.109 
RSL effect All regions: Divergent -4.554 -9.693* 
 Club 1: Tohoku, Chugoku, Shikoku 0.136 0.136 
 Club 2: Divergent -6.592 -13.244* 
Equity effect All regions: Convergent 2.931 1.5 
Scale effect All regions: Divergent -1.439 -3.861* 
 Club 1: Tohoku, Chubu, Chugoku, Shikoku 1.553 7.965 
 Club 2: Hokkaido, Kanto 0.936 0.924 
 Club 3: Divergent -7.677 -9.523* 
Technological change All regions: Divergent -4.147 -57.098* 
 Club 1: Hokkaido, Kanto -0.235 -0.402 
 Club 2: Chubu, Chugoku 0.651 4.307 
 Club 3: Tohoku, Kyushu 0.107 0.146 
 Club 4: Divergent -4.482 -46.464* 
Notes: This Table reports the log t-test and club convergence test for regional average TFP growth and the 
effect of each component on TFP growth of banks across regions. The data are total factor productivity 
growth (TFP), the effect of bankrupt loans (BRL), restructured loans (RSL), equity, the scale effect and 
technological change on TFP growth. The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test and club convergence test were 
run in OxEdit using the Gauss code by Sul (2007). b-hat is the convergence coefficient or speed of 
convergence. If t-statistics<-1.65, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. If the null is rejected, we conduct club convergence test. The corresponding regions are reported for 
each convergent club. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance 
level.  
 
Alas, convergence in TFP growth is not present between regions. The club 
convergence test uncovers two convergence clubs, which are illustrated in Figure 1 by 
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the green and blue areas. The first club consists of two regions: Tohoku and Shikoku. The 
second club includes three regions, namely Kanto, Chubu, and Chugoku. There are 73 
Regional Banks and 6 City Banks in these five regions, constituting 65.3% of the number 
of banks in our sample. The null hypothesis of convergence in productivity growth is 
rejected for the remaining regions, which are displayed in reddish areas in Figure 1. This 
finding lends some support for limited convergence. 
Figure 1. Convergence in total factor productivity growth – Japan map. 
 
Notes: This map illustrates the convergence in total factor productivity growth between regions. 
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Note from the map that Kanto and Chubu, two regions classified in convergence club 
two, are adjacent. This finding may suggest that apart from City Banks, Regional Banks, 
which have their head offices in one region, may also operate in adjacent regions through 
their local branch network. This is in line with findings from Kano and Tsutsui (2003) 
who investigate the geographic segmentation in the loan market of Japanese banks. They 
provide evidence for an absence of loan market segmentation within Regional Banks as 
these banks can operate through their branches in adjacent prefectures. Kano and Tsutsui 
(2003) show that about 18.9% of Regional Banks in their sample had branches outside 
their head offices’ prefectures. Hence, partially overlapping operational areas exist among 
Regional Banks. Kanto is well known as Japan’s economic heart, with Tokyo being one 
of the most important economic centres. Based on regional economic data in 2012, 
Kanto’s gross regional product and income (1,886,166 and 1,439,151 hundred million 
JPY) were the highest among eight regions.34 As previously mentioned, the majority of 
City Banks have their headquarters registered in Kanto. It could be the impact of their 
branch network that results in the integration process existing in these regions. In addition, 
Chugoku, which is also in this convergence club, is similar to Chubu in terms of economic 
activities. Chubu, where Toyota - Japan’s largest company is based, is specialised in 
transportation equipment and textiles. Shipbuilding, automobile (Mazda’s head office is 
based in Hiroshima), and textile are also the dominant industries in Chugoku.  
 Interestingly, although being classified in the same convergence club, Tohoku and 
Shikoku are in fact geographically distant from each other. However, there are similarities 
in terms of economic features between the two. First, they are the “poorer” regions 
compared to others in terms of gross regional product and income. Tohoku was 
																																																						
34	Source: Social Indicators by Prefectures, available from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of International 
Affairs and Communications, Japan.	
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traditionally the poorest, least developed part in Japan. The 2012 statistics for Tohoku 
and Shikoku are 181,241 and 134,789 (hundred million JPY) in gross regional product 
respectively, and 135,051 and 101,341 (hundred million JPY) in income respectively. 
Second, the main economic activities in both regions include agriculture, fishery, forestry, 
and pulp and paper.  
The divergence club also consists of regions that are scattered across the country. 
Hokkaido and Kyushu are the two far-ends of Japan surface area, and they are not 
geographic neighbours with Kansai either. It could be due to the significant disparities in 
economic features that these regions are in the divergence group of productivity growth. 
Kansai is a region, beside Kanto, contributing significantly to Japan’s economic wealth. 
Historically, Kansai developed as a major rice producing and trading area, with Osaka 
being the centre for economic activities. The Osaka-Kobe metropolitan area has been the 
modern manufacturing base for textile, machinery, metal, chemicals, and heavy industries 
since the 20th century. In contrast, the capital of Kyushu, Fukuoka, is specialised in 
services and the automobile industry, being one of the world’s largest car manufacturing 
bases. Hokkaido, on the other hand, is a popular island for tourists, and an important food-
supply region. Sapporo, its capital, apart from tourism, is also well-known for the bio and 
IT industries. One thing in common but probably very important reflecting on the 
divergence of the three regions is that they all have a regional stock exchange market. 
They are Sapporo in Hokkaido, Osaka in Kansai, and Fukuoka in Kyushu. These markets 
are characterised by distinctive regional political economies which result in significant 
market segmentation (Hearn, 2016). The regional-related factors that distinguish banks 
in these diverging regions would be an interesting issue for future research. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
This study quantifies the impact of undesirable outputs on productivity growth of 
Japanese commercial banks. We adopt a parametric methodology which allows for a 
decomposition of TFP growth with respect to the impact of undesirable outputs, namely 
bankrupt and restructured loans. Our finding reports an average productivity growth of 
1.52% semi-annually. Productivity growth deteriorated during the restructuring period 
(2001-2003) and the following global financial crisis. Alongside the downturn of the scale 
effect, the loss in productivity growth was attributed to the adverse effect of bankrupt 
loans and the negative impact of equity in a few periods. There exists evidence showing 
that some legislation changes have benefited the banking industry, indicated by the cost-
reducing impact of restructured loans. 
We further proceed with convergence tests for TFP growth and its components. The 
presented results have important policy implications. Over 15 years, there has been 
heterogeneity among banks, as they are recognised as diverging altogether. Nevertheless, 
within City Banks, there is some evidence of slow convergence. Regional Banks that 
operate in the same geographic regions appear to develop with some degree of 
commonality. The evidence of a banking integration process within and across some 
regions would assist policymakers to design appropriate schemes to promote growth. As 
the banking system remains the important channel to convey the economic impact of 
Abenomics – the current economic policy to combat deflation and boost growth, bank 
productivity growth would act as a signal for the effectiveness of this policy. It would be 
worth looking into the characteristics of the diverging regions so that modified versions 
of these policies would be more applicable. 
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Given the negative interest rate policy enacted in January 2016 for the first time in 
Japan’s history, bank productivity gain could be an important indication for the efficacy 
of this central banking policy. However, negative interest rates should be accompanied 
by prudent lending standards and proper supervision in order not to increase the risk of 
bankrupt and restructured loans. Additionally, potential challenges associated with 
prolonged negative interest rates may limit bank productivity growth by, for example, 
lowering outputs. For instance, the fear of substantial deposit withdrawals may inhibit 
banks to pass the cost of negative rates on to retail depositors. Hence, if banks have to 
incur this cost, they may be reluctant to increase lending due to low profit margin (Bech 
and Malkhozov, 2016). These policy limitations are beyond the scope of this paper. It 
would be an interesting area for future research to observe and study the benefits and 
drawbacks of negative interest rate on Japanese bank productivity growth. 
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Appendices – Chapter 4 
Appendix A. Estimated parameters for the translog cost function 
Notations Variables Coefficient S.e Notations Variables Coefficient S.e 
2a  w2 0.8521*** 0.004 12j  y1*RSL 0.0381** 0.016 
1b  y1 0.5275*** 0.022 21j  y2*BRL 0.0958*** 0.015 
2b  y2 0.1088*** 0.013 22j  y2*RSL -0.0422*** 0.008 
1f  BRL 0.0384*** 0.007 el  E*E 0.0415 0.026 
2f  RSL 0.0203*** 0.004 1o  y1*E -0.1036** 0.043 
l  E 0.0533*** 0.015 2o  y2*E 0.0895*** 0.027 
tq  t -0.0042*** 0.000 2µ  w2*E 0.0404*** 0.011 
22a  w2*w2 0.0743*** 0.006 1V  BRL*E -0.1127*** 0.019 
11b  y1*y1 0.5465*** 0.086 2V  RSL*E 0.0213* 0.012 
22b  y2*y2 0.0745*** 0.016 tl  E*t -0.0045*** 0.002 
12b  y1*y2 -0.2523*** 0.033 ttq  t*t -0.0002* 0.000 
11f  BRL*BRL 0.0280* 0.015 t2a  w2*t -0.0002 0.001 
22f  RSL*RSL -0.0082* 0.005 t1b  y1*t 0.0139*** 0.002 
12f  BRL*RSL -0.0196*** 0.007 t2b  y2*t -0.0038*** 0.001 
21d  w2*y1 -0.0563*** 0.017 t1f  BRL*t -0.0023** 0.001 
22d  w2*y2 -0.0018 0.009 t2f  RSL*t -0.0041*** 0.001 
21g  w2*BRL -0.0152** 0.007 oa  Constant -0.0903*** 0.009 
22g  w2*RSL 0.0248*** 0.005 R
2 0.91   
11j  y1*BRL -0.0172 0.031 Observations 3484   
Notes: This Appendix reports the parameters estimated and corresponding standard errors from the translog 
cost function with input price w (price of fund w1; price of physical capital and labour w2; w1 is the 
normalising input price), output Y (net loans and bills discounted y1; earning assets y2), undesirable outputs 
(bankrupt loans BRL; restructured loans RSL), equity E, and time t. w1=(interest expense)/(deposits + 
borrowed funds); w2=noninterest expenses/fixed assets;  y1= net loans and bills discounted; y2 are call loans, 
receivables under resale agreement, receivables under securities borrowing transactions, bills bought, 
monetary claims bought, foreign exchanges, customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, 
investment securities, and other assets; Bankrupt loans = loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy + past due 
loans in arrears by 6 months or more. Restructured loans = past due loans in arrears by 3 months but less 
than 6 months + restructured loans. ***, **, * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively; 
S.e: standard error. 
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Appendix B. Log t-test and club convergence test 
The Phillips and Sul (2007) approach is more advanced compared to β-convergence 
and σ-convergence. It accounts for both common and heterogeneous components of a 
panel data variable. That systemic idiosyncratic element is also allowed to evolve over 
time. Furthermore, Phillips and Sul (2007) argue that the rejection of the null hypothesis 
of convergence does not always mean that there is no convergence among sub-groups of 
the panel. Their clustering algorithm can unfold the existence of club convergence within 
the panel. The transition parameter and the regression t test can be summarised as follows: 
The variable of interest Xit (in our study, it is TFP growth and its components) in the 
context of a panel data can be decomposed into a systemic component git, and a transitory 
component ait:  
ititit agX +=             Eq. (A.1) 
To distinguish between the common and idiosyncratic components which may be 
embraced in git and ait, equation (A.1) can be reformulated as:  
titt
t
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agX µdµ
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=                               Eq. (A.2) 
with µt is a single common component and itd is a time-varying idiosyncratic element 
measuring the relative share in µt of individual i at time t.  
Phillips and Sul (2007) define the relative transition coefficient hit and obtain itd as 
follows:  
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The objective is to test whether the factor loading coefficients itd  converge to δ, 
which means the relative transition coefficients hit converge to unity. Hence, in the long 
run, the cross-sectional variance of hit ( ) ( ) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-= å
=
N
i
itt hN
1
22 11s  converges to zero. 
The regression test of convergence is a regression t test for the null hypothesis of 
convergence Ho: id = d and α≥0, where α is the decay rate
35, against the alternative 
hypothesis Ha: id ≠d for all i or α<0. The log t regression is conducted in three steps: 
i) Calculate the cross-sectional variance ratio tHH1 , where ( ) ( )å
=
-=
N
i
itt hNH
1
211    
ii) Perform the OLS regression: ( ) ( )
ÙÙÙ
++=- tt utbatLHH loglog2log 1          Eq. (A.4)                
where the fitted coefficient of log t, b-hat 
ÙÙ
= a2b , is the estimate of the speed of 
convergence, and 
Ù
a  is the estimate of a  in Ho, and ( ) ( )1log += ttL . Phillips and Sul 
(2007) recommend that the data for this regression start at t = rT, with r = 0.3 obtained 
from Phillips and Sul (2007)’s Monte-Carlo regression. 
iii) Apply an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (HAC) robust one-sided t test of the 
inequality null hypothesis α ≥ 0 using b-hat and a HAC standard error. If t-statistics < -
1.65, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level. 36 
 
  
																																																						
35 Phillips and Sul (2007) show that the formulation for δit ensures it converges to δi for all α≥0. Refer to 
their paper for the derivation of the log t regression equation. 
36 For the procedure to test for club convergence, please refer to Phillips and Sul (2007), pp. 1798-1801 for 
more details. 
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Chapter 5. The Interplay between Quantitative Easing, 
Risk and Competition: The Case of Japanese Banking. 
5.1. Introduction 
The competition and bank risk-taking nexus has sparked heated debates (Beck et al., 
2013; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Jiménez et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2015). There is 
extensive research that reveals the mixed evidence as both positive and negative 
relationships between bank competition and risk are reported (Berger et al., 2009; 
Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Liu and Wilson, 2013). One strand of the 
literature argues that there are benefits to be derived from enhanced competition as it 
promotes efficiency and prevents banks from taking excessive risk (Schaeck and Cihák, 
2008; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). On the other hand, some (Fu et al., 2014; Liu and 
Wilson, 2013) raise concerns due to uncertainties that could be brought by increased 
competition through excessive bank risk-taking. Others argue that stiff competition 
results in loss of high economic rents (e.g. lending opportunities and profit) associated 
with reduced competition, and this has an augmenting effect on risk (Allen and Gale, 
2004; Keeley, 1990). Hence, whether higher competition destabilises the banking system 
by accumulating bank risk remains yet to reach unanimity. 
In this chapter, we build on the existing literature to investigate the relationship 
between bank competition and risk for the Japanese banking industry that also 
experiences extensive quantitative easing. To this end, we bring into the framework also 
quantitative easing. We further innovate by using bank specific Boone indicators instead 
of its aggregate value or the Lerner index to capture competition.  
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The case of Japan is of interest as it has faced chronic problems with nonperforming 
loans, and is one of the first economies that an extensive and far-reaching program of 
quantitative easing has been initiated.37 We tackle the former factor in our measure of 
bank risk-taking by opting for a new data set, whilst we explore the impact of quantitative 
easing through the bank risk channel. Given the significance of quantitative easing for 
Japan, it warrants examining its impact at bank level. The emerging of quantitative easing 
as a monetary policy tool to achieve price stability has raised concerns among academics 
and policymakers about its association with bank risk-taking (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; 
Claeys and Darvas, 2015). Low short-term interest rates prior to loan issuance result in 
banks granting more new risky loan portfolios, distorting their credit supply to favour 
borrowers with worse credit histories, lower ex-ante internal ratings, and weaker ex-post 
performance (Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). Less return from yields is 
another motive for financial institutions to accelerate their risk-taking activities 
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Rajan, 2005). Banking surveys based on credit standards in the 
US and the UK, on the contrary, do not suggest an excessive risk-taking by banks as a 
result of the enforcement of quantitative easing (Claeys and Darvas, 2015).  
The Bank of Japan was the pioneer in empowering quantitative easing policy. 
Currently, there has been a strong record of active and aggressive quantitative easing 
																																																						
37 It is well documented (Caballero et al., 2008; Imai, 2009) that there were destructive effects from the 
prolonged banking crisis to the first half of the 2000s as economic policies in Japan failed to recognise that 
the mounting nonperforming loans were an issue. Eventually, a restructuring of the whole banking industry 
was initiated in 2000s. However, this restructuring campaign was met with controversies as it incorporated 
funding for unprofitable firms, which in turn crowded out solvent firms and lengthened the revitalisation 
of the economy (Caballero et al., 2008). Moreover, there exists evidence of political influence, where 
regulators deferred solvency declaration of banks situated in prefectures supporting the then ruling party 
(Imai, 2009). However, the global financial crisis rather left the Japanese banking industry unaffected. 
Nonperforming loans of all banks increased slightly from 11.4 trillion JPY in March 2008 to 12 trillion JPY 
in March 2009. It is noteworthy that during 2008-2013, the government strategically aimed to assist small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are Regional Banks’ primary corporate clients, via the SME 
Financing Facilitation Act. One term in the Act involved reclassifying SME’s nonperforming loans. This 
has raised concern about the accumulated hidden credit risks within the banking system (Hoshi, 2011), as 
about 3-6% of total credit in Regional Banks was reclassified (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
	132 
	
since 2010. We are interested in investigating whether the warning of heightened financial 
stability risks associated with this policy is supported by Japanese bank level data. We 
hypothesise, based on the aforementioned literature, that quantitative easing and 
competition affect bank risk-taking. After the acute phase of the banking crisis in Japan 
(1997-1999), the banking system underwent major reforms, bailout and consolidation 
from 1999 to 2003. Their competition stance, hence, is expected to vary over time, also 
in light of the global financial crisis 2007-2008. Between 2000 and 2015, quantitative 
easing was launched twice (during March 2001-March 2006 and from October 2010). 
This could be considered as a macroeconomic shock to bank competition due to the 
relaxation of economic conditions, which in turn may affect the competition-risk nexus. 
The degree of competition in the banking industry, however, could also influence the 
quantitative easing-risk linkage (Altunbas et al., 2014). Therefore, we control for the 
effect of quantitative easing when measuring the competition-risk relationship, and vice 
versa. We also explore in depth the underlying causality among quantitative easing, 
competition and risk.  
Thereby, our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, whereas 
the current literature has mostly used the bank-specific Lerner index or aggregate Boone 
indicator as a proxy for competition (Liu and Wilson, 2013; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014), 
we estimate bank level Boone indicators. We use local regression techniques to calculate 
the Boone indicator for each bank-year observation. Second, we opt for an original data 
set to capture risk that has been overseen by the literature to date. Bank risk-taking, our 
primary focus, is represented by bankrupt loans and restructured loans. Data on bankrupt 
and restructured loans are available for Japanese commercial banks and have not been 
used extensively in the Japanese banking literature (Mamatzakis et al., 2015). We also 
use the classical measure of bank default risk, Z-score, to enhance the robustness of our 
	133 
	
analyses. The use of bankrupt and restructured loans at semi-annual data frequency allows 
an enriched information set in our modelling of competition and quantitative easing.38 
Third, we employ a bank level proxy of quantitative easing that is the bank specific 
lending rate. The advantages of this microeconomic measure lie on the absence of 
aggregation bias and the ample set of information. This bank-specific variable ensures its 
compatibility with the bank level Boone indicator and risks in our analyses. We also 
conduct the analyses with two other proxies for quantitative easing: the 10-year Japanese 
government bond yield and Bank of Japan total assets. To examine the risk-competition 
and risk-quantitative easing nexus, we employ dynamic panel threshold analysis, where 
Generalised Methods of Moments type estimators are used to tackle the issues of 
endogeneity (Kremer et al., 2013). This methodology allows us to examine whether these 
relationships are stable over the observed period (financial years from 2000 to 2014) 
which embraces quite a few important events. They are the final phase of the banking 
crisis (2000-2001), the restructuring period (2001-2003), the presence of quantitative 
easing (2001-2006 and from 2010), the global financial crisis (2007-2008), and the 
Tohoku earthquake (2011). Fourth, we extend our analysis by using a panel vector 
autoregression (VAR) approach to address the underlying causality and the potential 
endogeneity among competition, quantitative easing and risk.  
Our results show that competition and quantitative easing appear to undermine 
overall bank stability. However, quantitative easing reduces problem loans. The results 
could entail the countervailing effects of quantitative easing on bank risk-taking (Buch et 
al., 2014; De Nicolò et al., 2010). Regarding the causality between the variables of 
																																																						
38	Bankrupt loans are loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans by 6 months or more. 
Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans by 3 months but less than 6 months and 
restructured loans. See Data section for more details. 
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interest, the panel VAR analysis suggests that quantitative easing causes bank risk and 
bank competition.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 briefly reviews the literature and 
associated hypotheses. Section 5.3 presents the methodologies. Section 5.4 introduces the 
data. Section 5.5 discusses the results. Finally, section 5.6 concludes.  
5.2. Related literature and hypotheses  
In this section, we establish our research hypotheses based on the literature regarding 
the competition-risk nexus and the relationship between quantitative easing and bank risk. 
The two renowned hypotheses about the impact of competition on financial stability, an 
important part of our main investigation objectives, have been well defined in the 
literature as introduced in the following sections.  
5.2.1. The competition - fragility hypothesis 
The underlying theory of this hypothesis poses the view of uncertainty created by a 
competitive banking industry. The rationale behind this is the threat of market share being 
reduced by the entry of newly established banks as well as stronger competence of 
incumbent rivals. The rise in bank competition could be attributed to, e.g., consolidation, 
deregulation, and technological advances (Berger and Mester, 2003; Jeon et al., 2011; 
Keeley, 1990). The liberalisation of geographic restriction and relaxation in 
unconventional banking activities have also fostered bank competition (Berger and 
Mester, 2003). There exists evidence suggesting that when deregulation took place (e.g. 
in the US during 1970s–1980s), poor performers were more vulnerable due to the 
incompetence in keeping pace with their counterparts and potential entrants (Stiroh and 
Strahan, 2003). Deregulation also fuelled bank consolidation, resulting in a large number 
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of banks disappearing from the market due to mergers (Berger and Mester, 2003). Note 
that sizeable consolidation could, however, result in large banks exerting considerable 
market power (Yildirim and Mohanty, 2010). In developing banking markets, beside the 
lift in entry barriers, technological development is another catalyst for heightened 
competition brought by foreign bank entry (Jeon et al., 2011).  
One of the main arguments for greater risks corresponding to increased competition 
is profit reduction. This reasonably serves as a motive for bank managers to take excessive 
risks to pursue business targets, to preserve market shares, and eventually to protect 
market power. Of course, the notion of falling profitability could also raise concerns 
among banks’ executives and jeopardise their position. Consequently, they may have the 
incentive to stretch their risk tolerance ability. Keeley (1990) is among the studies laying 
the first bricks of the debate of an increasing level of fragility in association with 
intensified competition. The results lend support for the hypothesis to the extent that 
amplified competition lowers bank charter value, which in turn promotes extra risk-taking 
through either higher leverage or asset risk.  
Apart from profitability, a number of factors have been put forward as arguments for 
the competition-fragility hypothesis. Boot and Greenbaum (1993) and Allen and Gale 
(2004) show that in a less concentrated banking market, the arising asymmetric 
information would discourage proper credit screening. Consequently, the rise in credit 
risk could accumulate the latent uncertainty within the banking system. Another 
fundamental factor of financial safety in association with competition is liquidity. 
Liquidity constraints could be better handled in a more concentrated market as 
information regarding the probability of withdrawal of depositors is private (Smith, 
1984). Furthermore, as modelled in Allen and Gale (2000), financial distress would be 
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less contagious as banks would be willing to provide liquidity to temporarily illiquid 
banks. Other proponents of these views argue that a few large banks in highly 
concentrated markets are easier to supervise than many small banks. Large banks are also 
more flexible in diversifying investment portfolios, which in turn lowers the fragility of 
the banking system (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
5.2.2. The competition - stability hypothesis 
Contrasting the previous hypothesis, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) propose that market 
concentration intensifies risk. Ceteris paribus, less competition implies that banks could 
be granted more market power; they in turn would impose higher lending rates on loan 
portfolios. The rise in loan rates, thus, could increase bankruptcy probability for 
borrowers. On the other hand, this would magnify the moral hazard incentives within the 
borrowers themselves in an attempt to reap greater returns. 
As opposed to the competition-fragility hypothesis, Caminal and Matutes (2002) 
present a model explaining the ambiguous relationship between market power and bank 
failure. They argue that it is not always valid the argument that higher probability of 
default is due to higher degree of competition. In fact, if investments were assumed to be 
subject to a large aggregate shock, at the presence of intermediate monitoring costs, a 
monopolistic bank would be exposed to more bankruptcy risk than a competitive bank. 
This arises from less credit rationing which can serve as an imperfect substitute for 
monitoring.  
Advocates of the competition-fragility hypothesis dispute that it is generally easier to 
regulate and monitor a few incumbent banks to prevent contagion risk than many banks 
in a competitive banking industry (Beck, 2008; Beck et al., 2006). Financial support from 
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the government to big banks may also prevent a distress time from turning into a crisis 
(Schaeck et al., 2009). Nevertheless, there are still arguments along the lines of the “too-
big-to-fail” concern, especially in light of financial conglomerates emerging as a result of 
the consolidation trend. In view of the consolidation, internationalisation, and 
conglomeration trend, Nicoló et al. (2004) report that more concentrated banking systems 
reflect higher systemic risk potential than less concentrated ones. In the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, “large, complex financial institutions” pose a great threat to the 
global financial system (Saunders et al., 2009). Such global banks due to the complexity 
of their operations require appropriate regulatory control across borders. However, it is 
possible that big banks are politically powerful to compromise the power of their 
supervisors (Johnson and Kwak, 2011).		Even Basel III guidelines would probably not be 
adequate to account for all the potential risk-holding aspects of global banks. Other 
potential causes for increased riskiness associated with “large, complex financial 
institutions” include difficulties in controlling and monitoring operational risk, credit risk, 
and market risk (Jones and Nguyen, 2005). In addition, these banks are more prone to 
volatile and short-term non-deposit funding sources which, as a result, could expose them 
to higher liquidity risk. Besides, given that global banks are commonly subsidised by the 
government, their risk-taking motives could be twisted, hence, threatening overall 
financial stability. 
In a similar vein, Anginer et al. (2014) address the issue of systemic risk in 
association with competition on 1872 published banks in 63 countries over 1997-2009. 
Competition is measured by the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, whereas 
systemic risk is computed from the Merton distance-to-default model. More especially, 
Anginer et al. (2014) use the correlation in risk-taking behaviour obtained from a time 
series analysis. A bank’s change distance-to-default is regressed on average change in 
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distance-to-default excluding the examined bank. The results show that heightened 
competition leads to more diversified risk-taking activities which subsequently enhance 
bank resilience to shocks. 
A growing body of bank competition literature of which empirical findings support 
the competition-stability has adopted the prevailing Boone indicator as a competition 
proxy. The evidence in Schaeck and Cihák (2008) indicates that competition (measured 
by the Boone indicator) stabilises the banking systems in Europe and the US (1995-2005). 
In a recent study examining banks in major European countries, Schaeck and Cihák 
(2014) confirm their previous findings of competition being stability-enhancing. It is 
noteworthy that the relationship is conveyed through the efficiency channel which 
reallocates profit from cost-inefficient banks to the cost-efficient ones.  
As the literature has yet to reach a consensus over the two hypotheses, we attempt to 
revisit the competition-risk dispute by investigating their existence in Japanese banking 
using bank level Boone indicator, while taking into account the impact of quantitative 
easing. The next section reviews the relationship between quantitative easing and bank 
risk as another primarily investigatory subject in our study. 
5.2.3. Quantitative easing and risk hypothesis 
After a long history of nearly zero policy rates during the 1990s to avoid deflationary 
slump (Leigh, 2010), the Bank of Japan initiated quantitative easing policy in March 2001 
through long-term government bond purchase. That central banking policy has made 
Japan the pioneer in introducing an unconventional monetary policy to combat deflation 
and sluggish growth. The initial target outstanding balance of current accounts held at the 
Bank (i.e. bank reserves) was 5 trillion JPY, being raised further to 30-35 trillion JPY by 
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January 2004. Thereafter, assets purchased were broadened to private assets held by 
private banks, asset-backed securities and asset-backed commercial papers (Girardin and 
Moussa, 2011). Officially ended in March 2006, the first quantitative easing period did 
not firmly prove its effectiveness in detaching the economy from the deflation circle 
(Bowman et al., 2015; Ueda, 2012b; Ugai, 2007). 
The Bank of Japan reactivated this policy in October 2010, when a comprehensive 
monetary easing policy comprising of purchasing a variety of assets was announced. The 
financial assets included are government securities, commercial paper, corporate bonds, 
exchange-traded funds, and Japan real estate investment trusts. From October 2010 to 
March 2013, the outstanding amount of Japanese long-term government bonds nearly 
doubled (from 50 trillion JPY to 91 trillion JPY). From April 2013, the Bank introduced 
a so-called qualitative and quantitative easing (QQE), entering a new phase of monetary 
easing policy. To the extent of quantitative easing, the Bank has changed the target from 
the uncollateralised overnight call rate to monetary base, aiming to increase it at the pace 
of 60 to 70 trillion JPY annually. The Bank also increases its purchase of Japanese 
government bonds, exchange traded funds, and Japan real estate investment trusts. Beside 
the main courses of actions of quantitative easing, qualitative easing means that the Bank 
expands its purchase to all maturities of Japanese government bonds. The average 
remaining maturity of the Bank's Japanese government bond purchases is extended from 
slightly less than three years at present to about seven years, equivalent to the average 
maturity of the amount outstanding of Japanese government bonds issued (Bank of 
Japan’s announcement on 04 April 2013).  
The importance of quantitative easing has been addressed in its significant impact on 
aggregate demand, financial markets and economic growth (Bowman et al., 2015; Glick 
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and Leduc, 2012; Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2013). Regarding its effect on the banking 
system, the bank lending channel is emphasised as a main conduit (Bowman et al., 2015; 
Hosono, 2006). As Lucas (2014) points out, the success of quantitative easing (in the US) 
is partly indicated by increased risk-taking, hence more bank lending. Starting with the 
zero lower bound interest rate policy, Hosono (2006) investigates the different impacts of 
expansionary monetary policy on bank lending. This paper addresses the three important 
bank characteristics, namely size, liquidity and capitalisation, which could alter a bank’s 
reaction to monetary policy stance. Results indicate that expansionary monetary policy in 
Japan is less effective for undercapitalised banks. Lending of small, less liquid and well-
capitalised banks are more exposed to monetary policy shocks than their counterparts.  
Inspired by Hosono (2006) but slightly more comprehensive is Bowman et al. (2015), 
which particularly focus on the first quantitative easing period. Bowman et al. (2015) 
show that bank lending, through the transmission of quantitative easing, appears in the 
liquidity channel. The results suggest that liquidity injection of the central bank was 
inhibited by interbank illiquidity, thus the size of credit boosted was relatively small. 
Unlike findings of Hosono (2006), less-capitalised banks benefit more from quantitative 
easing than their well-capitalised peers. Weaker banks in the sense of higher 
nonperforming loan to asset ratio also appear to be more sensitive to liquidity injection. 
Bank size is reported to be insignificant in affecting the relationship between bank lending 
growth and liquidity. Kobayashi et al. (2006) also find evidence to support that financially 
weaker banks and firms reap more benefits from quantitative easing through positive 
excess stock returns.  
To this end, to the best of our knowledge, no study has established a clear link 
between quantitative easing in Japan and bank risk-taking using bank level information. 
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Academics and policymakers have addressed the potentially disproportionate bank risk-
taking associated with the enactment of quantitative easing (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; 
Claeys and Darvas, 2015). Quantitative easing is supposed to encourage financial 
institutions to attempt socially desirable risk-taking. However, banks may be deviated 
from their secured path when excessive risk-taking is recorded (Claeys and Darvas, 
2015). In addition, under lax lending standards and low interest rates, the likelihood that 
more risky borrowers being offered new loans could rise, and so could credit risk 
(Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). The countervailing effects of interest rate 
changes on bank risk are also addressed in Buch et al. (2014). Lower interest rates could 
reduce the cost burden for borrowers, increase the collateral value, and subsequently raise 
the likelihood of repayment. In parallel, the borrowing capacity rises as a result of higher 
prices of collaterals, and banks are induced to engage in riskier projects to offset lower 
profit associated with lower interest rates. On the contrary, Lucas (2014) argues that 
quantitative easing could unintentionally reduce bank risk-taking incentives. Banks 
benefit from the term premium in the yield curve if their asset duration exceeds their 
liabilities’. When the yield curve is flat, they may be discouraged in issuing long-term 
loans which may be more desirable by borrowers.  
In this regard, we leave our quantitative easing-risk hypothesis open: The 
implementation of quantitative easing could lead to either an increase or a reduction in 
bank risk. 
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5.3. Methodology 
5.3.1. Marginal cost 
In order to obtain values for the Boone indicator, we need to model bank marginal 
cost. In line with Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) and Fu et al. (2014), marginal cost is obtained 
from a flexible translog cost function specification39: 
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with total costs TCit, total earning assets Q (loans, investments, and securities) (Delis, 
2012), price of inputs Pj (subject to the condition of homogeneity of degree one), time 
trend t and a composed error term εit. Two input prices are incorporated: i) price of funds 
P1 is defined as interest expenses divided by deposits and borrowed funds; ii) price of 
physical capital and labour P2 as noninterest expenses divided by fixed assets40. 
The marginal cost MC for bank i at time t can be derived from equation (1) as follows: 
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39 Subscripts (it) are omitted for simplification.	
40 Due to data unavailability, we are unable to extract data from general and administrative expenses which 
include personnel expenses and non-personnel expenses associated to physical capital. Hence, we define 
the second input price in line with Fu et al. (2014). 
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5.3.2. The Boone indicator 
The Boone indicator of competition has quite a few advantages in comparison with 
others. This measure accounts for both a lift in entry barriers or more aggressive 
interaction between market participants (Boone, 2008b), while other indicators contain 
limitations or bias. As Beck (2008) argues, concentration ratios such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and three (five)-bank concentration ratio are rather unreliable measures 
of competition as they only weigh concentration levels. Concentration ratio could rise 
following an increase in competition, as incompetent participants would have to exit the 
market. Hence, if one interpreted higher concentration ratios as a proxy for uncompetitive 
markets, the results could be misleading (Schaeck and Cihák, 2014). Other measures of 
competition such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and Lerner index also have some 
limitations. While H-statistic requires a priori assumption of long-run equilibrium 
operating markets (Panzar and Rosse, 1987), it is ambiguous whether the Lerner index 
captures the degree of product substitutability (Vives, 2008). Mirzaei and Moore (2014) 
argue that the H-statistic does not embrace the evolution of bank competition as there is 
only one score obtained over time. Even though time-varying scores are achievable 
(Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Jeon et al., 2011), they are either increasing or decreasing which 
may be inapplicable in effect. 
Introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008b), firms’ (banks’) market power 
can be measured through profit elasticity β in a simple profit equation: 
ititit umc ++= lnln bap              (3) 
where πit and mcit are profit and marginal costs of bank i at time t. β is the Boone indicator 
of market power which is expected to be negative as higher marginal costs would result 
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in lower profits. Intuitively, compared to operating in an uncompetitive market, in a 
competitive market, inefficient banks signified by comparatively high marginal costs are 
penalised more harshly since they will endure high loss in profits. Hence, the larger the 
absolute value of β, the more intense the degree of competition. 
In our paper, we employ the non-parametric methodology used in Delis (2012) to 
compute the Boone indicator for individual banks in each period. This allows us to create 
bank level estimates of competition. We estimate equation (3) by using a local regression 
analysis41, which fits the relation between log profits and log marginal costs on the 
neighbourhood subsample of each observation to obtain individual βit.42 
5.3.3. The Lerner index 
We also use the Lerner index, another proxy of bank market power, to achieve a 
comprehensive analysis with different indicators of competition. The Lerner index is 
formulated as follows: 
																																																						
41	According to Loader (1999), a local regression iii xY eµ += )(  with predictor variable x and response 
variable Y is estimated by smoothing the unknown function )( ixµ . This is obtained through fitting a 
polynomial model within a sliding window of x. Each point in the neighbourhood of x is assigned a weight 
corresponding to its distance from x. In particular, the closer the point to x, the larger its weight. The next 
step is to choose an optimal bandwidth h which controls the smoothness of fit and a smoothing window (x-
h(x), x+h(x)). In other words, for each observation xi, all neighbour points within the sliding window h are 
used in the following locally weighted least squares criterion: ( )( )( )210
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( ) ( )xhxxu i /-= . In line with Delis (2012), we use the generalised cross-validation method to obtain 
our bandwidth. The result indicates a bandwidth of 0.42.	
42	 In regression (3), the Boone indicator is averaged over the entire sample across the whole examined 
period. Put differently, it cannot be measured for individual banks. To overcome this drawback, empirical 
research has modified this model to yield values of β for each period (Schaeck and Cihák, 2014; Van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2011) by adding a time dummy and its interaction with marginal costs in order to 
increase the frequency of the indicator. However, the number of observations achieved from this approach 
does not rise significantly as they are estimated values for each period.	
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( )
itQititQit
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where
itQ
P is output price calculated as operating income divided by earning assets. This 
indicator captures pricing ability above marginal cost, which has been used extensively 
in the banking literature (Berger et al., 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; 
Koetter et al., 2012). Values of the index are bounded between 0 and 1, with the former 
presenting perfect competition while the latter indicating pure monopoly. A negative 
Lerner index entails inability to price above marginal cost which might be a consequence 
of non-optimal behaviour (Fu et al., 2014). 
5.3.4. Dynamic panel threshold analysis 
To examine the risk-competition, risk-quantitative easing nexus, we adopt the 
dynamic panel threshold model introduced by Kremer et al. (2013). This methodology 
allows for the estimation of a threshold effect within a panel data framework involving 
endogenous regressors. The threshold variables of interest are the proxies of competition 
and quantitative easing. In our main analyses, when one of them is treated as the threshold 
variable, the other is included in the model as a control variable. As quantitative easing 
policy influences interest rates, and thereby indirectly affecting competition, potential 
endogeneity exists. Besides, as I use a bank-specific variable which is bank lending rate 
as a proxy for quantitative easing, one may argue that it can be affected by competition. 
The dynamic threshold model of Kremer et al. (2013) extends the original static set up of 
Hansen (1999) to account for endogeneity. Therefore, the model allows for an estimate 
of a threshold value which is free from endogeneity bias. Apart from tackling endogeneity 
concerns, another advantage of this methodology in the case of Japanese banking is that 
no priori assumption needed with regard to structural breaks. Such breaks, within the 
present threshold model, are endogenously determined from the underlying data 
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generating process. The model estimates threshold values for competition and 
quantitative easing over time, which in turn signify regime changes.  In some details, the 
model specification is written as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )TtNizqIqqIqIqy itititititititiit ...,,1,...,,1211 ==++>+£+£+= efgbgdgbµ       (5) 
where indicates bank-specific fixed effect43; I(.) is the indicator function indicating the 
regime defined by the threshold variable (qit) and the threshold level γ; qit is both the 
threshold variable and the regime-dependent regressor. zit is a vector of control variables, 
which may include both endogenous and exogenous variable. As in Kremer et al. (2013), 
we account for the regime intercept (δ1) because omitting the intercept may result in 
biases in the threshold estimates and regression slopes (Bick, 2010).εit is the error term.
44 
As in Caner and Hansen (2004) and Kremer et al. (2013), we estimate equation (5) by 
using GMM to account for endogeneity. The first lag of the endogenous variable is used 
as the instrument. 
5.4. Data 
Our data are extracted from semi-annual financial reports of Japanese commercial 
banks published on the Japanese Bankers Association website. Our sample consists of 
3491 observations from financial years 2000 to 2014. Three particular types of 
																																																						
43 To eliminate bank-specific fixed effects, as suggested by Kremer et al (2013), we employ the forward 
orthogonal deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).  
44 The estimation procedure is as follows. First, a reduced-form regression is estimated for endogenous 
variables as a function of the instrumental variables. Second, using least squares, we estimate equation (5) 
for a fixed threshold with the predicted values of endogenous variables obtained from the first step 
regression. Third, the second step regression is repeated to find the estimator of the threshold value 
associated with the smallest sum of squared residuals. The critical values for the 95% confidence intervals 
of the threshold value are: , with  is the 95% percentile of the asymptotic 
distribution of the likelihood ratio statistic  (Caner and Hansen, 2004). The slope coefficients are 
estimated by GMM procedure for the formerly used instruments and estimated threshold. 
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commercial banks are examined in our study, namely City Banks, Regional Banks I and 
Regional Banks II. They form more than half the whole banking system and correspond 
to various types of operations. If City Banks involve more in different aspects of banking 
business, Regional Banks are prone to conventional banking activities. City Banks are 
referred as main banks in the horizontal keiretsu network – the enterprise groups 
consisting of one large firm for every major sector pre- and post-crisis. These banks act 
as the core of the business group and offer venture capital for affiliates. The number of 
City Banks has declined over time since the crisis occurred in the 1990s. Besides, during 
the restructuring period, City Banks benefited from the tendency of mergers in 
empowering their resistance to overcome the consequences of the crisis45.  
The operating locations of Regional Banks are refined by their scope of business, 
with tighter geographic region restriction for Regional Banks II. These banks are the 
smallest in comparison with the other two. Unlike City Banks, Regional Banks mainly 
invest in government bonds and originate loans for small and medium firms in their 
specific areas where their head offices are located. Thus, Regional Banks are more 
committed to the local development of their prefectures. There are other different kinds 
of banks currently operating in Japan, for example, Trust Banks, Long-Term Credit 
Banks, Shinkin banks (credit cooperatives), and foreign banks. Due to data unavailability 
or differences in business features, we do not observe non-commercial banks in our study. 
In terms of dependent variables representing bank risk-taking, we opt for bankrupt 
loans to total assets (BRL ratio), restructured loans to total assets (RSL ratio), and the 
																																																						
45	Mitsui Bank and Taiyo-Kobe Bank to form Sakura Bank; Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kanyo, and Industrial Bank of 
Japan to form Mizuho Bank; Sanwa and Tokai Banks to form UFJ Banks; UFJ Banks and Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi; Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank (Nakamura, 2006) .	
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natural logarithm of Z-score46. The first two variables characterise credit risk, whereas 
the remaining variable is a proxy for overall bank stability. They are incorporated 
respectively in the model to analyse the highlighted hypotheses. Bankrupt and 
restructured loans are obtained from data of risk-monitored loans disclosed under the 
Banking Law. Bankrupt loans are named after the sum of bankrupt loans and non-accrual 
loans,47 while restructured loans are the sum of the other two categories: past due loans 
by 3 months or more but less than 6 months, and restructured loans.48 The ratios of these 
risk-monitored loans to assets capture credit risk, similar to nonperforming loan to asset 
ratio that has been widely used in the literature to test for the competition-fragility nexus 
(Beck, 2008). Bank stability indicated by the Z-score is another gauge for the likelihood 
of bank failure (Beck et al., 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2009). This is defined as the 
number of standard deviations below the mean of return on assets that would result in 
insolvency by evaporating capital ( ) (Beck et al., 
2013).  
To ensure the robustness of our estimation, we analyse the dynamic panel threshold 
model with two proxies for competition, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index, with 
the former being our primary interest. With regard to quantitative easing, we choose the 
bank-specific lending rate calculated as interest income on loans divided by loans and 
bills discounted (Delis and Kouretas, 2011)49. We employ bank-specific lending rate as 
																																																						
46 Nonperforming loan ratio and Z-score are used extensively in the literature to represent bank risk 
(Agoraki et al., 2011; Beck, 2008; Buch et al., 2012). 
47 Reported in Japanese commercial banks’ balance sheets, these loans are named loans to borrowers in 
legal bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears by six months or more. 
48 The Japanese Bankers Association originally defined restructured loans as loans of which interest rates 
were lowered. In 1997, the definition was extended to loans with any amended contract conditions and 
loans to corporations under on-going reorganisation (Montgomery and Shimizutani, 2009). 
49 We could also use the amount of asset purchases or Japanese government bond’s yield as measures for 
quantitative easing (Bowman et al., 2015; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012; Voutsinas and Werner, 2011). 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
	149 
	
the threshold variable for quantitative easing for several reasons. First, under the zero 
lower bound interest rate policy, short-term interest rates are inoperative (Girardin and 
Moussa, 2011). Second, the Bank of Japan loan rate, uncollateralised overnight call rates, 
and the Bank of Japan’s total reserves, the amount of asset purchases, and government 
bond yields do not reflect individual bank characteristics in relation to changes in 
quantitative easing. Third, we could avoid aggregation bias and enhance the compatibility 
of quantitative easing proxy with the dependent variable and the Boone indicator. For 
each set of models with different threshold variables, we also control for the impact of 
either competition or quantitative easing. For instance, when proxies for competition are 
treated as threshold variables, quantitative easing will appear among the determinants, 
and vice versa. As quantitative easing influences deposit interest rates, it may in turn 
affect bank competition in the loan market. In addition, one may argue that lending rate 
is not a direct measure of quantitative easing, and may be affected by competition. To 
tackle the potential endogeneity between the three main variables of interest, we treat 
them as endogenous in the dynamic panel threshold model.50 For robustness, we also use 
the 10-year Japanese government bond yield and the Bank of Japan total assets (Lyonnet 
and Werner, 2012) as other proxies for quantitative easing. 
Regarding a subset of explanatory variables, we specify a number of control variables 
varying from bank characteristics to macroeconomic impact. To account for capitalisation 
and the potential moral hazard problem, we use the capital to assets ratio (Tabak et al., 
2012)51. Bank size is taken as the natural logarithm of total assets (Delis and Kouretas, 
																																																						
50	We use the first lag of the endogenous variable as its instrument to preserve information. Following 
Kremer et al. (2013), all available lags of the endogenous regressor are also examined. In fact, the 
corresponding results reveal little variation in the parameters estimated. 	
51 As capital ratio is part of the formula of Z-score, we exclude it from models in which lnZ-score is used. 
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2011). We also take into consideration the impact of revenue diversification which is the 
ratio of non-interest income to total operating income (Anginer et al., 2014; Beck et al., 
2013), assets diversification represented by the ratio of securities to assets (Zhang et al., 
2013), and liquidity which is defined as liquid assets52 to total assets (Jeon et al., 2011). 
GDP growth is included to reflect the influence of macroeconomic environment (Jiménez 
et al., 2013). Market capitalisation is accounting for financial market development and 
also functioning as an alternative source of fund for incumbent firms (Beck et al., 2013). 
Descriptive statistics of data used are displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
BRL ratio 0.0263 0.0219 0.0000 0.6765 
RSL ratio 0.0092 0.0093 0.0000 0.1958 
LnZscore 3.9335 0.5223 0.0000 5.6410 
Boone indicator -0.0542 0.0579 -1.6390 -0.0391 
Lerner index 0.2531 0.2664 -4.0314 0.7583 
Lending rate 0.0106 0.0024 0.0012 0.0366 
Size 14.5717 1.1591 12.0571 19.0109 
Capital ratio 0.0432 0.0240 -0.7882 0.1279 
Asset diversification 0.2394 0.0770 0.0000 0.4807 
Liquidity ratio 0.0722 0.0380 0.0089 0.3679 
Revenue diversification 0.2220 0.0817 0.0577 0.5445 
GDP growth 0.0032 0.0234 -0.0787 0.0543 
Bond yield 0.0122 0.0039 0.0041 0.0185 
Bank of Japan assets 18.7201 0.2530 18.3119 19.5192 
Market capitalisation 19.2235 0.2546 18.8248 19.6968 
Notes: This Table reports the descriptive statistics for key variables employed in the dynamic panel 
threshold analysis. Number of observations: 3491. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: 
restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest 
income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, Bond yield: 10-year Japanese government bond yield, Bank of Japan assets and 
market capitalisation are in natural logarithm. S.D.: Standard deviation. 
 
																																																						
52 Liquid assets = Cash and due from banks + call loans + receivables under resale agreements + receivables 
under securities borrowing transactions + bills bought + monetary claims bought + trading assets + trading 
account securities + money held in trust (Radić, 2015). 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
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5.5. Results 
5.5.1. The Boone indicator 
As introduced in section 5.3.2, the Boone indicator is estimated for each bank in the 
sample. This provides much more information on competition in the Japanese banking 
industry than other measures. More in details, the average indicator for the entire sample 
from 2000 to 2014 is -0.0542.53 Reported in Mirzaei and Moore (2014), the average 
Boone indicator for Japanese banking between 1999 and 2011 is -0.02.54 Figure 1 
illustrates the mean value of the Boone indicator over time for all banks in our sample. 
Its highest score in absolute value is recorded in March 2002 at -0.0813, indicating the 
toughest degree of competition for the entire period. During the restructuring period 
(September 2000 to March 2003), the government imposed policy changes on the banking 
system in order to revitalise its resilience to the aftermaths of the crisis. In addition, 
undercapitalisation and the threat of nonperforming loans induced fragile banks to agree 
to merger proposals from financially healthier banks. The consolidation tendency was 
augmented by a number of mergers between large City Banks, indicating an adverse 
phase for too-big-to-fail banks in maintaining their market power. Afterwards, the 
average score slightly increased to -0.0483 in March 2004 and became relatively flat until 
September 2008. This may serve as evidence in supporting the positive outcomes of 
government intervention. Within that time frame, the turbulence caused by the huge 
amount of nonperforming loans had been alleviated gradually.  
 
																																																						
53 Delis (2012) includes Japan in the sample of 84 countries and reports that the average Boone indicator 
for Japanese banks during 1988-2005 is -0.584.  
54 Note that the data are obtained from World Bank for the whole banking system. 
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Figure 1. The Boone Indicator and the Lerner Index 
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the average values of the Boone indicator and the Lerner index over time. 
Year denotes financial year. 
 
There was a shift in the Boone indicator which signified higher competition during 
the US subprime crisis. At the end of March 2009, the corresponding Boone indicator 
dropped from -0.0489 (in September 2008) to -0.0659. The contagion of the global 
financial crisis possibly deviated Japanese banks from their profit goals. The deterioration 
of profit, in turn, could reduce bank market power. Between September 2009 and 
September 2012, the Boone indicator had a stable trend similar to its pattern after the 
restructuring period, before slightly decreasing towards the end of the sample period. 
The corresponding stiff competition is identified by higher absolute values of the 
Boone indicator. There is no specific benchmark for the value of  in general, yet what 
we have found implies a moderate degree of competition in the banking sector, as the 
figures are not too distant from zero. Estimating an international sample, Clerides et al. 
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(2015) also find that the Japanese banking system is in the least competitive group based 
on profit elasticities. Table 2 provides further insight of competition among each bank 
type. In general, competition within City Banks (-0.0654) and Regional Banks II (-
0.0559) are more intense than between Regional Banks I (-0.0518). The largest magnitude 
(absolute value) of the Boone indicator is recorded for City Banks in March 2002 at -
0.1906. The trend of competition in City Banks during the restructuring period was more 
volatile than those in the other two types, indicating the effect of the aforementioned 
consolidation tendency. It seems that the onset of the US credit crunch 2007-2008 
imposed a pronounced effect on competition between Regional Banks II, notably at -
0.0809 in March 2009. A potential explanation could rest on the size factor which may 
denote a bank’s resistance to external shocks. Regional Banks II are the smallest 
compared to the other two and operate under more limited geographic restrictions. Hence, 
it might be challenging for Regional Banks II to withstand exogenous shocks which could 
erode their profits and weaken their market power. Nevertheless, competition in Regional 
Banks II appeared to be relatively stable compared to City Banks and Regional Banks I 
after the global financial crisis. 
With regard to the Lerner index, its trend over time illustrated in Figure 1 shows 
support for previous findings of the Boone indicator.55 Our result reveals that the average 
Lerner index is 0.2531, with some variation across bank types (the average Lerner index 
reported for Japanese banks from 2003 to 2010 in Fu et al. (2014) is 0.2521). The level 
of competition is relatively tougher for City Banks (0.1467) and Regional Banks II 
(0.2421) than for Regional Banks I (0.2777), in line with the rank of Boone indicators 
formerly reported for three types. The trend of the Lerner index over time is very similar 
																																																						
55 There are some cases when market power characterised by the Lerner index is negative, but occasionally 
found. Agoraki et al. (2011) and Fu et al. (2014) explain the implication of negative Lerner index by the 
non-optimising behaviour of banks which are unable to price above marginal cost. 
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to the pattern of the Boone indicator (see Fig. 1). The two points expressing the strongest 
competitive environment are also observed in March 2002 and March 2009. Our results, 
however, are different from findings of Liu and Wilson (2013), possibly because they 
obtain the Lerner index by estimating the whole banking system, including Trust Banks, 
Shinkin Banks and Credit cooperatives during 2000-2009. Concerning the three types in 
our sample, Liu and Wilson (2013) find that City Banks have the greatest market power, 
followed by Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. Similar interpretation is drawn from 
Montgomery et al. (2014) as large banks enjoy greater market power post-mergers. 
  
	155 
	
Table 2. Boone Indicator and Lerner Index per Bank Type. 
Variable Boone  Lerner 
Time City Regional I Regional II  City Regional I Regional II 
Sep-00 -0.0840 -0.0575 -0.0581  0.1337 0.2001 0.1732 
Mar-01 -0.1129 -0.0597 -0.0683  -0.1054 0.1321 0.1356 
Sep-01 -0.1332 -0.0605 -0.0886  -0.2174 0.1146 0.0830 
Mar-02 -0.1906 -0.0625 -0.0894  -0.7096 0.0647 0.0289 
Sep-02 -0.0517 -0.0535 -0.0795  0.0709 0.1813 0.1597 
Mar-03 -0.1206 -0.0515 -0.0810  -0.8319 0.1173 0.0257 
Sep-03 -0.0429 -0.0699 -0.0469  0.2166 0.2190 0.2822 
Mar-04 -0.0616 -0.0452 -0.0503  0.1374 0.3101 0.2645 
Sep-04 -0.0601 -0.0469 -0.0455  0.1992 0.3177 0.3030 
Mar-05 -0.0562 -0.0461 -0.0510  0.0917 0.3196 0.2993 
Sep-05 -0.0432 -0.0486 -0.0458  0.3346 0.3169 0.3385 
Mar-06 -0.0432 -0.0457 -0.0563  0.3082 0.3628 0.3086 
Sep-06 -0.0413 -0.0464 -0.0550  0.3191 0.3303 0.2757 
Mar-07 -0.0467 -0.0453 -0.0579  0.2326 0.3249 0.2593 
Sep-07 -0.0546 -0.0496 -0.0468  0.2172 0.2880 0.2889 
Mar-08 -0.0574 -0.0489 -0.0539  0.2117 0.2482 0.2143 
Sep-08 -0.0513 -0.0453 -0.0537  0.0899 0.1893 0.1809 
Mar-09 -0.0598 -0.0562 -0.0809  -0.0583 -0.0060 -0.0608 
Sep-09 -0.0428 -0.0433 -0.0452  0.1706 0.2947 0.2577 
Mar-10 -0.0445 -0.0443 -0.0493  0.2579 0.2994 0.2286 
Sep-10 -0.0483 -0.0440 -0.0453  0.3296 0.3270 0.3011 
Mar-11 -0.0435 -0.0442 -0.0442  0.2450 0.2942 0.2965 
Sep-11 -0.0458 -0.0438 -0.0446  0.3260 0.3461 0.3194 
Mar-12 -0.0579 -0.0464 -0.0438  0.3335 0.3280 0.3254 
Sep-12 -0.0513 -0.0436 -0.0435  0.2787 0.3167 0.3245 
Mar-13 -0.0586 -0.0605 -0.0426  0.3910 0.3630 0.3309 
Sep-13 -0.0916 -0.0519 -0.0437  0.4174 0.3879 0.3878 
Mar-14 -0.0419 -0.0612 -0.0439  0.3781 0.3673 0.3775 
Sep-14 -0.0450 -0.0642 -0.0430  0.4285 0.4013 0.3927 
Mar-15 -0.0438 -0.0663 -0.0451  0.3356 0.3895 0.3878 
Total -0.0654 -0.0518 -0.0559  0.1467 0.2713 0.2421 
Notes: This Table reports the average Boone indicator and the Lerner index per bank type over time. Sep: 
September; Mar: March; 00-15: 2000-2015. 
 
5.5.2. Risk and competition: The Boone indicator as the threshold variable 
Table 3 reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis for the relationship 
between competition and risk, with the Boone indicator as the threshold variable. 
Columns 1 to 3 report findings with three proxies for risks (bankrupt loan ratio, 
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restructured loan ratio, and lnZ-score, respectively). In the first two columns, the 
threshold values found are quite close to each other (-0.0457 and -0.0481). The impact of 
the Boone indicator in the low regime is negative and insignificant. In the high regimes, 
the regime-dependent coefficients of the Boone indicator are positive and statistically 
significant (0.5654 and 0.4257). It suggests that when above the threshold value, the 
Boone indicator is positively associated with bankrupt loan/restructured loan ratios. In 
other words, the higher the bank competition, the lower the risk. Comparing the 
magnitude of the coefficients, we observe a stronger effect when risk is captured by 
bankrupt loan ratio (0.5654 against 0.4257). Compared to restructured loans, bankrupt 
loans are more detrimental as they have a smaller likelihood of recovery. This could 
suggest a more favourable effect of competition on reducing riskier loan portfolios. Our 
results, therefore, support the competition-stability hypothesis, in line with findings of 
Schaeck and Cihák (2014) for EU banks. Also examining Japanese banks but using Z-
score to proxy for risk, Liu and Wilson (2013) report the existence of the competition-
fragility hypothesis for all banks during 2000-2009.  
There is a positive relationship between the Boone indicator and lnZ-score in both 
regimes. The parameters reported in column 3 are 0.3231 and 1.156 for the low and high 
regimes, respectively. Thus, in terms of overall bank soundness, competition appears to 
reduce bank stability, supporting the competition-fragility hypothesis. This implication is 
in line with the finding of Liu and Wilson (2013) who also use lnZ-score as an indicator 
for bank stability. The threshold value is identified at -0.1026, putting approximately 94% 
of the observations of the sample in the high regime (3283). To this end, there is evidence 
that both competition-risk hypotheses exist in Japanese banking. Competition is found to 
be a risk-reducing factor in terms of credit risks, but not in the case of overall bank 
stability.  
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We are more confident in the credibility of the former interpretation which supports 
the competition-stability hypothesis, since Z-score contains some limitations. As argued 
in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011), Z-score is an accounting-based measure, 
which may not fully reflect the solvency of individual banks, especially if banks are able 
to smooth out data before reporting. Cihák and Hesse (2007) also cast doubts on whether 
Z-score produces a fair measure of default risk across financial institutions. An example 
given in their study is cooperative banks that are less focused on profitability. Another 
problem of Z-score is the volatility measure in the denominator of its formula. Lepetit 
and Strobel (2013) compare different alternatives for the construction of Z-score. They 
provide evidence that the mean and standard deviation of return on assets calculated for 
the whole sample and the current capital ratio best fit their data.56 To this end, our proxies 
of credit risks are straightforward from balance-sheet data. We do not have the issue of 
comparability discussed in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) for the use of 
nonperforming loans, as banks operate under the same reporting rules. Furthermore, the 
data set of bankrupt and restructured loans represents a more realistic picture of the 
problem that Japanese banks encountered. 
  
																																																						
56 Tsionas (2014) provides more discussion regarding the limitations of Z-score. 
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Table 3. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus 
(Boone Indicator). 
	
Notes: This Table reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the 
endogenous variable (lending rate) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Boone indicator. BRL 
ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. 
***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
 
The number of banks over time in each regime classified by the Boone indicator 
threshold is reported in Table 4. In the low regime, there are 611 (column 1), 562 (column 
2), and 208 (column 3) observations. The high regime consists of many more 
observations: 2880 (column 1), 2929 (column 2), and 3283 (column 3). The patterns of 
the number of banks are rather clear in columns 1 and 2, in which we observe some breaks 
in September 2003, September 2007, and March 2009. From September 2003 to 
September 2007, competition appeared less intensified as there were significantly fewer 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates -0.0457 -0.0481 -0.1026 
95% confidence interval [ -0.0459  -0.0457] [-0.0493  -0.0457] [-0.1151  -0.0988] 
Impact of threshold variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime  -0.0571 0.0382 -0.0116 0.0097 0.3231* 0.1775 
High regime 0.5654*** 0.0849 0.4257*** 0.0554 1.1560*** 0.1676 
Intercept -0.0249*** 0.0044 -0.0152*** 0.0025 -0.1453*** 0.0240 
Impact of covariates       
Lending rate 0.0421*** 0.0032 0.0372*** 0.0020 0.1820*** 0.0300 
Size -0.0002 0.0038 0.0096*** 0.0027 0.0758*** 0.0307 
Capital ratio -0.6081*** 0.1054 -0.1051*** 0.0421   
Asset diversification -0.0454*** 0.0091 -0.0128*** 0.0050 0.1204 0.1598 
Liquidity -0.0429*** 0.0096 -0.0084 0.0068 0.0982 0.2349 
Revenue diversification 0.0144* 0.0087 0.0125 0.0080 0.1927*** 0.0655 
GDP growth 0.0573*** 0.0074 0.0462*** 0.0046 0.2623*** 0.0596 
Market capitalisation -0.0029*** 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0373*** 0.0090 
       
Obs in low regime 611  562  208  
Obs in high regime 2880  2929  3283  
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observations in the low regimes. From September 2009 to September 2012, a similar trend 
prevailed. Between March 2008 and March 2009, the number of observations in the low 
regimes increased quite significantly. This highlights tougher competition, probably in 
connection with the onset of the global financial crisis. In column 3, the identification of 
strong competition may not be obvious as the majority of banks are classified in the high 
regime. However, the threshold value itself (-0.1026) signifies a rather high level of 
competition in comparison to those reported in columns 1 and 2 (-0.0457 and -0.0481). 
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Table 4. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Competition Nexus. 
 1  2  3 
 BRL ratio  RSL ratio  lnZ-score 
 -0.0457  -0.0481  -0.1026 
 Low  High   Low  High   Low  High  
Sep-00 41 87  37 91  11 117 
Mar-01 43 82  43 82  19 106 
Sep-01 42 86  42 86  20 108 
Mar-02 51 74  51 74  30 95 
Sep-02 17 110  17 110  10 117 
Mar-03 42 79  39 82  21 100 
Sep-03 13 108  13 108  5 116 
Mar-04 13 107  12 108  4 116 
Sep-04 13 107  9 111  3 117 
Mar-05 14 105  11 108  3 116 
Sep-05 10 109  8 111  4 115 
Mar-06 13 104  9 108  4 113 
Sep-06 11 106  8 109  2 115 
Mar-07 11 105  11 105  6 110 
Sep-07 12 103  11 104  2 113 
Mar-08 23 91  23 91  5 109 
Sep-08 29 86  28 87  4 111 
Mar-09 49 65  46 68  12 102 
Sep-09 5 109  5 109  0 114 
Mar-10 9 103  7 105  3 109 
Sep-10 5 106  3 108  1 110 
Mar-11 4 107  2 109  0 111 
Sep-11 6 105  3 108  0 111 
Mar-12 9 102  8 103  1 110 
Sep-12 7 103  3 107  0 110 
Mar-13 15 95  15 95  10 100 
Sep-13 17 93  15 95  5 105 
Mar-14 23 87  22 88  6 104 
Sep-14 29 81  27 83  9 101 
Mar-15 35 75  34 76  8 102 
Obs 611 2880  562 2929  208 3283 
Notes: This Table reports the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-competition 
nexus, with the Boone indicator being the threshold value, and lending rate being the proxy for quantitative 
easing. Threshold values for the Boone indicator are obtained from the dynamic panel threshold analysis, 
reported in Table 3. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows dependent variables, the third row 
shows the threshold values, the fourth row indicates low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 
00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of observations. 
  
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
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The impact of other control variables is a non-trivial concern. Quantitative easing is 
the variable that we consider of particular importance in affecting the risk-competition 
connection. We find a significant and positive impact of bank lending rate on all 
dependent variables. Thereby, while a rise in lending rate would increase bank stability 
(column 3, Table 3), it would also raise bank risk-taking in terms of higher 
bankrupt/restructured loan ratios (columns 1 and 2, Table 3). This finding could give 
support to the argument of Buch et al. (2014). Quantitative easing could explain for this 
reduction in credit risk because lower lending rates mitigate the interest burden for 
borrowers. However, banks may involve in riskier activities to seek for high yield so as 
to compensate for the low interest margin. 
We find a negative association between bank characteristics (capitalisation, assets 
diversification and liquidity) and risk-monitored loan ratios. Well-capitalised banks are 
expected to have lower credit risk as the risk of capital loss outweighs the temptation from 
higher returns associated with riskier investments, in line with the finding reported in 
Tabak et al. (2015) for Brazilian banks. Concerning the favourable impact of asset 
diversification on risk, the result proposes that when diversifying earning assets, banks 
would benefit from lower risk-monitored loan ratios. The reason could be that managers 
of banks which have a well-diversified asset portfolio are expected to also effectively 
control their loan-generating practices. Regarding liquidity, banks having high liquidity 
ratio are found to be less sensitive to risk. Liquidity not only enhances banks’ resilience 
to shocks, but also liberates banks in managing outstanding loans, rolling over debts and 
considering prospective loan applications. Highly liquid banks, hence, could be more 
flexible in extending loan maturity or amending loan contracts, which in turn would give 
temporarily troubled borrowers valuable opportunities to defend their financial health and 
commit to loan repayment. 
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In terms of bank size and revenue diversification, we find that large banks would 
have higher restructured loan ratio (column 2, Table 3), but also higher overall bank 
stability (column 3, Table 3) compared to their smaller peers. This could be explained 
through the segmentation of Japanese banking. Loan financing of systemically important 
banks, e.g. City Banks, is not refined within specific locations and particular types of 
borrowers. This may increase the likelihood of greater restructured loan ratio in 
comparison to small banks. However, it is more likely for too-big-to-fail banks to prevent 
restructured loans from transferring to bankrupt loans as they could benefit from various 
funding sources and better access to information. These advantages could also enhance 
bank stability. Moreover, as a feature of the keiretsu network, Japanese City Banks have 
strong ties with their clients (Lincoln et al., 1996). Management assistance from City 
Banks could aid temporarily distressed borrowers to reverse the situations. Affiliated 
firms could benefit from strategic advice of their Main banks to encounter challenging 
periods. Our results support Liu and Wilson (2013) to the extent that Japanese large banks 
are less risky than their smaller peers. In terms of the impact of revenue diversification, 
an increase in this ratio is reported to enhance bank soundness (column 3, Table 3). The 
more diversified the bank is in business activities, the less risk it may incur. Nguyen et al. 
(2012) also report that South Asian banks are more stable in response to diversifying their 
income.  
Turning to the influence of macroeconomic variables, an increase in GDP growth 
would positively affect risk-monitored loan ratios. Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) 
argue that the pro-cyclical bank lending pattern is supposed to influence bank risk since 
banks are more likely to relax lending standards and expand credit during economic 
upturn. Nevertheless, the result indicates a favourable impact of GDP growth on bank 
stability (column 3, Table 3), in line with Agoraki et al. (2011). With regard to the effect 
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of market capitalisation on risk, our result denotes that the development of the stock 
market would have a positive effect on the banking market through lower ratio of 
bankrupt loans (column 1, Table 3) and higher bank soundness (column 3, Table 3). There 
is a weak implication that firms can seek funding from alternative markets to repay their 
debts. However, in developed financial markets, credit information sharing would easily 
assist creditors to detect firms with bad reputation and moral hazard behaviour (Beck et 
al., 2013).  
Table 5 reports results for the competition and risk relationship with other proxies of 
quantitative easing. We find consistent threshold values for the Boone indicator, as well 
as its relationship with risk across models. The magnitudes of the impact of the threshold 
variable on the dependent variable are also very similar to those reported in Table 3. In 
particular, competition is found to reduce credit risk (high regimes, columns 1 to 4), but 
undermine bank soundness (columns 5 and 6). As lower bond yield and higher Bank of 
Japan assets indicate more aggressive quantitative easing (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012), results in columns 1 to 4 show that 
quantitative easing reduces risk-monitored loan ratios, in line with results in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 3. This relationship is drawn from a positive association between bond 
yield and bankrupt/restructured loan ratios (columns 1 and 3), and a negative association 
between these ratios and Bank of Japan assets (columns 2 and 4). For the impact of control 
variables, there is little variation in terms of signs and magnitudes, with an exception of 
revenue diversification. This variable reveals a statistically significant effect in reducing 
risk-monitored loan ratios (columns 1 to 4).  
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Table 5. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Boone Indicator and other proxies for Quantitative Easing). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio BRL ratio RSL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates -0.0457 -0.0457 -0.0481 -0.0481 -0.1026 -0.1026 
95% confidence interval [-0.0459  -0.0457] [ -0.0459  -0.0457] [ -0.0494  -0.0457] [ -0.0494  -0.0457] [ -0.1151  -0.0988] [ -0.1151  -0.0988] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0571 0.0374 -0.0571 0.0365 -0.0116 0.0092 -0.0116 0.0084 0.3226* 0.1815 0.3221* 0.1815 
High regime 0.5436*** 0.0881 0.5416*** 0.0982 0.4070*** 0.0603 0.4066*** 0.0723 1.1667*** 0.1737 1.1679*** 0.1756 
Intercept -0.0241*** 0.0047 -0.0240*** 0.0050 -0.0145*** 0.0027 -0.0145*** 0.0032 -0.1465*** 0.0245 -0.1467*** 0.0246 
Impact of covariates             
Yield 0.0153*** 0.0011   0.0136*** 0.0007   0.0675*** 0.0119   
BoJ assets   -0.0275*** 0.0021   -0.0244*** 0.0013   -0.1208*** 0.0214 
Size -0.0033 0.0037 -0.0039 0.0037 0.0069*** 0.0026 0.0064*** 0.0028 0.065** 0.0313 0.0627** 0.0310 
Capital ratio -0.5848*** 0.1028 -0.5772*** 0.1037 -0.0845** 0.0409 -0.0778* 0.0404     
Asset diversification -0.0592*** 0.0091 -0.0560*** 0.0096 -0.0249*** 0.0051 -0.0221*** 0.0057 0.0690 0.1596 0.0836 0.1630 
Liquidity -0.0127 0.0102 0.0082 0.0109 0.0183*** 0.0067 0.0368*** 0.0075 0.2391 0.2618 0.3328 0.2764 
Revenue diversification -0.0097*** 0.0034 -0.0071* 0.0037 -0.0089*** 0.0026 -0.0065** 0.0030 0.0910 0.0625 0.1030 0.0641 
GDP growth 0.0621*** 0.0082 0.0368*** 0.0082 0.0505*** 0.0058 0.0281*** 0.0055 0.2859*** 0.0596 0.1739*** 0.0673 
Market capitalisation -0.0074*** 0.0009 0.0014 0.0010 -0.0047*** 0.0006 0.0031*** 0.0006 0.0176 0.0120 0.0562*** 0.0079 
             
Obs in low regime 611  611  562  562  208  208  
Obs in high regime 2880  2880  2929  2929  3283  3283  
Notes: This Table reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (10-year Japanese government bond yield and the 
natural logarithm of the Bank of Japan Total assets) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Boone indicator. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured 
loans to assets, Z-score , size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid 
assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.	
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
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5.5.3. Risk and quantitative easing: Quantitative easing as the threshold variable 
Findings for the risk-quantitative easing nexus are reported in Table 6. There exists 
a positive relationship between lending rate and risk in all different model specifications 
(columns 1 to 3). A rise in lending rate is found to increase bankrupt/restructured loan 
ratios and lnZ-score, statistically significant in both regimes. When risk is measured by 
bankrupt loan ratio and restructured loan ratio, the threshold value is identified at 
1.2052% (column 1) and 1.0562% (column 2). When lnZ-score is in play, the threshold 
value is 0.9401% (column 3). To this end, quantitative easing is beneficial in terms of 
reducing credit risk. The effect is more prominent in the high regimes, where the 
coefficients are 0.037 (column 1) and 0.0385 (column 2). Although the coefficients 
indicating the impact of lending rate on risk-monitored loan ratios in the low regimes are 
statistically significant, the magnitude is quite negligible (0.0088 and 0.0063 in columns 
1 and 2, respectively). Nevertheless, this favourable effect of lower risky loan ratios 
associated with quantitative easing may be at the expense of bank stability. The reason is 
that, reported in column 3, lnZ-score is also reduced, given an aggressive quantitative 
easing policy. Notably, the magnitude of the coefficients for the impact of lending rate 
provides insightful implications. Compared to the detrimental effect that quantitative 
easing could impose on bank stability (0.3416 and 0.2833 in the low and high regimes, 
respectively), the beneficial impact that it exerts on credit risk is quite small. In a nutshell, 
comparing the results to the hypotheses set out in section 5.2, we can conclude that 
quantitative easing could lower credit risk but may harm overall bank stability.  
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Table 6. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing 
Nexus (lending rate). 
 
Notes: This Table reports results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (Boone) as its instrument. The threshold variable is lending rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to 
assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending 
rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, 
asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-
interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: 
standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.
	 	
 
The implication of variability in our results could be interpreted by the countervailing 
effects of low interest rates on bank risk-taking as discussed in Buch et al. (2014). On the 
one hand, quantitative easing may reduce risk, as it aims to facilitate lending so that 
increased investment could boost economic growth. Both banks and borrowers can 
benefit from ample liquidity injected by quantitative easing to strengthen their resistance 
to exogenous shocks. Low interest rates would encourage more potential borrowers to 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 1.2052% 1.0562% 0.9401% 
95% confidence interval [0.9861% 1.2102%] [0.9613% 1.1205%] [0.9216% 1.0122%] 
Impact of threshold variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime  0.0088*** 0.0026 0.0063*** 0.0020 0.3416*** 0.0442 
High regime 0.0370*** 0.0090 0.0385*** 0.0036 0.2833*** 0.0751 
Intercept -0.1288*** 0.0417 -0.1469*** 0.0194 0.3061 0.2818 
Impact of covariates       
Boone -0.1359*** 0.0557 -0.0790*** 0.0234 0.9370*** 0.3350 
Size -0.0140*** 0.0031 -0.0014 0.0022 0.1029*** 0.0356 
Capital ratio -0.5453*** 0.1079 -0.0560 0.0372   
Asset diversification -0.0791*** 0.0088 -0.0387*** 0.0055 0.1920 0.1889 
Liquidity -0.0619*** 0.0110 -0.0243*** 0.0076 0.1413 0.2368 
Revenue diversification -0.0068 0.0059 -0.0061 0.0042 0.2777*** 0.0771 
GDP growth 0.0387*** 0.0083 0.0297*** 0.0050 0.2827*** 0.0602 
Market capitalisation -0.0020** 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0374*** 0.0107 
       
Obs in low regime 2532  1789  1090  
Obs in high regime 959  1702  2401  
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apply for funding because of a greater probability of fulfilling their repayment duties. 
Evidenced in Jiménez et al. (2014), low interest rate reduces the cost burden of existing 
loans for borrowers. Therefore, lower bankrupt/restructured loan ratios would be 
expected. On the other hand, quantitative easing could amplify risk. When banks foresee 
an extended period of low interest rate, they may alter their risk-taking appetites towards 
riskier projects to pursue greater gains (Altunbas et al., 2014; Gambacorta, 2009). In more 
details, low yield and abundant liquidity accelerate asset prices and promote leverage, in 
turn induce excessive risk-taking (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2010). Larger loanable proportion 
of collaterals and the search for yield (Rajan, 2005) may drive banks to grant more risky 
loan portfolios (Jiménez et al., 2014), or to invest in higher yield-higher risk instruments. 
Another risk-taking channel could be through a typical type of moral hazard, where banks 
realise the continuity of quantitative easing policy in difficult economic times. As 
Altunbas et al. (2014) argue, banks may perceive the presence of a so-called insurance 
effect, in which the enforcement of monetary easing is expected during financial downturn 
to decelerate the fall of asset values. The prediction of lower probability of large downside 
risk, therefore, would magnify bank risk-taking. This perception may well be the case of 
prolonged low interest rate and extensive quantitative easing in Japan. Taken together, 
these arguments could explain for lower bank stability corresponding to quantitative 
easing. 
Interestingly, in terms of control variables, the results reveal a negative association 
between the Boone indicator and risk-monitored loan ratios. Hence, greater competition 
would be harmful for banks because of higher bankrupt/restructured loan ratios. This 
finding is reinforced by the positive association between the Boone indicator and lnZ-
score in column 3, indicating higher bank stability in lower competition. In this case, 
when competition is a control variable, the results do not uncover its desirable impact in 
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reducing risky loan ratios shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. The impact of other 
determinants in Table 6 is similar to findings reported in Tables 3 and 5, with minor 
variation. In particular, in terms of diminishing risk and enhancing bank soundness, there 
are four variables: capital ratio, asset diversification, liquidity and market capitalisation. 
In contrast, higher GDP growth is found to increase risk-monitored loan ratios, probably 
due to softened lending standards during good economic times (Dell'Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2006). Turning to Z-score, there is a favourable impact on bank stability during 
economic upturn and when banks divert their focus to noninterest income. Bank stability 
increases corresponding to larger bank size, while bankrupt loan ratio decreases.  
The number of banks in each regime is shown in Table 7. Analysing the trend of the 
number of observations in column 1, we observe a significant increase of banks in the 
low regime after the global financial crisis. Especially, from March 2011 to March 2015, 
almost all banks in the sample charged less than 1.2052% lending rate. Note that this time 
frame covers the on-going quantitative easing policy (since October 2010). Illustrated in 
column 3, the distribution of the number of banks in the low regime provides further 
evidence for the initial quantitative easing period. Recall that the threshold value for 
column 3 is 0.9401%, which is lower than the values for columns 1 (1.2052%) and 2 
(1.0562%). From September 2003 to March 2006, the number of banks charging lending 
rate lower than 0.9401% increased monotonically. This tendency indicates the effect of 
the first quantitative easing period (March 2001-March 2006). In the high regimes of all 
model specifications, it is confirmed that the number of observations gradually decreased 
during this period. 
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Table 7. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Quantitative Easing 
Nexus. 
 1  2  3 
 BRL ratio  RSL ratio   lnZ-score 
 1.2052%  1.0562%  0.9401% 
 Low  High   Low  High   Low  High  
Sep-00 46 82  5 123  0 128 
Mar-01 45 80  2 123  0 125 
Sep-01 58 70  18 110  1 127 
Mar-02 60 65  35 90  2 123 
Sep-02 63 64  35 92  5 122 
Mar-03 65 56  36 85  9 112 
Sep-03 68 53  41 80  14 107 
Mar-04 74 46  44 76  15 105 
Sep-04 71 49  47 73  16 104 
Mar-05 78 41  54 65  25 94 
Sep-05 84 35  55 64  31 88 
Mar-06 90 27  61 56  41 76 
Sep-06 92 25  61 56  33 84 
Mar-07 80 36  53 63  19 97 
Sep-07 76 39  38 77  5 110 
Mar-08 75 39  37 77  2 112 
Sep-08 79 36  38 77  5 110 
Mar-09 87 27  52 62  10 104 
Sep-09 94 20  66 48  25 89 
Mar-10 96 16  71 41  43 69 
Sep-10 97 14  78 33  50 61 
Mar-11 102 9  82 29  62 49 
Sep-11 103 8  86 25  68 43 
Mar-12 106 5  91 20  75 36 
Sep-12 104 6  94 16  78 32 
Mar-13 106 4  98 12  85 25 
Sep-13 107 3  99 11  88 22 
Mar-14 108 2  101 9  90 20 
Sep-14 109 1  105 5  96 14 
Mar-15 109 1  106 4  97 13 
Obs 2532 959  1789 1702  1090 2401 
Notes: This Table reports the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-quantitative 
easing nexus, with lending rate being the threshold variable, and the Boone indicator being the proxy for 
competition. Threshold values of lending rate are obtained from the dynamic panel threshold analysis, 
reported in Table 6. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows dependent variables, the third row 
shows the threshold values, the fourth row indicates low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 
00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of observations. 
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In Table 8, we use the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (columns 1 to 3) and 
Bank of Japan assets (columns 4 to 6) to replace lending rate as the threshold variable. 
The results show a positive influence of bond yield on lnZ-score in both regimes of 
column 3. This is in line with previous findings of quantitative easing reducing bank 
stability, reported in column 3 of Table 6. The magnitude of the impact in the high regime 
(0.6513, column 3) is also notable. Interestingly, bond yield affects risk-monitored loan 
ratios differently in two regimes. There is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between bond yield and bankrupt/restructured loan ratio in the high regimes. The 
coefficients of bond yield’s impact are 0.0131 (column 1) and 0.0107 (column 2). This 
relationship turns out negative in the low regimes (-0.017 in column 1 and -0.0149 in 
column 2). It is also worth noting that the absolute magnitudes of the impact of bond yield 
on risk-monitored loans in the two regimes are approximately the same (around 0.01). 
Additionally, the threshold value is consistently realised at 1.032%. Thus, when bond 
yield is below 1.032%, quantitative easing increases credit risk. In this regard, more 
aggressive quantitative easing would encourage banks to enrol more risk. First, banks 
may tend to soften lending standards due to low yield and interest rate, thereby issuing 
loans to less creditworthy borrowers (Jiménez et al., 2014). Second, as Ioannidou et al. 
(2015) argue, due to low monetary policy rate, banks may be less concerned about the 
compensation which should be required for the higher risk taken. In fact, Ioannidou et al. 
(2015) find that during monetary expansion, banks charge riskier borrowers relatively 
less than what they would. When bond yield is greater than 1.032%, quantitative easing 
reduces credit risk, similar to our previous conclusion drawn from the use of lending rate 
(Table 6).  
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Table 8. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus (10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank 
of Japan assets) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BoJ assets BoJ assets BoJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.032% 1.032% 1.484% 118,437,502 mil JPY 118,437,502 mil JPY 118,437,502 mil JPY 
95% confidence interval [1.032% 1.032%] [1.032% 1.032%] [1.484% 1.484%] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0170*** 0.0014 -0.0149*** 0.0010 0.0856*** 0.0113 -0.0347*** 0.0098 -0.0286*** 0.0050 -0.1219 0.0929 
High regime 0.0131*** 0.0049 0.0107*** 0.0028 0.6513*** 0.1882 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0010 -0.1709*** 0.0194 
Intercept -0.1427*** 0.0253 -0.1222*** 0.0151 -2.2627*** 0.8002 0.6492*** 0.1814 0.504*** 0.0910 -0.9858 1.9967 
Impact of covariates             
Boone -0.1837*** 0.0528 -0.122*** 0.0296 0.7841*** 0.2696 -0.1767*** 0.0530 -0.1151*** 0.0273 0.8562*** 0.2814 
Size -0.0232*** 0.0035 -0.0095*** 0.0026 0.0580** 0.0295 -0.0245*** 0.0031 -0.0108*** 0.0023 0.0543* 0.0283 
Capital ratio -0.4923*** 0.1082 -0.0085 0.0390   -0.4981*** 0.1034 -0.0142 0.0362   
Asset diversification -0.1008*** 0.0087 -0.0602*** 0.0053 0.1431 0.1502 -0.1093*** 0.0087 -0.0691*** 0.0051 0.0609 0.1414 
Liquidity -0.0737*** 0.0111 -0.0326*** 0.0078 0.2455 0.2653 -0.0897*** 0.0116 -0.0474*** 0.0078 0.1494 0.2634 
Revenue diversification -0.0178*** 0.0046 -0.016*** 0.0035 0.1182* 0.0606 -0.0197*** 0.0043 -0.0181*** 0.0033 0.1033* 0.0562 
GDP growth 0.0847*** 0.0119 0.0712*** 0.0078 0.3185*** 0.0741 0.0081 0.0083 -0.0018 0.0053 -0.0463 0.0750 
Market capitalisation -0.0113*** 0.0018 -0.0083*** 0.0012 0.0479*** 0.0082 0.0002 0.0011 0.0028*** 0.0006 0.1032*** 0.0067 
             
Obs in low regime 1114  1114  2898  1156  1156  1156  
Obs in high regime 2377  2377  593  2335  2335  2335  
Notes: This Table reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (Boone) as its instrument. The threshold variable is 
the 10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of Japan (BoJ) assets. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue 
diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.	 	 	
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
	172 
	
The periods where bond yield is lower than the threshold value (1.032%) happened 
in March 2003, September 2010, and from September 2011 to March 2015. The last time 
frame includes the current quantitative easing period. If we combine this finding with the 
aforementioned impact of the threshold, the on-going quantitative easing may pose a 
threat to the banking system by augmenting credit risk. Regarding control variables, 
similar to the results reported in Table 6, we also find that competition increases credit 
risk and bank fragility. Larger size, higher capital ratio, more liquidity, greater asset 
diversification, revenue diversification and market capitalisation would help lower credit 
risk. Higher GDP growth, on the other hand, would increase credit risk exposure. In terms 
of bank stability, it would be enhanced following larger bank size, more diversified 
income, higher GDP growth, and greater market capitalisation.  
A first glance at columns 4 to 6, where the Bank of Japan total assets are used as a 
proxy for quantitative easing, reveals a consistent estimate of the threshold value at 
118,437,502 mil JPY. There is a negative association between the Bank of Japan assets 
and risk variables. For credit risk, this relationship is statistically significant in the low 
regime (-0.0347 in column 4 and -0.0286 in column 5), implying a favourable impact of 
quantitative easing. The influence of Bank of Japan assets on risk-monitored loan ratios 
in the high regime is insignificant. Differently, for bank stability, when the Bank of Japan 
assets are greater than the threshold, more aggressive quantitative easing policy would 
reduce bank soundness (-0.1709 in column 6). The relationship between quantitative 
easing and bank stability is insignificant in the low regime. These results strengthen those 
reported in columns 1 to 3, where bond yield is the proxy for quantitative easing. Up to a 
certain level of asset purchases (118,437,502 mil JPY), quantitative easing lessens credit 
risk. When the amount of asset purchases passes the threshold, quantitative easing reduces 
bank stability. 
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The time frame in each regime complements these findings. First, the periods of high 
regimes coincide with the two quantitative easing periods. In particular, the amount of 
asset purchases which were higher than the threshold is recorded from March 2001 to 
March 2006, and from March 2011 to March 2015. Hence, the more asset purchases of 
the Bank were not really effective due to its detrimental impact on bank stability. Second, 
the period of low regimes falls in to the gap between the two quantitative easing periods, 
and also embraces the global financial crisis. During this interval (September 2006-
September 2010), more asset purchases would mitigate credit risk. However, overall, the 
estimated impact suggests that the reduction in credit risk may not be considerable 
compared to the reduction in bank soundness (e.g. -0.0347 in column 4 versus -0.1709 in 
column 6). The influence of other control variables appears consistent as previously 
reported in columns 1 to 3 and in Table 6. 
5.5.4. Competition and quantitative easing: Quantitative easing as the threshold 
variable 
As quantitative easing affects risk and thereby indirectly competition, it is worth 
exploring whether the former has a direct effect on bank competition. To test this 
hypothesis, we apply threshold modelling where competition is the dependent variable 
and quantitative easing is the threshold variable. We respectively include a number of 
control variables such as risk, as measured by bankrupt loan ratio, restructured loan ratio, 
and lnZ-score. In addition, we also include some environmental variables such as bank 
size, capital ratio, asset diversification, revenue diversification, liquidity, GDP growth, 
and market capitalisation. The results are reported in Table 9.  
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Table 9. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative 
Easing Nexus. 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable Boone Boone Boone 
Threshold variable Lending rate Lending rate Lending rate 
Threshold estimates 0.8496% 0.6935% 0.7397% 
95% confidence interval [0.7274% 0.9307%] [0.6925% 0.921%] [0.7028% 0.8084%] 
Impact of threshold variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0905*** 0.0233 0.0667 0.0417 0.1095** 0.0510 
High regime -0.0657*** 0.0226 -0.0276*** 0.0102 -0.0805*** 0.0260 
Intercept 0.7444*** 0.1201 0.4389** 0.2130 0.9231*** 0.1936 
Impact of covariates       
BRL ratio -0.0151 0.3644     
RSL ratio   -0.5595 0.4007   
lnZ-score     0.3487*** 0.1058 
Size -0.0083 0.0173 -0.0052 0.0152 -0.0091 0.0186 
Capital ratio 0.5151 0.3782 0.4606*** 0.1868   
Asset diversification -0.0406 0.0407 -0.0431 0.0386 -0.0415 0.0682 
Liquidity -0.1226*** 0.0505 -0.1315*** 0.0489 -0.1015 0.0796 
Revenue diversification 0.0345 0.0268 0.0296 0.0252 0.0065 0.0437 
GDP growth 0.0716* 0.0419 0.0886*** 0.0398 -0.0507 0.0596 
Market capitalisation 0.0051 0.0032 0.0049* 0.0027 -0.0088* 0.0046 
       
Obs in low regime 624  181  287  
Obs in high regime 2867  3310  3204  
Notes: This Table reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the 
endogenous variable (BRL ratio, RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. The threshold variable is 
lending rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. 
***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.  
 
In Table 9, the proxy for quantitative easing – the bank lending rate – is the threshold 
variable, whereas the Boone indicator is the dependent variable. The threshold values for 
lending rate are 0.8496% (column 1), 0.6935% (column 2), and 0.7397% (column 3), 
corresponding to different risk variables included in the models. The important finding is 
the different impacts that lending rate places on the Boone indicator. It is positive in the 
low regimes, and negative in the high ones. The former implies that more aggressive 
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quantitative easing would cause higher competition. In contrast, the latter indicates lower 
competition in response to a more extensive quantitative easing program. The magnitude 
of the effect of quantitative easing on competition is larger in the low regimes (0.0905; 
0.0667; 0.1095 compared to -0.0657; -0.0276; -0.0805), although the numbers of 
observations in the low regimes are significantly fewer. 
The number of observations in each regime enlightens the implication of our findings 
(Table 10). Overall, the high regimes outnumber the low ones. The number of banks 
classified in the low regime started increasing significantly, particularly, since September 
2010 in column 1, March 2013 in column 2, and September 2012 in column 3. Based on 
the threshold values, more banks in the sample experienced a decrease in competition as 
a result of greater quantitative easing, considerably before the second quantitative easing 
period. After September 2012 to March 2015, there was an upward trend of the number 
of banks charging lending rate lower than the threshold, corresponding to the extensive 
quantitative easing program.  
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Table 10. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Competition - 
Quantitative Easing Nexus (Boone indicator and lending rate).	
 1 2 3 
 0.8496% 0.6935% 0.7397% 
 BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
 Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
Sep-00 0 128 0 128 0 128 
Mar-01 0 125 0 125 0 125 
Sep-01 0 128 0 128 0 128 
Mar-02 1 124 0 125 0 125 
Sep-02 0 127 0 127 0 127 
Mar-03 1 120 1 120 1 120 
Sep-03 2 119 0 121 0 121 
Mar-04 3 117 0 120 0 120 
Sep-04 3 117 0 120 1 119 
Mar-05 4 115 1 118 1 118 
Sep-05 3 116 0 119 0 119 
Mar-06 7 110 0 117 2 115 
Sep-06 5 112 0 117 0 117 
Mar-07 2 114 1 115 1 115 
Sep-07 0 115 0 115 0 115 
Mar-08 0 114 0 114 0 114 
Sep-08 0 115 0 115 0 115 
Mar-09 1 113 0 114 0 114 
Sep-09 2 112 0 114 0 114 
Mar-10 9 103 0 112 1 111 
Sep-10 17 94 1 110 2 109 
Mar-11 27 84 1 110 2 109 
Sep-11 36 75 1 110 3 108 
Mar-12 51 60 3 108 8 103 
Sep-12 56 54 6 104 22 88 
Mar-13 71 39 14 96 27 83 
Sep-13 75 35 23 87 42 68 
Mar-14 80 30 33 77 50 60 
Sep-14 82 28 45 65 57 53 
Mar-15 86 24 51 59 67 43 
Obs 624 2867 181 3310 287 3204 
Notes: This Table reports the number of observations in each regime over time for the competition-
quantitative easing nexus, with lending rate being the threshold variable, the Boone indicator being the 
dependent variable. Threshold values are obtained from the dynamic panel threshold analysis, reported in 
Table 9. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows the threshold values, the third row 
shows the risk variable used in each model specification, the fourth row indicates low and high regimes, 
Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of observations. 
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Based on our results, during the first two third of the sample period, the majority of 
banks in the sample are found to enjoy a less competitive environment brought by 
quantitative easing. The reason could be due to the implicit subsidisation from the 
government. First, quantitative easing policy aims to facilitate investment and spending 
through lowering lending rates paid by households and businesses (Wright, 2012). As a 
result, financial institutions are injected with ample liquidity to increase loan financing at 
low rates. Second, quantitative easing may generate a standard case of moral hazard 
which is the insurance effect discussed in Altunbas et al. (2014). Banks are less concerned 
about the fall of asset values as they could predict an extension of the program, or at least 
the prolonged low short-term interest rate, which could serve as a cushioning effect to 
prevent further downturn. Thereby, the threat of closure if they took on more risk would 
not be too high. Besides, according to Boone (2008a), more intense competition is a result 
of an increase in the number of firms in the industry, more aggressive interaction between 
firms, or a fall in costs of other incumbents. In the case of Japan, the number of 
commercial banks from the first quantitative easing period to before the second one did 
not change significantly, indeed, decreased slightly. We conjecture it is the relaxed 
economic condition and the implicit government protection that quantitative easing 
created less competition in the banking industry. 
From September 2010 onwards, more banks are categorised in the low regime in 
which they face intense competition due to quantitative easing. It could be the case that 
Japanese commercial banks have become close substitutes as quantitative easing 
facilitates the whole banking system more extensively in the second program. 
Furthermore, as set out in the monetary policy statement on 30/10/2012, the Bank of 
Japan has committed to provide banks with unlimited long-term funding to match the net 
increase in loan financing to non-financial sectors. Being closer substitutes indicates more 
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aggressive interaction between banks. As shown in Boone (2008a), it is a condition for 
more intense competition. 
In terms of control variables, the impact of bank stability on the Boone indicator is 
positive, in line with the positive association between the Boone indicator (as the 
threshold variable) and lnZ-score, which we find for both regimes in column 3 of Table 
3. Higher capital ratio and GDP growth reduce competition, similar to findings of Delis 
(2012). Capital-abundant banks tend to exercise their market power more greatly than 
their peers. These banks could be able to define their own high margin and take 
advantages of variable funding sources which result in lower costs. Higher liquidity ratio, 
in contrast, would lead to greater competition. 
We further replace lending rate with bond yield and Bank of Japan assets. The 
relationship with the Boone indicator is reported in Table 11. Unlike lending rate, the 
analysis identifies a consistent positive relation between bond yield and the Boone 
indicator in both regimes (columns 1 to 3), while it is negative for the Bank of Japan 
assets (columns 4 to 6). The impact is statistically significant in almost all regimes, except 
the high one in column 6. The threshold estimates for bond yield are 1.33% (columns 1 
and 3) and 1.685% (column 2). The corresponding time periods when the threshold values 
were recorded are March 2005 and September 2007. The impact of bond yield on the 
Boone indicator is more pronounced in the high regimes (0.0655, 0.5397, and 0.042 
compared to 0.0149, 0.0113, and 0.009). With the Bank of Japan assets, we also find two 
threshold values. Reported in columns 4 and 6, it is 121,771,462 mil JPY recorded in 
March 2001, which marked the start of the first quantitative easing program. In column 
5, the threshold estimate is 124,746,234 mil JPY recorded in September 2011. To this 
end, these results suggest that greater quantitative easing would lead to more intense 
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competition. Besides, the different impacts of quantitative easing on competition between 
regimes are revealed only when lending rate is used. 
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Table 11. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative Easing Nexus (Boone Indicator and other proxies for 
Quantitative Easing) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BoJ assets BoJ assets BoJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.330% 1.685% 1.330%  121,771,462 mil JPY  124,746,234 mil JPY  121,771,462 mil JPY  
95% confidence interval [1.33% 1.415%] [1.33% 1.685%] [1.33% 1.415%] 
[119,777,762  
126,958,482] 
[118,437,502  
126,208,495] 
[106,002,035  
216,697,081] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0149*** 0.0035 0.0113*** 0.0030 0.0090*** 0.0036 -0.0678*** 0.0262 -0.0606*** 0.0240 -0.0482* 0.0279 
High regime 0.0655*** 0.0194 0.5397*** 0.1971 0.0420** 0.0201 -0.0233*** 0.0047 -0.0213*** 0.0068 -0.0070 0.0061 
Intercept -0.2102*** 0.0873 -2.1249*** 0.7925 -0.1344 0.0908 0.8180* 0.4895 0.7236 0.4703 0.7625 0.5488 
Impact of covariates             
BRL ratio -0.6179 0.5332     -0.5277** 0.2597     
RSL ratio   -0.9872** 0.4582     -0.9149* 0.5102   
lnZ-score     0.0509 0.0749     0.0888 0.0766 
Size 0.0000 0.0202 0.0001 0.0163 0.0103 0.0156 -0.0020 0.0166 -0.0005 0.0159 0.0081 0.0147 
Capital ratio 0.1163 0.5167 0.4185 0.2912   0.1832 0.3176 0.4294 0.2941   
Asset diversification -0.0042 0.0707 -0.0017 0.0514 0.0627* 0.0380 -0.0066 0.0425 -0.0157 0.0595 0.0582 0.0408 
Liquidity -0.1293** 0.0574 -0.1257*** 0.0518 -0.0876 0.0579 -0.1362*** 0.0555 -0.1341** 0.0588 -0.0961 0.0614 
Revenue diversification 0.0213 0.0206 0.0177 0.0209 0.0349* 0.0199 0.0193 0.0207 0.0122 0.0215 0.0296* 0.0178 
GDP growth 0.1291*** 0.0452 0.1521*** 0.0428 0.0799* 0.0476 0.0972*** 0.0324 0.1322*** 0.0423 0.0726* 0.0427 
Market capitalisation -0.0136*** 0.0051 -0.0053* 0.0032 -0.0081 0.0062 0.0022 0.0032 0.0014 0.0039 -0.0046 0.0068 
             
Obs in low regime 1824  3246  1824  1409  1520  1409  
Obs in high regime 1667  245  1667  2082  1971  2082  
Notes: This Table reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (BRL ratio, RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. 
The threshold variable is the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (Yield) and the Bank of Japan total assets (BoJ assets). BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: 
restructured loans to assets, Z-score , size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard 
error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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5.5.5. Robustness check with the Lerner index as a competition proxy 
We further conduct the dynamic panel threshold analysis, replacing the Boone 
indicator by the Lerner index to examine the robustness of our findings. The results are 
reported in Tables A1 to A7 in the Appendices. 
For the risk and competition relationship (Table A1), the threshold values are 0.2661 
(column 1), 0.2835 (column 2), and 0.4117 (column 3). Unlike the Boone indicator, the 
Lerner index exhibits a negative relationship with risk-monitored loan ratios (columns 1 
and 2). The results show that higher competition would lead to an increase in bankrupt 
loan ratio in both regimes and restructured loan ratio in the low regime. However, 
although statistically significant, the economic impact is not very strong. The reason is 
that in column 1, the parameters are significant at the 10% level in both regimes (-0.0116 
and -0.0018), and the magnitude of the impact of the Lerner index in column 2 is quite 
small (-0.005 for the low regime). The positive relation between the Lerner index and 
lnZ-score in the low regime of column 3 (0.1878) also suggests that competition reduces 
bank stability. Overall, by using the Lerner index, we find a presence of the competition-
fragility hypothesis. This is in line with the results reported in column 3 of Table 3. The 
distributions of the number of observations in each regime are reported in Table A2.  
Consistent with findings for the impact of covariates in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3, 
we find a desirable effect of capitalisation, asset diversification, liquidity, and market 
capitalisation in reducing risk. Higher GDP growth and lending rate, in contrast, would 
engage banks in higher credit risk exposure. Therefore, quantitative easing would 
introduce a stabilising effect on credit risk, but not on bank soundness as we find a 
positive impact of higher lending rate on lnZ-score (column 3, Table A1). The impact of 
bank size is important for restructured loan ratio and bank stability, while revenue 
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diversification is a significant determinant in all model specifications. However, the 
influence of revenue diversification on risk variables varies. The more diversified a bank, 
the higher the risk-monitored loan ratios, but also the higher the bank stability.  
In Table A3, we report the results with bond yield and Bank of Japan assets as proxies 
for quantitative easing. The impact of the Lerner index in each regime and the threshold 
values across columns 1 to 6 remain similar to those reported in Table A1. Regarding the 
impact of other control variables, the results also do not vary significantly. 
Table A4 shows the results for the relationship between risk and quantitative easing, 
where the Lerner index is a control variable, and lending rate is the threshold variable. 
The threshold values of lending rate in columns 1 and 2 are similar to those reported in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 6. The impact of lending rate on risk-monitored loan ratios 
remains positive and significant in both regimes. Some variation is found for bank 
stability. The threshold of lending rate in column 3 is 0.6929%, positively related to bank 
stability, and statistically significant in the low regime only (the coefficient is 0.6754). 
To this end, our previous conclusion of less credit risk and higher bank fragility associated 
with greater quantitative easing remains unchanged, regardless of competition proxies. 
When we use bond yield and Bank of Japan assets as the threshold variable (Table A5), 
this conclusion is upheld, but minor variability exists. For example, compared to column 
1 of Table 8, column 1 of Table A5 shows a positive impact of bond yield on bankrupt 
loan ratio in both regimes. Therefore, if using only the Lerner index, we may miss the 
different impacts that bond yield could impose on bankrupt loan ratio in different regimes.  
Regarding the relationship between competition and quantitative easing, compared 
to the aforementioned results with the Boone indicator, we find that in the case of the 
Lerner index capturing competition, the nexus between competition and quantitative 
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easing is clearly negative (columns 1 to 3 of Table A6). It is statistically significant in 
both regimes with the threshold value identified at 0.692%. It appears that by focusing 
only on the Lerner index we would have missed the change in the sign of the relationship 
between competition and quantitative easing between two regimes. Replacing lending 
rate by bond yield and Bank of Japan assets, the results shown in Table A7 are similar to 
those reported in Table 11. In more details, the Lerner index is positively related to bond 
yield and negatively related to Bank of Japan assets. The threshold values are consistent 
at 1.33% for bond yield and 124,746,234 mil JPY for the Bank of Japan assets. Hence, 
more aggressive quantitative easing would lead to more intensified competition. 
5.5.6. The panel VAR specification 
Given some variability in our results, which could be driven by endogeneity issues, 
we attempt to address the underlying dynamics between risk, competition, and 
quantitative easing. We adopt the methodology of panel vector autoregression (VAR) to 
account for the causality relationship as well as the existence of unobservable 
heterogeneity, specified by an individual specific term. An advantage of the model is 
assumption-free for the relationship between variables. We treat all three variables in the 
equation system as endogenous. 57  Risk, taken as bankrupt loan ratio, restructured loan 
ratio, and lnZ-score, is incorporated respectively in the analysis. The Boone indicator and 
lending rate are proxies for competition and quantitative easing, respectively. We also 
include bank size as an exogenous control variable because of its importance in the 
Japanese banking structure. As discussed in the Data section, City Banks are the biggest 
in size and operate in a wide range of geographic regions, whereas Regional Banks II are 
																																																						
57 Following Love and Ariss (2014), we run the model on lag order 1 to preserve information. 
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the smallest. The nature of banking business also varies across three types. Besides, too-
big-to-fail City banks are at the centre of the keiretsu network as well as being the 
important nodes channelling the impact of quantitative easing.  
Following the estimation of panel VAR, we derive the Impulse Response Functions 
(IRFs) (Fig. 2 to 4), which enable us to interpret the reaction of one variable to a shock in 
another variable in the system. We also report the Variance Decomposition (VDCs) for 
forecast horizons of 5 and 10 periods to illustrate the variance of the response variable 
corresponding to a shock in another variable (Table 12). All model specifications satisfy 
stability condition.58 
  
																																																						
58 The variables enter the equation system as endogenous, with the most exogenous ones appearing first 
(Love and Zicchino, 2006). Following Love and Zicchino (2006), fixed effects are removed by using the 
Helmert procedure (Arellano and Bover, 1995).  
The first order VAR model takes the form: TtNieww tiitiit ,...,1;,...,1,1 ==+F+= -µ where wit is 
a vector of three random variables: quantitative easing QE, Competition Comp and risk R (bankrupt loan 
ratio, restructured loan ratio and lnZ-score), Φ is a 3x3 matrix of coefficients, µi is a vector of m individual 
effects, and ei,t is a multivariate white-noise vector of m residuals. The equation system to be estimated with 
lag order one is: 
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Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions-Bankrupt loan ratio 
	
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with 
respect to shocks in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing represented by bank lending rate; Boone is the 
Boone indicator of competition; BRL_ratio is bankrupt loan ratio; step: number of periods. Errors are 5% 
on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
 
Regarding the risk-competition nexus, a shock to the Boone indicator has a negative 
and significant impact on bankrupt loan ratio (Fig.2, second row, first column). This 
negative relationship is in line with the results reported in Tables 6 and 8. Figure 4 (second 
row, first column) reveals a positive and significant response of lnZ-score to shocks in 
the Boone indicator. This positive association is similar to findings shown in Tables 3, 5, 
6, and 8. Restructured loan ratio, on the other hand, does not show a significant response 
to shocks in the Boone indicator. In terms of reverse causality, shocks in risk variables 
generate insignificant responses of the Boone indicator. Two scenarios can be at play to 
interpret the results. First, a positive shock in the Boone indicator which denotes lower 
competition will lead to decreased credit risk and increased bank stability. This case gives 
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support to the competition-fragility hypothesis. Second, a negative shock in the Boone 
indicator, referred as higher competition, will cause bankrupt loan ratio to decline and 
enhance bank stability. This situation is in line with the competition-stability hypothesis. 
Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions-Restructured loan ratio 
	
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with 
respect to shocks in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing represented by bank lending rates; Boone is 
the Boone indicator of competition; RSL_ratio is restructured loan ratio; step: number of periods. Errors 
are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
 
In terms of the risk-quantitative easing nexus, in the short-term, there is a positive 
and significant response of risk-monitored loan ratios to a one standard deviation shock 
in lending rate (Fig. 2-3, last row, first column). This positive reaction is similar to the 
findings shown in Tables 3 and 6. There is no evidence for a significant response of bank 
stability to a shock in lending rate. The diagrams also reveal insignificant responses of 
lending rate to shocks in risk variables. Thus, if there exists a positive shock in lending 
rate, which translates into decreased quantitative easing, credit risk could rise 
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accordingly. Hence, the simulation base of panel VAR could reinforce the claim of lower 
credit risk as a result of quantitative easing.  
Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions-Bank stability 
	
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with 
respect to shocks in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing represented by bank lending rate; Boone is the 
Boone indicator of competition; lnz is the natural logarithm of Z-score 
; step: number of periods. Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
 
Turning to the competition-quantitative easing linkage, diagrams from the IRFs yield 
consensus findings for the relationship between these two aspects across different proxies 
for risk. A shock in lending rate would generate a negative response in the Boone 
indicator, marginally significant in the short-run (Fig. 2-4, last row, second column). 
Investigating the reverse causality, we observe an insignificant response of lending rate 
to a shock in the Boone indicator (Fig. 2-4, second row, last column). These findings are 
in line with the negative association between lending rate and the Boone indicator 
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reported in the high regimes of Table 9. If the shock in lending rate is positive, which 
represents reduced quantitative easing, competition would increase. Yet, if there is a 
negative shock in lending rate, quantitative easing would cause higher competition. 
Complementing findings of the IRFs, the VDCs show that changes in competition 
are important in explaining the variation in bankrupt loan ratio (5.66%), restructured loan 
ratio (1.26%) and lnZ-score (12.79%) (Table 12, 10 periods). In contrast, about 0.36% 
and 12.4% of variations in the Boone indicator are due to innovations from restructured 
loan ratio and lnZ-score, respectively. The variation of bankrupt loan ratio does not 
explain the variation in competition at all. Findings from the IRFs and VDCs reveal that 
competition triggers its relationship with risk. 
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Table 12. Variance Decompositions. 
 1 2 3 
Periods Variables QE Boone BRL ratio Variables QE Boone RSL ratio Variables QE Boone lnZ-score 
5 QE 0.9997 0.0001 0.0002 QE 0.9997 0.0001 0.0002 QE 0.9888 0.0004 0.0108 
5 Boone 0.0438 0.9561 0.0000 Boone 0.0292 0.9683 0.0025 Boone 0.0567 0.8303 0.1130 
5 BRL ratio 0.2801 0.0765 0.6434 RSL ratio 0.1168 0.0166 0.8667 lnZ-score 0.0039 0.1429 0.8532 
10 QE 0.9996 0.0001 0.0003 QE 0.9992 0.0001 0.0007 QE 0.9686 0.0012 0.0301 
10 Boone 0.0835 0.9164 0.0000 Boone 0.0614 0.9350 0.0036 Boone 0.1030 0.7729 0.1240 
10 BRL ratio 0.4679 0.0566 0.4756 RSL ratio 0.3089 0.0126 0.6785 lnZ-score 0.0068 0.1279 0.8653 
Notes: This Table reports the variance decompositions of the panel vector autoregression model for 5 and 10 periods ahead. There are 3 models, each model has 3 variables: 
quantitative easing QE represented by the lending rate, competition represented by the Boone indicator, and risk. Column 1: risk is bankrupt loan (BRL) ratio, column 2: risk is 
restructured loan (RSL) ratio, column 3: risk is lnZ-score, . ( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ s/+=
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Regarding the risk-quantitative easing relationship, about 46.79% of the variation in 
bankrupt loan ratio is explained by variations in quantitative easing, while only 0.03% of 
the variation in quantitative easing is explained by shocks in bankrupt loan ratio. 
Similarly, 30.89% of the variation in restructured loan ratio is due to shocks in 
quantitative easing, while 0.07% of the variation in quantitative easing is explained by 
changes in restructured loan ratio. Differently, changes in quantitative easing is not so 
important in explaining the variation of bank stability. The reason is that while 3.01% of 
the variation in lending rate is due to innovations in lnZ-score, only 0.68% of the variation 
in lnZ-score is attributed to variations in lending rate. To this end, along with results from 
the IRFs, quantitative easing is found to originate its relationship with risk. 
The variation in the Boone indicator indicated by the variation in lending rate is 
distinguishably larger than the variation in lending rate explained by changes in the Boone 
indicator (8.35%, 6.14%, 10.3% in comparison to 0.01%, 0.01%, 0.12% in columns 1-3, 
respectively). Thus, a conclusion of the causality starting from quantitative easing to 
competition can be drawn. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Revisiting the risk-competition debate using the dynamic panel threshold analysis, 
we find evidence to support the competition-stability hypothesis in Japanese banking to 
the extent of credit risk. In more details, competition represented by the bank-level Boone 
indicator is found to reduce bank risk-taking by diminishing bankrupt and restructured 
loan ratios. However, this desirable effect may be offset by a decrease in overall bank 
stability. Similarly, regarding the risk-quantitative easing nexus, a more extensive 
quantitative easing program would assist banks in lowering their risk-monitored loan 
ratios. Yet, it could threaten bank solvency. Further exploring the causality relationship 
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between competition, quantitative easing and risk, we find that competition and 
quantitative easing cause risk in most models.  
Our findings indicate that in an environment where quantitative easing is taking 
place, banks might find it more challenging to compete with their counterparts. To 
improve their competitiveness, banks could strengthen their competence from other 
aspects, e.g. capitalisation, liquidity, and asset diversification. Bank executives could 
enhance banking services by, e.g., diversifying their investments or increasing 
unconventional business activities to offer more benefits to their customers in time and 
cost savings. In addition, focusing on relationship banking, improving their flexibility in 
debt rollover, and operating more efficiently may also be among the tactics bringing 
banks ahead their rivals. The proposed threshold values for lending rates and the Boone 
indicator in this study may also be useful for bank managers to construct their risk 
management policy.  
For policymakers, e.g. the Japan Financial Services Agency, relaxing entry and exit 
for the banking industry, promoting small and medium sized banks, or disentangling 
business operation restrictions could create a competitive environment which in turn 
would diminish bank risk-taking. Policymakers could also encourage the mutual 
assistance prevailing under the keiretsu network. Note that a disadvantage of keiretsu 
affiliations is that main banks could exert their monopoly power in loan financing. Our 
analyses show that attempts to discourage competition increase credit risk. Therefore, our 
results argue that keiretsu should be applied with extreme caution. 
Last but not least, to take into account the stability of the banking system while 
enforcing quantitative easing, regulators may revise rules associated with the initial credit 
screening and barriers in lending principles. In more details, avoiding incorrect 
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evaluations at the beginning of the loan generating process and complying with lending 
standards help banks lessen the possibilities of future uncertainty. These policies should 
not contradict with but promote the efficacy of quantitative easing and the Abenomics - 
the current monetary and economic growth policy. Given that the Bank of Japan has 
adopted negative rates in January 2016 for the first time in its history, Japan would 
warrant a very interesting platform for future research. If the negative interest rate could 
drive economic recovery, it would open up a new era for monetary policy. 
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Appendices – Chapter 5 
Table A1. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus 
(Lerner Index). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 0.2661 0.2835 0.4117 
95% confidence interval [-0.1724  0.3027] [0.2728  0.3433] [0.3997  0.4164] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0116* 0.0061 -0.0050*** 0.0016 0.1878*** 0.0354 
High regime -0.0018* 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0091 0.0059 
Intercept 0.0047*** 0.0009 0.0023*** 0.0004 -0.1046*** 0.0180 
Impact of covariates       
Lending rate 0.0390*** 0.0031 0.0347*** 0.0017 0.2387*** 0.0340 
Size -0.0007 0.0038 0.0094*** 0.0026 0.0762*** 0.0302 
Capital ratio -0.6053*** 0.1046 -0.0997*** 0.0393   
Asset diversification -0.0443*** 0.0104 -0.0161*** 0.0047 0.0214 0.1316 
Liquidity -0.0345*** 0.0104 -0.0045 0.0063 -0.0279 0.1979 
Revenue diversification 0.0216*** 0.0053 0.0142*** 0.0029 0.1527*** 0.0576 
GDP growth 0.0640*** 0.0072 0.0438*** 0.0047 0.0674 0.0910 
Market capitalisation -0.0013* 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005 0.0131 0.0117 
       
Obs in low regime 1160  1392  3134  
Obs in high regime 2331  2099  357  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the 
endogenous variable (lending rate) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Lerner index. BRL ratio: 
bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. 
***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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Table A2. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Competition 
Nexus (Lerner index). 
 1 2 3 
 BRL ratio RSL ratio Z-score 
 0.2661 0.2835 0.4117 
Time Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
Sep-00 68 60 89 39 128 0 
Mar-01 85 40 97 28 123 2 
Sep-01 95 33 105 23 127 1 
Mar-02 99 26 107 18 124 1 
Sep-02 69 58 81 46 125 2 
Mar-03 88 33 102 19 119 2 
Sep-03 42 79 53 68 116 5 
Mar-04 37 83 50 70 115 5 
Sep-04 25 95 32 88 107 13 
Mar-05 27 92 34 85 101 18 
Sep-05 14 105 18 101 104 15 
Mar-06 14 103 23 94 90 27 
Sep-06 15 102 17 100 101 16 
Mar-07 25 91 28 88 98 18 
Sep-07 22 93 29 86 107 8 
Mar-08 48 66 60 54 110 4 
Sep-08 84 31 90 25 115 0 
Mar-09 100 14 105 9 114 0 
Sep-09 47 67 56 58 111 3 
Mar-10 39 73 50 62 110 2 
Sep-10 16 95 20 91 104 7 
Mar-11 30 81 43 68 109 2 
Sep-11 13 98 17 94 94 17 
Mar-12 18 93 25 86 98 13 
Sep-12 19 91 26 84 98 12 
Mar-13 11 99 22 88 86 24 
Sep-13 3 107 6 104 72 38 
Mar-14 2 108 2 108 86 24 
Sep-14 0 110 0 110 69 41 
Mar-15 5 105 5 105 73 37 
Obs 1160 2331 1392 2099 3134 357 
Notes: This Table reports the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-competition 
nexus. The Lerner index is the proxy for competition, while lending rate is the proxy for quantitative easing. 
Threshold values are obtained from the dynamic panel threshold analysis, reported in Table A1. BRL ratio: 
bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows the threshold values, the third row 
shows the dependent variables used in each model specification, the fourth row indicates low and high 
regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of observations. 
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Table A3. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Lerner index and other proxies for Quantitative Easing). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio BRL ratio RSL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 0.2661 0.2661 0.2835 0.2835 0.4117 0.4117 
95% confidence interval [-0.1724  0.3003] [-0.1724  0.3039] [0.2728  0.3433] [0.2707  0.3436] [0.3997  0.4164] [0.3997  0.4163] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0115* 0.0060 -0.0115* 0.0060 -0.005*** 0.0016 -0.005*** 0.0015 0.1878*** 0.0358 0.1879*** 0.0362 
High regime -0.0016* 0.0009 -0.0017* 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0074 0.0078 -0.0082 0.0077 
Intercept 0.0048*** 0.0009 0.0046*** 0.0009 0.0024*** 0.0004 0.0023*** 0.0005 -0.1032*** 0.0203 -0.1042*** 0.0211 
Impact of covariates             
Yield 0.0143*** 0.0012   0.0128*** 0.0007   0.0867*** 0.0138   
BoJ assets   -0.0258*** 0.0021   -0.0230*** 0.0013   -0.1552*** 0.0252 
Size -0.0034 0.0038 -0.0039 0.0038 0.0070*** 0.0027 0.0066*** 0.0028 0.0598* 0.0307 0.0566* 0.0307 
Capital ratio -0.5839*** 0.1027 -0.5769*** 0.1034 -0.0806** 0.0380 -0.0744** 0.0375     
Asset diversification -0.0562*** 0.0104 -0.0535*** 0.0108 -0.0267*** 0.0052 -0.0243*** 0.0058 -0.0487 0.1275 -0.0313 0.1313 
Liquidity -0.0061 0.0116 0.0134 0.0123 0.0208*** 0.0068 0.0383*** 0.0074 0.1540 0.2300 0.2732 0.2487 
Revenue diversification -0.0011 0.0051 0.0016 0.0054 -0.0059* 0.0031 -0.0035 0.0036 0.0156 0.0509 0.0318 0.0530 
GDP growth 0.0694*** 0.0080 0.0454*** 0.0079 0.0486*** 0.0058 0.0271*** 0.0057 0.0963 0.0913 -0.0484 0.1066 
Market capitalisation -0.0055*** 0.0008 0.0027*** 0.0010 -0.0034*** 0.0006 0.0038*** 0.0006 -0.0120 0.0156 0.0375*** 0.0101 
             
Obs in low regime 1160  1160  1392  1392  3134  3134  
Obs in high regime 2331  2331  2099  2099  357  357  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (10-year Japanese government bond yield and the 
natural logarithm of the Bank of Japan Total assets) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Lerner index. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured 
loans to assets, Z-score , size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid 
assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number 
of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.	
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Table A4. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing 
Nexus (lending rate and Lerner index). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 1.2052% 1.0554% 0.6929% 
95% confidence interval [1.1976% 1.2102%] [0.9847% 1.1212%] [0.6922% 0.7089%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0249*** 0.0024 0.0145*** 0.0015 0.6754*** 0.2843 
High regime 0.0540*** 0.0085 0.0490*** 0.0033 0.0083 0.0498 
Intercept -0.1340*** 0.0378 -0.1575*** 0.0153 3.3572*** 1.3170 
Impact of covariates       
Lerner -0.0054 0.0045 -0.001 0.0015 0.2069*** 0.0306 
Size -0.0045 0.0028 0.0036* 0.0021 -0.0160 0.0357 
Capital ratio -0.6234*** 0.0999 -0.1048*** 0.0425   
Asset diversification -0.0566*** 0.0102 -0.0285*** 0.0058 -0.1910 0.1678 
Liquidity -0.0430*** 0.0109 -0.0125* 0.0067 0.0612 0.2138 
Revenue diversification 0.0178* 0.0091 0.0020 0.0035 -0.2582*** 0.0726 
GDP growth 0.0427*** 0.0078 0.0282*** 0.0043 -0.0771 0.0723 
Market capitalisation -0.0023*** 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0288*** 0.0117 
       
Obs in low regime 2352  1784  179  
Obs in high regime 959  1707  3312  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the 
endogenous variable (Lerner index) as its instrument. The threshold variable is lending rate. BRL ratio: 
bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. 
***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.	 	
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Table A5. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus (10-year Japanese government bond 
yield, Bank of Japan assets, and Lerner index) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BOJ assets BOJ assets BOJ assets 
Threshold estimates 0.709% 1.032% 1.484% 118,437,502 mil JPY 118,437,502 mil JPY 118,437,502 mil JPY 
95% confidence 
interval [0.709% 1.032%] [0.709% 1.032%] [1.484% 1.484%] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[113,693,826  
118,437,502] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0081*** 0.0015 -0.0117*** 0.0009 -0.0072 0.0117 -0.0450*** 0.0083 -0.0339*** 0.0043 -0.0204 0.0943 
High regime 0.0238*** 0.0020 0.0169*** 0.0023 0.4954*** 0.1927 -0.0169*** 0.0014 -0.0097*** 0.0008 0.0245 0.0197 
Intercept -0.0651*** 0.0121 -0.1359*** 0.0131 -2.0014*** 0.8190 0.5089*** 0.1540 0.4399*** 0.0795 0.8089 2.0389 
Impact of covariates             
Lerner -0.0053 0.0047 0.0020 0.0014 0.191*** 0.0512 -0.0054 0.0047 0.0008 0.0015 0.1869*** 0.0503 
Size -0.0107*** 0.0033 -0.0039* 0.0022 -0.0573** 0.0282 -0.0139*** 0.0029 -0.0053*** 0.0020 -0.0523* 0.0269 
Capital ratio -0.5889*** 0.0995 -0.0814* 0.0448   -0.5913*** 0.0949 -0.0817* 0.0437   
Asset diversification -0.0795*** 0.0105 -0.0530*** 0.0054 -0.1529 0.1694 -0.0917*** 0.0105 -0.0623*** 0.0052 -0.1914 0.1622 
Liquidity -0.0291*** 0.0118 -0.0041 0.0071 0.0405 0.2623 -0.0507*** 0.0123 -0.0221*** 0.0072 -0.0286 0.2642 
Revenue diversification -0.0019 0.0110 -0.0205*** 0.0041 -0.4013*** 0.0939 -0.0032 0.0110 -0.0189*** 0.0039 -0.4069*** 0.0902 
GDP growth 0.0694*** 0.0075 0.0653*** 0.0058 -0.0925 0.1230 -0.0156** 0.0072 -0.0218*** 0.0040 -0.1059 0.1288 
Market capitalisation -0.0127*** 0.0014 -0.0108*** 0.0010 0.0766*** 0.0119 0.0054*** 0.0011 0.0051*** 0.0006 0.0369*** 0.0084 
             
Obs in low regime 671  1114  2898  1156  1156  1156  
Obs in high regime 2820  2377  593  2335  2335  2335  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (Lerner index) as its instrument. The 
threshold variable is the 10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of Japan (BOJ) assets. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to 
assets, Z-score , size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid 
assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.	 	 	
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Table A6. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-
Quantitative Easing Nexus (Lerner index and lending rate). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable Lerner Lerner Lerner 
Threshold variable Lending rate Lending rate Lending rate 
Threshold estimates 0.6925% 0.6925% 0.6922% 
95% confidence 
interval [0.6925% 0.6931%] [0.6925% 0.6931%] [0.6922% 0.7028%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.3378*** 0.1323 -0.3415*** 0.1325 -0.3098** 0.1396 
High regime -0.0467* 0.0243 -0.0268 0.0182 -0.0725*** 0.0223 
Intercept -1.4765** 0.6572 -1.5923*** 0.6568 -1.2034* 0.6585 
Impact of covariates       
BRL ratio -0.2179 0.6517     
RSL ratio   -0.9287* 0.5479   
lnZ-score     0.2983*** 0.1172 
Size -0.0209 0.0179 -0.0159 0.0149 -0.0136 0.0178 
Capital ratio 0.5714 0.5851 0.6140* 0.3399   
Asset diversification 0.0786 0.0629 0.0659 0.0447 0.1044* 0.0517 
Liquidity -0.0787 0.0642 -0.0767 0.0546 -0.0290 0.0614 
Revenue diversification 0.1871*** 0.0339 0.1831*** 0.0336 0.1747*** 0.0470 
GDP growth 0.3219*** 0.0667 0.3421*** 0.0619 0.2116*** 0.0663 
Market capitalisation 0.0195*** 0.0046 0.0196*** 0.0038 0.0078 0.0056 
       
Obs in low regime 177  177  176  
Obs in high regime 3314  3314  3315  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis using the first lag of the 
endogenous variable (BRL ratio, RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the 
bank specific lending rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-
score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. 
***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.  
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Table A7. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative Easing Nexus (Lerner index and other proxies for 
Quantitative Easing) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BoJ assets BoJ assets BoJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.330% 1.330% 1.330% 124,746,234 mil JPY 124,746,234 mil JPY 124,746,234 mil JPY 
95% confidence interval [1.33% 1.685%] [1.26% 1.33%] [1.26% 1.33%] 
[118,437,502  
124,746,234] 
[119,777,762  
124,746,234] 
[109,020,450  
144,384,522] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0131** 0.0059 0.0132*** 0.0053 0.0104* 0.0053 -0.0741*** 0.0244 -0.0713*** 0.0246 -0.0560* 0.0288 
High regime 0.0553*** 0.0205 0.0525*** 0.0205 0.0333 0.0234 -0.0207*** 0.0082 -0.0112 0.0082 -0.0079 0.0075 
Intercept -0.1695* 0.0980 -0.1558 0.0974 -0.0866 0.1092 0.9781** 0.4859 1.1064** 0.5179 0.8833 0.5902 
Impact of covariates             
BRL ratio -0.6423 0.4896     -0.6768 0.4967     
RSL ratio   -0.0093* 0.0049     -0.0056 0.0052   
lnZ-score     0.0169 0.0889     0.0326 0.0928 
Size 0.0030 0.0197 -0.0045 0.0192 0.0177 0.0163 0.0033 0.0194 0.0009 0.0187 0.0183 0.0156 
Capital ratio 0.2466 0.4829 0.6435* 0.3352   0.2345 0.4831 0.6488* 0.3331   
Asset diversification 0.0816 0.0697 0.0747 0.0478 0.162*** 0.0600 0.0672 0.0765 0.0898* 0.0525 0.1529*** 0.0600 
Liquidity -0.0935 0.0659 -0.0722 0.0667 -0.0333 0.0828 -0.1229* 0.0730 -0.1027 0.0683 -0.0608 0.0850 
Revenue diversification 0.2953*** 0.0993 0.2857*** 0.1036 0.3168*** 0.0884 0.2904*** 0.0999 0.2896*** 0.1053 0.3112*** 0.0891 
GDP growth 0.3204*** 0.0570 0.3059*** 0.0564 0.2823*** 0.0631 0.3590*** 0.0591 0.3521*** 0.0574 0.3281*** 0.0703 
Market capitalisation 0.0101* 0.0056 0.0178*** 0.0057 0.0166*** 0.0071 0.0171*** 0.0047 0.0185** 0.0083 0.0149* 0.0090 
             
Obs in low regime 1824  1824  1824  1520  1520  1520  
Obs in high regime 1667  1667  1667  1971  1971  1971  
Notes: This Table reports the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (BRL and RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. The threshold variable 
is the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (Yield) and the Bank of Japan total assets (BoJ assets).  BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue 
diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% levels respectively.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Focusing on the Japanese banking sector, this thesis examines bank competition, 
efficiency, and productivity in a relation with problem loans and quantitative easing 
policy. Japan is a unique case due to the notorious nonperforming loan problem, which 
put the banking system at risk in the 1990s-2000s. Besides, hesitant government 
responses magnified the adverse effect of nonperforming loans, threatening overall 
financial stability. During the course of reform, various facilitating measures have been 
recorded. However, Japan is a contradictory story as variability in the impact of these 
government assistance programmes has been recorded. 
Based on a data set of problem loans which, to the best of our knowledge, has not 
been used in Japanese banking research, we are able to incorporate a straightforward 
measure of bank risk in our study. These loans are disaggregated into bankrupt and 
restructured loans, providing informative proxies for different problem loans’ 
characteristics. The methodologies employed are recent, parametric, and modified to 
account for the impact of problem loans. Where appropriate, we also control for 
quantitative easing policy. During our sample period September 2000 – March 2015, this 
monetary easing tool was activated twice, and has been ongoing. It is of interest to observe 
its impact at the microeconomic level, in particular, on bank performance, competition, 
and risk. 
Chapter three investigates the impact of bankrupt and restructured loans on bank 
efficiency. This chapter contributes to the existing literature in bank efficiency through 
the use of a translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function, which takes into account the 
impact of undesirable outputs, introduced by Cuesta et al. (2009). The data set regarding 
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problem loans and problem other earning assets, our two undesirable outputs, has not 
been used in previous studies. We find an average technical efficiency of 61.2% for 
Japanese commercial banks during financial years 2000-2012. Regional Banks II are 
reported to be more efficient than City Banks and Regional Banks I. As expected, problem 
loans impose a statistically significant negative impact on efficiency. Based on the mean 
value of efficiency, there is room for improvement. Banks could expand their desirable 
outputs by 63.4%, whilst simultaneously contracting undesirable outputs and inputs by 
38.8%. We further investigate the effect of bankrupt and restructured loans on bank 
efficiency in the second stage analysis, using fixed effect and two-stage least squares 
models. Among other covariates are bank competition and quantitative easing policy. The 
results denote a positive relationship between risk-monitored loans and efficiency. 
Competition, indicated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the Boone indicator, 
affects efficiency under the competition-efficiency hypothesis. In details, heightened 
competition would stimulate banks to minimise costs and maximise outputs (Andrieş and 
Căpraru, 2014; Schaeck and Cihák, 2008). More aggressive quantitative easing policy 
appears to undermine efficiency. The analysis proceeds with the panel VAR estimation 
for an equation system of four variables, namely technical efficiency, net interest margin, 
quantitative easing, and risk-monitored loans. The aim is to explore the causality 
relationship between the variables of interest, taking into account the potential 
endogeneity issue. We find a positive response of technical efficiency to a shock in 
bankrupt loans, in line with the “moral hazard” and “skimping” hypotheses, with the 
causality originating from bankrupt loans to efficiency. Differently, the relationship 
between restructured loans and efficiency gives support to the “bad luck” hypothesis. 
Shocks in quantitative easing policy result in a reduction in technical efficiency in the 
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short-run, but with a small magnitude. The shocks in net interest margin does not 
significantly explain the variation in efficiency.  
This chapter provides a reference point for the potential expansion of good outputs 
and shrinkage of bad outputs and inputs. Alongside reducing problem loans, to improve 
efficiency, Japanese banks could also diversify their loan and investment portfolios to 
achieve the optimal desirable output mix. Investing in technology innovation would also 
be among strategic policies as banks could expand their market share, consequently 
raising good outputs. It is worth noting that caution is needed as there is a potential of 
high risk-taking associated with best performing banks. High efficiency may be realised 
in the short-run due to bank managers skipping some management practices, thus 
resulting in less input usage. Our analysis brings to the attention of regulators and 
supervisors the signals of financial instability. Best and worst performing banks could be 
a latent threat to the system. While highly efficient banks may be attempting more risk, 
weak performers may be dealing with a rise in external uncertainties. Regulations 
regarding the level of risk-taking in commercial banks as well as their loan issuance 
process would help lessen bank default risk. Effective and timely government response 
to negative externalities could also maintain financial stability and improve bank 
performance.  
Chapter four measures the effect of bankrupt and restructured loans on bank 
productivity and investigates the banking integration process in terms of productivity 
growth. We use the parametric cost function to compute and decompose total factor 
productivity growth into the effects of undesirable outputs, quasi-fixed input, the scale 
effect, and technological change. Undesirable outputs are characterised by bankrupt and 
restructured loans, while equity is a quasi-fixed input proxy. For financial years 2000-
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2014, average productivity growth is reported at 1.52% semi-annually. The trend of 
productivity growth over time appears to follow the timeline of government intervention 
and unexpected events such as the global financial crisis and the Tohoku earthquake. 
Indeed, during the restructuring period (2001-2003) and the US subprime crisis 2007-
2008, Japanese banks experienced a fall in their productivity growth due to a drop in the 
scale effect and the negative impact of risk-monitored loans. We find a detrimental impact 
of bankrupt loans on total factor productivity growth on average. Restructured loans, in 
contrast, appear beneficial in the sense of reducing costs as a result of legislation changes. 
Equity also contributed to productivity growth, although with a small magnitude. Overall, 
a significant component of productivity growth was attributed to technical progress, apart 
from the scale effect. 
It is of interest to observe whether there exists a banking integration process in Japan 
as after all, the banking sector has recovered from the asset bubble burst. To the best of 
our knowledge, this chapter is the first application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) 
convergence test on bank-level productivity growth. We also test for the convergence in 
productivity growth between and within geographic regions in Japan. The results show a 
lack of convergence in TFP growth of Japanese banking, as well as in the components of 
TFP growth at the whole panel level. This might not come as a surprise as the Japanese 
banking industry underwent several acute phases of financial crises, coupled at times with 
natural disasters. On the other hand, over the examined period of 15 years, there were 
several policy interventions attempting to support the banking industry. For instance, in 
2008, the Bank of Japan proposed that Regional Banks would be responsible for 
channelling credits to SMEs. Furthermore, virtually zero interest rate policy remains an 
important monetary policy tool, which has been enforced for a long period (March 2001-
March 2006 and since October 2012). During the course of reform, some policies were 
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not planned efficiently as banks rescued by public capital carried on funding unprofitable 
firms. However, there exists evidence showing that some legislation changes have been 
effective, indicated by the cost-reducing impact of restructured loans. 
The presented results have important policy implications. Productivity growth of the 
banking system would be a significant contributor to economic growth which has not 
been going as planned. In light of the quantitative and qualitative easing policy, bank 
lending is expected to rise following credit expansion to households and businesses. If 
bank total factor productivity growth were positive and increasing, it could be a sign for 
the effectiveness of this unconventional monetary policy. As there is evidence for a 
divergence in bank productivity growth in some regions, policymakers could take into 
account the differences between regions to apply appropriate policies. Additionally, 
enhanced supervision would be encouraged so that the escalating quantitative easing 
would not lead to excessive risk-taking. 
The research topics in the fifth chapter relate to bank competition, risk and 
quantitative easing in Japan. Like in the other two main chapters, bankrupt and 
restructured loans are also at the centre of this study. They are the proxies for risk in the 
analysis for the relationship between the variables of interest. Given the extensive 
quantitative easing in Japan to stimulate growth, we revisit the linkage between 
competition and risk within this context. The hypotheses tested are competition-stability, 
competition-fragility, and quantitative easing-risk. To measure competition, we apply a 
local regression technique to obtain bank-level Boone indicator. The Boone indicator 
takes into account different forces which can cause an increase in competition, for 
example, an increase in the number of banks in the market, the lift in entry barriers, and 
more aggressive interaction between banks. For the main analysis, we apply the dynamic 
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panel threshold model and panel Vector Autoregression approach to take into account the 
potential endogeneity. An objective is to obtain a threshold of bank competition which 
could identify the relationship between competition and risk in different regimes. 
Similarly, the model yields threshold values of quantitative easing which may signify 
different effects of quantitative easing on risk in different regimes. The main findings 
reveal that quantitative easing and competition reduce bankrupt and restructured loan 
ratios, but also bank stability. Regarding the causality, the results suggest that quantitative 
easing initiates its causal relationship with risk and competition. Between competition 
and risk, the former triggers its relationship with the latter. 
The proposed threshold values for lending rates and the Boone indicator may be 
useful for bank managers to construct their risk management policy. Policymakers could 
also encourage the mutual assistance prevailing under the keiretsu network. However, the 
possibility of banks exerting their monopoly power by imposing higher lending rates 
could not be ruled out. As our findings are in favour of competition, relationship banking 
under keiretsu should be closely monitored. Policy recommendations include those which 
encourage competition, such as deregulation and technological advances. 
Notwithstanding, in an environment of low interest rates and quantitative easing, proper 
credit screening and lending standard compliance should remain one of the important 
supervisory issues. 
In terms of the generalisability of our findings, it is worth mentioning their 
applicability in the Eurozone institutional setting. Although the structures of the banking 
systems in the Eurozone and Japan are different, there are some insightful implications to 
be drawn from our results, especially as the European Central Bank also implements 
quantitative easing policy, and European banks also suffered from the global financial 
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crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. We have learned from the Japanese case that 
nonperforming loans are detrimental to bank performance, and that encouraging 
competition could reduce the nonperforming loan ratio. Besides, quantitative easing is 
useful to the extent of lessening credit risk. For countries with nonperforming loans (e.g. 
Cyprus, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Italy, Ireland), the national central banks should be 
the initiators to propose restructuring. They are the experts who have specific, detailed 
and privileged knowledge about the current financial situation of the banking systems, 
hence would be able to develop appropriate regulations or structural changes to regain or 
safeguard financial stability. As indicated in the European Banking Authority report on 
nonperforming loans (2016), policy options to ease the nonperforming loan issue are 
under consideration. Among them are: i) the call to enhance the quality, accuracy, and 
completeness of data (e.g. asset quality, the state of nonperforming loans, or collateral 
valuation); ii) improvements in the judicial system (e.g. timeliness of the procedure, 
accounting and tax regimes); and iii) a functioning secondary market facilitating the 
disposal of nonperforming loans.59 Based on our research of Japan, the first area would 
be the key factor in addressing the problem, as policy makers would then be able to 
anticipate and identify the areas of risk to respond timely. This in turn strengthens the 
coordination between national regulators and the European Central Bank in the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. The ongoing quantitative easing (extended until the end of 
2017) and emergency liquidity assistance from the European Central Bank could also be 
effective. However, caution is needed to prevent unwanted moral hazard problem and 
anticompetitive behaviour.  
 
																																																						
59 EBA report on the dynamics and drivers of non-performing exposures in the EU banking sector 
(22/7/2016), available from: https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-provides-updates-on-npls-in-eu-banking-
sector. 
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Limitations and directions for future research 
This thesis applies the parametric approach to measure efficiency and productivity 
growth. In more detail, in chapter 3, we use a stochastic frontier approach to compute 
efficiency scores. This approach has been widely employed for European banking 
industries where the banking structure is different from the Japanese case (except 
Germany). When frontier analyses are applied to the Japanese framework, the existence 
of the keiretsu and relationship banking may result in heterogeneous production 
technologies. However, this issue is of less significance in our study as only commercial 
banks are included in our sample. Note although that Japanese banks studied herein vary 
in terms of size, business structure, and geographical constraints, they also share some 
common characteristics. For example, City Banks also offer relationship banking to their 
clients as in the case of Regional Banks. Nevertheless, this issue should be taken into 
consideration, especially when the whole banking system is examined. One potential 
solution is to investigate and compare bank efficiency within subsamples. Another 
method could be running different frontiers for subsamples simultaneously so as to 
achieve comparable results for the entire sample.  
Moreover, another limitation of the parametric approach is that assumptions needed 
for the specification of the underlying function and the distribution of inefficiency. The 
methodology used in chapter four to compute total factor productivity growth is also 
parametric, thus inheriting this limitation. In this regard, the nonparametric approach has 
some appealing features, i.e. no such assumptions needed. Hence, it would be of interest 
for other studies on Japanese banking to apply a nonparametric methodology to compute 
efficiency and productivity with an incorporation of problem loans. Besides, to estimate 
productivity growth, we run the parametric cost function using the fixed effect regression 
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rather than the frontier analysis. This enables us to overcome the aforementioned issue of 
frontier approaches. However, it may be criticised for not taking into account the impact 
of efficiency change in productivity growth. The use of stochastic frontier approaches can 
generate the efficiency change component. In that case, the decomposition of total factor 
productivity growth will have to be modified, as it will not explicitly show the impact of 
bankrupt and restructured loans. Nonperforming loans are among the key factors to be 
accounted for when one studies the performance of Japanese banks. We argue that, as 
they are the focus of our research in Japan, we construct the model to account directly for 
their effect and estimate a system of equations to yield quantitative results for their 
impact. Future research could estimate productivity growth using approaches that contain 
the efficiency change component and compare the overall total factor productivity growth 
obtained from different methods.  
With regard to the panel VAR analysis used in chapters three and five, I opt to include 
additional variables in the system. For example, on the basis of quantitative easing in 
Japan, inflation and output could also be of interest as they are among the target variables 
of the implementation of quantitative easing. However, adding too many variables creates 
complications, especially if extra lag orders are also considered. Therefore, the choice of 
the number of variables of interest in a panel VAR framework should be carefully 
considered to allow for high degrees of freedom.  
Beside the techniques used, the sample period is different in chapter three and the 
rest due to updated data made available at the later stage of this PhD study. We also sought 
to quote policy announcements, banking regulations, and the Bank of Japan’s support 
measures. However, some of the policy documents are available in Japanese only. 
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Therefore, a few citations are taken from speeches and conference papers because of 
language barriers. 
In light of the ongoing Abenomics and negative interest rate policy enacted in January 
2016 for the first time in Japan’s history, Japan would warrant a very interesting platform 
for future research. Arguably, prolonged negative interest rates may do more harm than 
good. Now that depositors are charged for keeping their money at the bank, they may 
hoard cash or buy gold instead. The problem with the economic slump in Japan is not that 
banks are not willing to lend, but perhaps the lack of borrowers as the public probably do 
not perceive that investment opportunities exist. If the negative interest rate could drive 
economic recovery, it would open up a new era for monetary policy. At the 
microeconomic level, future research could observe bank productivity gain to investigate 
the efficacy of this central banking policy. The ongoing quantitative and qualitative easing 
program, together with negative interest rates, would provide a great research laboratory. 
Other central banks could obtain some practical lessons from the Japanese experience. It 
could also be of great potential for studies which aim to compare the impact of 
unconventional monetary policy in Japan and the US, UK, and Europe. How these 
policies apply in different institutional settings would be intriguing.  
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